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I. INTRODUCTION
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,1 a public hospital engaged in warrantless,
suspicionless urine testing of selected poor, pregnant women for signs of co-
caine use. A woman who tested positive was warned that she would face
criminal prosecution if she did not enter substance abuse treatment. Moreover,
even if she did enter a treatment program, she would be referred for criminal
prosecution if she tested positive a second time or missed an appointment with
a drug abuse counselor. The program had been jointly designed by the Hospi-
tal, that is, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), and by the local
police. Ten women arrested under the policy brought a civil suit against the
Hospital and others.
The United States Supreme Court held that, absent patient consent, this
testing program violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The Hospital had argued that the urine testing was done for a beneficent
civil administrative purpose: to get cocaine-addicted pregnant moms off of
drugs. Such administrative searches are often permitted absent a warrant or in-
dividualized suspicion.2 The Court conceded that the drug abuse treatment
purpose was indeed therapeutic, but concluded that the state’s primary “pro-
grammatic” purpose was criminal law enforcement, thus presumptively re-
quiring probable cause and a warrant.3 Rather than simply striking down the
program, however, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to deter-
mine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
the women had consented to the urine testing.4 Although the Court therefore
purported not to resolve the consent question, the Court offered the lower
courts guidance on how they should go about resolving the consent issue. That
guidance, stated in a single brief paragraph of the Court’s opinion, had radical
implications, or so this article will argue.
There was no question that the women had signed two general hospital
consent forms before being tested.5 But none of those forms or other media spe-
cifically informed the patients that they would be tested for cocaine for the spe-
1. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
2. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 349-
51 (1997) (defining “administrative searches” as those done for purposes other than criminal prose-
cution and explaining the significance of the high Court’s so labeling a search).
3. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-82.
4. As of this writing, the courts on remand of the consent issue had received briefs and heard
oral argument but not yet rendered a final decision. See, e.g., Appellants’ Supplemental Reply Brief,
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2512) (on remand from the
United States Supreme Court).
5. See Respondents’ Brief at 38-41, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-
936).
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cific purpose of turning the results over to the police for criminal prosecution
absent prompt and successful treatment.6 The women were, however, not
physically coerced into signing the forms, nor were any pre-signature threats
made to get them to do so.7
Under prior case law defining consent under the Fourth Amendment, sim-
ple “voluntariness”—the absence of coercion—was all that was required.8
Without altering this general definition, however, the Court applied a new con-
sent definition specific to this case, leaving open the possibility of applying this
new definition to selected other cases as well.9 This new definition required, in
addition to voluntariness, that consent to search be “knowingly and intelligently
made.”10 In other words, the patients must understand more precisely what it
was they were consenting to and what were its consequences.11 Moreover, the
Court cited as support for this conclusion Miranda v Arizona,12 a Fifth Amend-
ment case embracing a more vibrant notion of consent, a notion that the Court
had earlier rejected as too limiting for the state in the Fourth Amendment con-
text.13
In this article, I will argue that the Court’s rationale is best understood as
reflecting various insights from feminist theory. Specifically, the Court saw the
definition of consent as turning on context rather than on a universal notion
identical under all circumstances. Critical aspects of that context were the na-
ture of the human relationships involved—primarily the doctor-patient and
mother-child relationships—as well as the complexity of human emotion, the
power inequalities between the parties, and the social meanings of their ac-
tions.14 The Court at least implicitly gave patient and parental autonomy great
weight, and was offended by paternalistic notions that a more powerful social
actor, here, the Hospital, knows what is best for, and therefore can take advan-
tage of, the less powerful social actors, the patients. By asking the “woman
question”—that is, taking into account the experiences and values of women—
6. See id. at 39 (arguing, on MUSC’s behalf, that “[t]here is no precedent in this Court’s Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence which imposes any . . . requirement that the searching
agency inform the consenting party that the results of the search will be turned over to law enforce-
ment.”).
7. See generally Petitioners’ Brief, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936)
(making no such claim in its summary of the facts, even though they were of course recited in a
fashion most favorable to the cause of the pregnant women).
8. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 381-92 (summarizing consent to search doctrine case
law).
9. See infra Parts II – III (explaining the ways in which the Ferguson Court’s definition of con-
sent was “new,” that is, seemingly a departure from prior case law).
10. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 (concluding that hospital employees who obtain evidence from
their patients of the latter’s criminal conduct “for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients”
have “a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed of their constitutional
rights, as standards of knowing waiver require. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).”).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 84-114.
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 660-63 (explaining that a waiver of Miranda rights of
silence or counsel must be made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently”); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 62-70 (Miranda-like test originally rejected by the Court in the Fourth Amendment con-
text).
14. See infra Part III.
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by engaging in practical reasoning that is more sensitive to situation and context
than is usually true in the law; and by exploring social meanings as ways for ex-
acerbating and exploiting power inequalities, the Court acted consistently with
the best of feminist legal method.15
Indeed, Justice Scalia, without using the word “feminist,” seemed to realize
this in his dissent and was horrified. He therefore placed consent at the center
of his own opinion.16
The Court’s other holding, that the urine testing involved a criminal-
investigation-related, rather than an administrative, purpose, is also illuminated
by feminist theory. The Court declared that the beneficent, subjective intentions
of the state actors are irrelevant. What mattered was that the state’s “program-
matic purpose” was aimed at investigating crime.17 Yet what does “program-
matic purpose” mean if it does not include subjective intentions? The Court did
not say. Instead, the Court emphasized the deep involvement of the police in
creating and monitoring the testing program and the use of the threat of crimi-
nal prosecution to attain the end of public safety.18 But the latter circumstance is
likely present in all admittedly criminal investigatory searches,19 yet it is hard to
see what the former (degree of police involvement) has to do with “purpose.”
Police are the enforcers in other areas, such as drunk driving roadblocks, that
the court treats as administrative in nature.20 Police involvement alone is there-
fore not the key. This murky state of affairs can be clarified if “programmatic
purposes” are those most plausibly attributed to the state actors by their audience,
that is, by the rest of society. Such attributions turn on the common social
meaning of particular conduct in our political culture.21 Some feminists have
long understood how the social meanings of action create our social world.
Hostile environment sexual harassment, for example, such as posting photo-
graphs of nude women about a male-dominated workplace, is fairly perceived
by women as marking them as inferior to men, women being more about body
15. On the distinguishing characteristics of feminist method, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
16. See infra Part III.F (analyzing Scalia’s dissent).
17. See infra, text accompanying notes 218-28 (analyzing of the Court’s idea of “programmatic
purposes” in detail).
18. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-86 (“Moreover, throughout the development and application of
the policy, the Charleston prosecutors and police were extensively involved in the day-to-day ad-
ministration of the policy.” Id. at 82. The policy further crossed the line onto the boundaries of or-
dinary criminal searches by undertaking to test patients for the specific and immediate purpose of
incriminating them.).
19. Cf. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“By very defini-
tion, in almost every case the immediate purpose of a search policy will be to obtain evidence,” the
threat of evidence discovery partly being designed to deter criminal conduct.). Justice Kennedy
does, however, find the extensive involvement of law enforcement in the design of the policy, com-
bined with the explicit threat of arrest to implement the policy’s purportedly civil objectives, as
demonstrating a criminal-investigation, rather than administrative, programmatic purpose. See id. at
86-88. His disagreement with the majority turned on other grounds, discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 237-51.
20. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 368-70 (drunk driving roadblocks as administrative sei-
zures, despite Court’s occasional rhetoric to the contrary).
21. See infra Part IV (summarizing feminist social meaning theory and its application to the
Ferguson case).
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than mind, more about play than work.22 Similarly, to label someone a “criminal
suspect” in our society is to mark them as outsiders who need to be “brought
down a peg,” thereby teaching them respect for others and for society’s moral
and legal code.23
In Ferguson, the underlying conduct was drug abuse, and that is far more
stigmatizing, more of a “true crime,” in our culture than is drunk driving.24
Even worse, however, there were implicit or explicit charges of child abuse.25
For the Ferguson plaintiffs to use illegal drugs to harm their own future children
violated powerful social understandings about the almost sacred nature of
motherhood.26 Furthermore, the plaintiffs were both black and poor, implicating
cultural images of such women’s being by nature bad mothers, inherent crimi-
nals who, by their misconduct, foist the costs of childcare and further future
crime on the rest of us, the “responsible hardworking” mass of society.27 Finally,
the police did not simply implement the program in Ferguson but in fact helped
to create it, including guiding hospital employees to care for evidence in a way
that would maximize its chances of trial admissibility.28 This combination of
22. See generally MARGARET A. CROUCH, THINKING ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A GUIDE FOR
THE PERPLEXED 141-74 (2001) (summarizing various feminist theories justifying legal prohibitions
against hostile environment sexual harassment, of which the “dominance” theories are most in tune
with what I have labeled “social meaning”). The term “social meaning” is mine, but I think that it
accurately captures the focus of many feminists on the sometimes subconscious social meanings at-
tributed to human conduct as instantiating gendered oppression. For a recent synthesis of ideas in
this area, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001). I make no claim that feminists are the only thinkers to em-
brace social meaning approaches, but only that they have been among the most consistent and per-
suasive of such theorists. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. U.
L. REV. 171, 177-78 (1999) [hereinafter What Feminism] (elaborating on a similar point but in the con-
text of evidentiary theory). Furthermore, they more often emphasize social meanings associated
with gender, one of the two foci (consent definition being the other) of this article. Outstanding
work in social meaning is being done by others, including former neo-conservative commentators,
but focusing on other sources of discrimination, such as racial bias. See generally GLENN C. LOURY,
THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002) (identifying subconscious racial stereotyping and racial
stigma as the source of much modern racial discrimination and disparity).
23. For a synthesis of much more traditional work, outside the feminist rubric, on the commu-
nicative functions of criminal punishment, see Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society:
Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 305 (2001) [hereinafter Civil Soci-
ety]. For a concise summary and critique of feminist social meaning theories concerning the political
function of pornography as illustrative of the social meaning approach, see CAROL SMART, FEMINISM
AND THE POWER OF LAW 114-37 (1989).
24. See Part V.B.1-2.
25. The Policy in Ferguson provided for charging a patient who was 27 or fewer weeks pregnant
with simple possession; 28 or more weeks with possession and distribution to a minor (the fetus);
and one testing positive at the time of delivery with neglect of a child. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72-73; see
also Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (holding
that the ingestion of cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy constitutes criminal child ne-
glect under South Carolina law).
26. See Part V.B.4 (discussing motherhood’s meaning in modern American culture).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 600-04 (discussing how race and class complicate allega-
tions of “unmotherly” conduct).
28. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71-72 (“[The Policy] stated that a chain of custody should be fol-
lowed when obtaining and testing urine samples, presumably to make sure that the results could be
used in subsequent criminal proceedings.”).
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forces—the grave nature of the crime of drug abuse, the criminal violation of
motherhood norms, class and racial fears of inherent criminality, and the un-
usual extent of police involvement in the program’s creation and implementa-
tion—carried a clear social meaning: a stigma akin to that carried by allegations
of the worst sort of crimes. Feminist social meaning theory thus helps both to
explain and to critique the Court’s often unconvincing and contradictory efforts
to distinguish “administrative” from “criminal-investigation-related” purposes.
My use of the term “feminism” is not meant to simplify the term’s complex
and multiple meanings.29 I define “feminism” as any way of looking at the
world that draws on women’s historical and current life experience as a source
for learning and growing.30 Men can, therefore, be “feminist.”31 There are many
different schools of feminist thought, and I neither defend nor eschew any par-
ticular such school here.32 Rather, I draw eclectically on feminist writings about
consent and social meaning. I can do so because my purpose is simply to dem-
onstrate that Ferguson’s significance is best clarified by recognizing its implicit
embrace of precisely those aspects of feminist theory identified here. The Court
did not seek ideological consistency or purity. Moreover, conflicts among the
various schools of thought are often exaggerated.33 Thus, the purported dichot-
omy between those feminist scholars who celebrate female “difference” from
men and those who stress male power and unequal resource access is often a
flawed one.34 As I have explained elsewhere, perceptions of women’s modest
power, dependency, and over-reactive emotions may be what accounts for
many of the differences in both women’s behavior and men’s perceptions of that
behavior.35 Therefore, both “difference” and “dominance” feminism are right.
29. See, e.g., What Feminism, supra note 22, at 175-77 (concisely summarizing the different ana-
lytical approaches of “cultural,” “radical,” and “liberal” feminists); see generally FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (anthology collecting excerpts of articles
authored by leading feminist scholars taking very different approaches to the subject); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 239-323 (1999) (examining the
ways in which queer theory offers its own unique perspective on the insights of feminism).
30. Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 8-9 (1998) [hereinafter Feminist Approach] (“By ‘feminism’ I mean any theory that
draws on the lives of women or seeks to emancipate them from oppressive social constraints im-
posed by gendered roles, rules, and expectations.”).
31. See generally WHO CAN SPEAK? AUTHORITY AND CRITICAL IDENTITY (Joan Roof & Robyn
Wiegman eds., 1995) (collecting essays debating when, if ever, members of one group can speak for
another). I note that I do not purport to speak for anyone but myself, though I do hope to have
learned from the insights of female feminists sufficiently to add my voice to the conversation that
they have begun.
32. See infra sources cited notes 279-302, 463-500 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 67-69 (1999)
[hereinafter RAPE AND CULTURE] (explaining why “essentialist” and “social constructivist” ap-
proaches to feminist linguistics are complementary rather than dichotomous); Feminist Approach, su-
pra note 30, at 8-10 (defending a “pragmatic postmodern feminism” that fuses the best of the insights
of modernist and postmodernist feminist thinking).
34. See What Feminism, supra note 22, at 175-76 (explaining how traditional distinctions among
difference, power, and liberal feminist theories often blur or are irrelevant to much modern feminist
jurisprudence).
35. See RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 33, at 69-80 (describing mechanisms by which gendered
stereotypes affect both women’s linguistic behavior and the credibility accorded their speech by
their audiences, including juries as rape trial audiences).
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Before wading into the depths of the Court’s Ferguson decision, however, a
recitation of some more detailed relevant facts in the case is necessary.
II. FERGUSON’S FACTUAL BASIS: “HELPING” ADDICTED MOMS
In April 1988, MUSC, the Medical University of South Carolina, a public
hospital, began ordering drug screening of maternity patients suspected of us-
ing cocaine.36 A patient testing positive was referred by MUSC staff to the
county substance abuse commission for counseling and treatment. Despite
these referrals, the incidence of prior cocaine use did not decline.
Four months later, Nurse Shirley Brown, the case manager for the MUSC
obstetrics department, learned that the Charleston solicitor had begun to prose-
cute pregnant drug users who tested positive at their child’s birth. Nurse Brown
promptly contacted the Hospital’s general counsel, who in turn sent a letter to
the County Solicitor inquiring about “what, if any,. . .[the] Medical Center needs
to do to assist you in this matter” of prosecuting drug-addicted new mothers?37
The Solicitor responded by organizing initial meetings resulting in a task force
consisting of representatives of MUSC, the police, the County Substance Abuse
Commission, and the Department of Social Services. That task force eventually
adopted a Search Policy dealing with the Management of Drug Abuse During
Pregnancy. The Policy originated in internal memoranda by law enforcement
agencies.38 The Policy was implemented at only one Charleston hospital—
MUSC, which served a large number of African-American, economically
disadvantaged clients.39 The Policy also applied only to cocaine use and not to
36. My summary of the facts here is largely drawn from the high Court’s Ferguson opinion, 532
U.S. at 69-76. I add pinpoint cites only where my summary also builds on another source, such as
the briefs of the parties and amici in the case, or where I quote directly from the Court’s opinion.
37. Id. at 71 n.3 (quoting the MUSC General Counsel’s letter to the County Solicitor).
38. Petitioners’ Brief at 2-4, Ferguson (No. 99-936). The County Solicitor organized the initial
policy-planning meetings, chose the participants, issued the invitations, and described his plan to
prosecute pregnant women using cocaine. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69-71. He ultimately formed a
task force consisting of representatives of the police, MUSC, the County Substance Abuse Commis-
sion, and the Department of Social Services. Id. at 71-72. The task force’s deliberations led to the
Hospital’s adoption of Policy M-7.
39. See Petitioners’ Brief at 21, Ferguson (No. 99-936). The Policy was only applied at MUSC, the
“one hospital in Charleston whose patient population was predominantly African-American.” Id.
The Ferguson patient petitioners were nine African-American women and one white woman. Id. at 1.
The jury found in favor of MUSC and the other respondents on a statutory racial discrimination
claim, finding insufficient evidence of intentional racial discrimination, with the District Court ruling
again in MUSC’s favor in finding that disparate racial impact did not establish the statutory claim
for race discrimination. See Respondents’ Brief at 11, Ferguson (No. 99-936). That portion of the ver-
dict and that ruling were not appealed. Id. However, amici argued that disparate racial impact was
relevant to the “reasonableness” of the search, an issue that was appealed, an argument not ad-
dressed in the Supreme Court’s opinion. See Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and
Brief of the NARAL Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23 n.16, Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) [hereinafter NARAL Brief]. Because I here ad-
dress only the consent search doctrine and the administrative/criminal search purpose distinction,
and because the Court found the search in Ferguson to be an ordinary criminal one, I do not in this
article attempt to engage in the flexible and detailed reasonableness balancing of state and individ-
ual interests that an administrative search finding would require. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2,
at 349-51 (describing reasonableness methodology for administrative searches).
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other illegal drugs.40
Under the Policy, hospital staff had discretion to identify selected maternity
patients for cocaine screening based on the presence of at least one of nine crite-
ria.41 The Policy also provided detailed guidance on how to maintain a proper
chain of custody in conducting the tests.42 Under the initial version of the policy,
women testing positive during or just after labor triggered immediate notifica-
tion of that fact to the police by the hospital and the patient’s prompt subsequent
arrest.43 Some women were in fact arrested while still in pain and bleeding from
childbirth.44 However, women testing positive during pregnancy, but well be-
fore labor’s onset, were not reported to the police for arrest unless the women
tested positive for cocaine a second time or failed to keep an appointment with a
substance abuse counselor.45
In 1990, the policy was altered at the Solicitor’s request to treat all positive
testers alike so that even women first testing positive during or after childbirth
were given an opportunity to avoid arrest by participating in drug treatment.
The Policy also contained forms for the patient to sign and procedures for the
police to follow upon a patient’s arrest. Those procedures included a scale of
charges, more serious ones to be lodged the later the stage of the pregnancy, and
encouraged police to interrogate the arrestee to discover the source of the drugs.
But other than providing for substance abuse counseling, the Policy made no
mention of any change in prenatal care for the mother or special medical treat-
ment for the newborn.46
Maternity patients signed general hospital consent forms. Those forms in-
cluded consent to necessary testing, including urine testing, conducted for the
purpose of medical treatment.47 But that form did not contain an express con-
sent declaring that positive test results could be revealed to the police for the
purposes of criminal prosecution.48 Moreover, each patient was shown a Patient
Handbook stating that “medical records and all communication pertaining to
40. See Petitioners’ Brief at 11, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (“Respondents also designed the Policy to
focus on cocaine to the exclusion of other illegal drugs or legal drugs that could harm the fetus.”).
41. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71 n.4. Those criteria included lack of, or incomplete or late, prenatal
care; intrauterine fetal death; preterm labor without an obvious cause; intrauterine growth retarda-
tion; previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and unexplained congenital abnormalities. See id.
The patients’ sympathizers argued that several of these criteria were “thinly veiled proxies for low
socioeconomic status or race.” For example, poor women often have inadequate access to prenatal
care and, thus, are singled out for urine-testing for cocaine use because they are poor. See NARAL
Brief at 23-24, Ferguson, (No. 99-936). Only one or more of the nine criteria had to be met to subject a
patient to testing. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Petitioners’ Brief at 8, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
45. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71.
46. Id.
47. Respondents’ Brief at 9, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (summarizing consent procedures).
48. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13-17 nn.19-22, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001) (No. 99-936) (describing alleged consent procedures in greater detail and concluding that
“none of the evidence proffered by Respondents to establish consent . . . told the patients that the
hospital would turn their medical records over to law enforcement agents if they revealed evidence
of drug use.”).
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your care are also treated as confidential.”49 However, all maternity patients re-
ceived educational information about the harmful effects of prenatal drug abuse,
and each patient also signed a statement acknowledging that she had received
counseling.50 And a public service announcement was made about the new
testing program shortly after the Policy’s adoption, but this announcement also
did not mention that medical records concerning positive test results would be
turned over to the police, though the announcement did declare that sticking
with the treatment program would protect them from arrest.51 If a patient tested
positive, only then was she provided with a letter from the Solicitor’s Office
warning her that she was required to attend substance abuse and prenatal ap-
pointments.52 Patients’ testing positive were also tracked as part of the Sus-
pected Child Abuse and Neglect or “SCAN” meetings at which Solicitors’ office,
police, hospital, and Department of Social Services’ personnel discussed sus-
pected child abuse.53
Although the Policy on its face applied to all hospital maternity patients, it
was enforced only at the high-risk clinic in the obstetrics/gynecology depart-
ment and not in the family practice department or other hospital clinics.54 Of the
thirty women ultimately arrested under the Policy, twenty-nine were African-
American.55 Furthermore, Nurse Brown, who was critical to the Policy’s creation
and later everyday implementation, admitted that she viewed interracial rela-
tionships as “against God’s way” and noted in the charts of pregnant white
women if their partners were black.56 Nurse Brown also raised the option of
sterilization for black women testing positive for cocaine, but not for white
women.57
49. Id. at 14 n.17.
50. Respondents’ Brief at 9, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
51. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.22, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
52. Id. at 16 n.20. Four of the patients were never shown the Solicitor’s Letter. Id. The Policy
itself, however, expressly provided for using the threat of criminal law enforcement to give MUSC
“leverage” in obtaining patient compliance with drug treatment. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71. After a
positive drug test, patients also received a “To Our Patients” letter stating that MUSC will “take ac-
tion” and “ask for help” if patients continue using drugs or halt treatment but again did not disclose
that confidential medical information would be revealed to the police. Reply Brief for Petitioners at
16 n.21, Ferguson (No. 99-936). When arrests were made, the Solicitor often used a “carrot and stick”
approach, following arrest by diversion into mandatory drug treatment. See id. at 5-6. Respondents
noted in their brief that 253 patients tested positive, 30 of these failed initially to complete treatment,
28 of them arrested but handled through pretrial intervention, and only two (neither of whom was a
Petitioner) being prosecuted upon continued failure to comply with treatment. Respondents’ Brief
at 10, Ferguson (No. 99-936). Even these last two women, Respondents note, were ordered to com-
plete treatment as a condition of probation rather than being sentenced to a jail term. Id. At least
one patient, according to Petitioners, however, was “deliberately deceived and misled,” with MUSC
telling her that her “urine was being tested to determine if she was dehydrated.” See Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 16, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
53. Petitioners’ Brief at 15 n.11, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
54. See id. at 12.
55. See id. at 13. Sixty-eight percent of the women testing positive for any drug were African-
American, but ninety percent of those testing positive specifically for the only drug to which the
Policy applied—cocaine—were African-American, thus alone establishing, in the Petitioners’ view, a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. See id. at 12-13.
56. See id. at 13 n.10.
57. Id.
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Ten of the women arrested pursuant to the Policy filed suit against the City
of Charleston, law enforcement officials, MUSC representatives and others in-
volved in the creation or implementation of the Policy.58 Although there were
several theories of liability advanced, the primary one was that the urine tests
were non-consensual, warrantless, suspicionless searches contravening the
Fourth Amendment.59 The district court as a matter of law rejected the defense
that the tests were reasonable administrative searches. However, the district
court instructed the jury to enter a verdict for the defendants if the jury believed
that the plaintiffs had consented to the tests, and the jury did indeed find in fa-
vor of the defendants.60
Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support
the jury’s finding of consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed on the ground that the tests were reasonable administrative or
“special needs” searches divorced from the intent to aid criminal law enforce-
ment. Thus, the Fourth Circuit never reached the issue of consent.61
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the “special
needs” issue. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit on that issue and remanded
for a determination on the consent issue. Nevertheless, the Court and Justice
Scalia in dissent had much to say bout the legal standard for determining con-
sent. Understanding the significance of the Court’s view on the special needs
and consent issues requires understanding some of the earlier case law on these
questions. The next section of this article begins that task by starting with the
meaning of “consent.”
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S OPINION
A. Schneckloth Voluntariness as Consent
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,62 the United States Supreme Court expressly
rejected the idea that constitutionally valid consensual searches require a waiver
of Fourth Amendment rights. Waivers of constitutional rights must be “know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary,” that is, based on an awareness of the rights be-
ing relinquished and of their significance, yet nevertheless freely foregoing their
protection.63 Because consensual searches are justified on policy grounds rather
than grounds of waiver, therefore, the Court required that consensual searches
merely be voluntary. The Court offered two reasons for equating voluntariness
with consent. First, the Court had required strict waiver standards only for trial
and pre-trial rights necessary to ensuring the fairness of the trial itself. Yet
Fourth Amendment rights are, according to the Court, “of a wholly different or-
der, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of
58. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 73-74.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 73-74 n.6.
61. See id. at 73-76.
62. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
63. Id. at 235-45.
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truth at a criminal trial.”64 There is, therefore, “no likelihood of unreliability in
an uncoerced search or seizure case.”65
Second, “the community has a real interest in encouraging consent,”66 said
the Court, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution
and prosecution of crime.”67 Nothing in the Fourth Amendment is meant to dis-
courage citizens from aiding in the apprehension of criminals.
Consequently, although decided only seven years after the Fifth Amend-
ment decision in Miranda v. Arizona,68 the Schneckloth Court rejected any re-
quirement of Miranda-like warnings to validate consent to search under the
Fourth Amendment. The Schneckcloth Court explained that the circumstances
under which consent searches are sought—on highways and in homes and of-
fices—involved “informal and unstructured conditions” far removed from the
incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere that worried
the Miranda Court.69
Of course, the Schneckloth Court further explained, the provision of warn-
ings is one relevant factor in determining the voluntariness of consent under the
totality of the circumstances. Similarly, the suspect’s age, lack of education, low
intelligence, and the use of physical punishments, such as deprivations of food
or sleep, are relevant to the voluntariness inquiry.70
Nevertheless, in practice, invalidating a purportedly consensual search as
coerced under the Schneckloth test is notoriously unlikely absent the most ex-
treme of circumstances. One study thus revealed that between January 1, 1989,
and April 15, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit found voluntary consent in every instance in which it was chal-
lenged.71 These holdings included one case in which a twenty-four-year-old de-
fendant with only a tenth-grade education had on four prior occasions refused
consent to police requests to search, only to be searched anyway each time; an-
other case in which the young, foreign-born, poorly educated defendant lacked
fluency in English and was ignorant of his rights; and a third case in which a
ninth-grade drop-out with an IQ only six points above mental retardation was
reading at only a second-grade level and suffering from borderline personality
disorder.72
Police deception is also relevant to voluntariness, yet the courts tolerate a
significant degree of deception. The high Court in at least two cases, On Lee v.
United States73 and Hoffa v. United States,74 has itself held that the use of under-
64. Id. at 242.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 243.
67. Id.
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring among other things, that police warn suspects of their rights
to silence and to counsel before being interrogated while in custody).
69. 412 U.S. at 232.
70. See id. at 226.
71. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 32 (1999) (relying on Ray O’Brien, Consent Search Abuse in Poor and Minority Communities
(May 17, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with Professor David Cole)).
72. See COLE, supra note 71, at 32.
73. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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cover agents did not protect individuals against their own misplaced confidence
in the agents, who turned out to be “false friends.”75
The Schneckloth test has been criticized on numerous grounds. Notably, the
need for evidence derived from consensual searches is argued to be less than the
need to obtain confessions; this is so because much physical evidence can be
obtained without the suspect’s consent while a confession never can.76 Addi-
tionally, commentators argue, it is unclear why protecting the fundamental right
to privacy is less important than the fundamental right to a fair trial.77 Finally,
these same commentators note, the Court has previously stated that “‘no system
of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued
effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their constitu-
tional rights.’”78
Despite these criticisms, the Court recently re-affirmed Schneckloth and its
notion of voluntary consent as fully consistent with citizen ignorance.79 The
Court did so in Ohio v. Robinette.80 Robinette involved a traffic stop for speeding,
after which the officer decided not to ticket the driver. After making that deci-
sion, the officer still continued the stop, ordering the driver out of his car and
obtaining consent to search. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the con-
tinued interaction between the officer and the driver constituted a seizure be-
cause an ordinary person would not have discerned that the forcible stop had
been completed and evolved into a mere voluntary encounter—that is, one that
the driver could freely have chosen to end. Because the Ohio Court believed
that “a ‘consensual encounter’ immediately following a detention is likely to be
imbued with the authoritative aura of the detention,”81 that Court adopted a
bright-line rule requiring officers completing traffic stops to warn drivers that
they are free to leave before the officers seek consent to search.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that it would be
“unrealistic” to require such a per se warning, citing Schneckloth and remanding
to the Ohio courts for further proceedings.82 Those proceedings were to be con-
sistent with the high Court’s instruction that the validity of consent is to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis in which awareness of rights is only one rele-
74. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
75. For a summary of additional United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case law
embracing police use of deception, see TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 109-12.
76. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 234 (3d ed. 2000).
77. See id.
78. See id. (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964)).
79. COLE, supra note 71, at 30 (making similar point).
80. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
81. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995).
82. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996). As this article went to press, the Court also de-
cided U.S. v. Drayton, which held, in part, that purported consensual searches of bus passengers by
plainclothes police officers involved in routine drug interdiction efforts were “voluntary” under the
Fourth Amendment, on the facts before the Court. The Court rejected any per se rule requiring bus
passengers in that or similar settings to be warned of their right not to cooperate and to refuse con-
sent. 122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002). Last term, the Court also had the opportunity to elaborate further on the
consent-to-search doctrine in the course of upholding a warrantless search of a probationer’s apart-
ment but declined to do so. See U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Nothing in Knights or Drayton
alters any of my analysis in this article.
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vant factor and the subjective intentions of the officer regarding whether he was
engaging in a forcible stop or a voluntary encounter are irrelevant.83
B. The Ferguson Court: The Return to Waiver
It was thus somewhat startling when the Ferguson Court, while purporting
not to resolve the question whether the maternity patients voluntarily consented
to their urine’s being searched, gave the following guidance to the lower courts
concerning how to handle the consent question upon remand:
The fact that positive [urine] test results were turned over to the po-
lice. . .provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment. While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a
duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they inadver-
tently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain
such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those pa-
tients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully in-
formed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require. Cf.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).84
This instruction was startling in part because it seemingly rejected Schneck-
loth’s equation of voluntariness with consent, instead requiring that consent also
be knowing and intelligent. Furthermore, the Ferguson Court cited Miranda as
support, an analogy expressly rejected by the Schneckloth Court.85 Fully under-
standing Miranda’s meaning is thus necessary to clarifying the radical implica-
tions of the Ferguson Court’s reliance on Miranda.
C. Mirandizing Schneckloth: Autonomy and Equality Re-enter Center Stage
It is important to stress that there were at least four separate holdings in
Miranda. First, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
state-compelled self-incrimination applied at the police stationhouse as well as
at the courthouse. Second, interrogation in the stationhouse or its functional
equivalent is inherently compelling. Third, overcoming that inherent compul-
sion partly required both the provision of the now-familiar warnings so often
seen on television crime shows and affirmative evidence that the warnings were
adequately understood and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived by
83. The Court also follows, in administrative search cases, what might be called a “pseudo-
consent” doctrine. Administrative search cases often involve a suspect’s “consenting” to the search
as a condition for continued employment or continued participation in a school activity. See TASLITZ
& PARIS, supra note 2, at 349-70 (summarizing case law). Yet the Supreme Court rarely resolves these
cases under the consent-to-search doctrine, though the Court does consider “consent” relevant to the
reasonableness balancing process for administrative searches. See id. This different treatment of
consent from the role that it plays in ordinary criminal searches is likely a recognition that “con-
senting” in response to the threat of being fired is not truly “voluntary,” though nevertheless con-
stituting a kind of “pseudo-consent” that favors a finding that the search is reasonable. See infra text
accompanying notes 246-51 (noting Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a similar position, though he does
not use the term “pseudo-consent”).
84. 532 U.S. at 84-85 (second emphasis added).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (discussing Schneckloth Court’s rejection of a
Miranda-like approach in the Fourth Amendment context); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 660-74
(explaining Miranda’s requirement of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver).
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the suspect. Merely hearing and even understanding the warnings were not
enough to establish waiver.
Finally, overcoming compulsion also required the creation of a Fifth
Amendment right to counsel before and during questioning. The Sixth Amend-
ment’s express right to counsel applies only after formal adversarial proceedings
have begun, usually by the state’s filing a criminal complaint—a time well after
the completion of most custodial interrogations.86 Yet the Fifth Amendment no-
where mentions a right to counsel.87 Nevertheless Miranda created such a right
during questioning as essential to protecting the core Fifth Amendment right to
be free from compulsion. Absent adequate warnings and an affirmative know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights, or the provision of counsel upon
request, questions may not even be posed, much less can answers be coerced,
under Miranda.88
The Miranda Court’s recognition of inherent compulsion stemmed from a
clear-eyed understanding of police interrogation practices and suspect vulner-
ability. Police are trained to isolate a suspect so that he feels at their mercy, to
use deception and false legal advice, as well as the good cop/bad cop and other
psychological techniques to obtain confessions.89 “Such an interrogation envi-
ronment,” said the Court, is “created for no purpose other than to subjugate the
will of his examiner. . .To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is
equally destructive of human dignity.”90 Simultaneously, police aggressions, ac-
cording to the Court, “[trade] on the weakness of individuals.”91 That is because
“[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, sur-
rounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
described. . .cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”92 Warnings,
said the Court, help both to make the individual aware of his rights and of at
least some important consequences of waiving them. Warnings and police ex-
pression of an ability to proceed only if the suspect affirmatively waives his
rights also send the message that the police will indeed honor the subject’s
rights rather than treating them as an empty formalism.
86. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE; LAW, JUSTICE,
AND POLICING 106-18 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas, III eds., 1998) (describing Miranda’s
holdings as staged in three steps). Accord WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS:
POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 55-58 (2001) (also describing Miranda as predi-
cated on three separate holdings). I have described four separate holdings because that better cap-
tures the aspects of Miranda to which its critics object. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 595-86,
624-28, 636-45 (summarizing criticisms of Miranda and comparing Miranda’s Fifth Amendment right
to counsel and affirmative waiver requirements to the narrower scope of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.”).
88. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 132-33 (1993) (criticizing Miranda
for prohibiting not only the compelling of suspects’ answers but also barring even asking them
questions).
89. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. For an excellent summary of the status of police interrogation
techniques at the time that Miranda was decided and of their continued status today see WHITE, supra
note 85, at 25-39, 76-107.
90. 384 U.S. at 457.
91. Id. at 455.
92. Id. at 461.
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Yet, said the Court, “[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interro-
gation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware
of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present
at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. . . .”93 Counsel’s consultation with his client before and during ques-
tioning ensures that the individual’s “right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.”94 Further-
more, counsel’s mere presence can reduce the risk of police coercion and raise
the chances that any statement given will be trustworthy.
Nor, explained the Court, should the financial ability of the individual af-
fect the scope of the rights involved. The privilege against self-incrimination
applies to everyone, regardless of income. Indeed, the Court continued, given
estimates of 50-90% indigency among felony defendants, limiting Miranda’s
counsel rights to those who can afford to pay for them would render the Court’s
decision “of little significance.”95
The original Miranda opinion was obviously concerned with suspect
autonomy and equality.96 The Court recognized that encouraging autonomy, in
the sense of the power to reflect rationally on one’s circumstances and to choose
the best course of action, is central to any sound system of liberal justice.97 But
such autonomy is “not so easily bestowed on disadvantaged persons,” who may
lack the talent, education, and privilege to make truly autonomous choices.98
93. Id. at 469.
94. Id.
95. 384 U.S. at 472.
96. Professor Kent Greenawalt has made this point, arguing that Miranda was rooted in con-
cepts of human dignity and that:
[D]ignity affects how people should act toward each other. Most especially, dignity pre-
cludes humiliating treatment. In a liberal democracy the concept of dignity is closely re-
lated to ideas of respect, individuality, autonomy, tolerance, and equality. To recognize
the dignity of liberal citizens involves acknowledgement of their independence of choice,
their power to define for themselves the kinds of persons they will be and the lives they
will lead. Dignity is something that is to be accorded all citizens, not only some; and in
some basic respect, equality of status is prerequisite for equal dignity.
R. Kent Greenawalt, The Right to Silence and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 192, 193 (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds.,
1992). Professor Greenwalt goes on to explain why police interrogation practices can endanger hu-
man dignity:
From the moral point of view, pressures and tricks designed to get suspects to confess are
much more questionable than inferences from silence and dismissal. When law enforce-
ment officers browbeat suspects, play on their weaknesses, deceive them as to critically
relevant facts, such as whether a suspected confederate has confessed, or keep them in a
hostile setting, the officials intentionally manipulate the environment to make rational, re-
sponsible choice more difficult. Such tactics hardly accord respect for autonomy and dig-
nity, and they work unevenly by undermining the inexperienced and ignorant and by
having little effect on the hardened criminal.
Id. at 206. Much the same might be said of police interrogation practices in obtaining “voluntary
consent” to search. See COLE, supra note 71, at 27-34.
97. See KEVIN M. CROTTY, LAW’S INTERIOR: LEGAL AND LITERARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELF
96-100 (2001).
98. Id. at 99.
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The warnings can help by providing some information. Yet, as one thoughtful
commentator has explained:
One possible reason why the Miranda court considered the right to counsel so
important may be that the lawyer is the very paradigm of rational autonomy—
educated, knowledgeable, capable of reflecting and reaching reasoned decisions.
The lawyer’s presence may be felt to supply otherwise disadvantaged suspects
with all the marks of autonomy and voluntariness life has effectively denied
them.99
Philosopher Michel Foucault, admittedly speaking of circumstances other
than police interrogation, recognized that encouraging confession is a way for a
culture to discipline citizens into conforming with social mandates.100 What is
unique about the self is deep in the interior life of the individual, a uniqueness
exposed by the interrogation of experts who try to quell what is unique about
that person and move him toward the normal.101 In a sense, Foucault views
protection of our inner thoughts and guilty secrets as a form of privacy. When
only we are aware of our unusual thoughts and experiences, we continue to
claim them as our own. But when they are exposed to an unwanted gaze, we
grow ashamed of our difference and feel compelled to think like others.102 As
with many other sorts of privacy violations, confession re-defines our identity
and limits.103 Foucault might, however, not recognize the idea of a confession
resulting from an overborne will. All individual identity is partly defined by
what society has made us. To confess at society’s urging is but one more way in
which a “detainee. . .already. . .pervasively shaped by the state” is further
molded.104
Jurgen Habermas, on the other hand, views confession as essential to re-
flecting and choosing about how to live.105 The power of tradition to control our
99. Id.
100. Id. at 100-01 (so reading Foucault); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 58-70
(1980) (describing our society as a “confessing society”); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
221-24 (Alan Sheridan, trans. 1979) (discussing use of confession and the disciplines to shape the in-
dividual). See generally ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND THE LAW (1994) (summariz-
ing Foucault’s thinking on the law).
101. See CROTTY, supra note 97, at 100-01.
102. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 65-68 (2000) [hereinafter Emotions in Date Rape] (discussing privacy as protecting
against conformism); see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2002) [herein-
after Privacy and Human Emotions] (articulating a renewed vision of “privacy’s” meaning under the
Fourth Amendment); JEFFERY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA (2000) (articulating a theory of privacy based on the metaphor of the “unwanted gaze”).
103. See Privacy and Human Emotions, supra note 102, at 126-35 (privacy and individual and group
identity).
104. CROTTY, supra note 97, at 102.
105. See id. at 103-04 (applying Habermas’s theories to custodial confessions); JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 96-
97 (1996) (discussing extralegal forms of confession, as in psychoanalysis or autobiographies). Fur-
ther illumination on the psychological functions served by confession, including custodial confes-
sions, is to be found in modern literature. See Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in
Law and Literature, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 114-34 (Peter Brooks and
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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lives in the modern world has declined. We must therefore consciously choose
among plural visions of the good life.106 Freely chosen confessions enable us to
confront, reflect upon, and thus shape our inner soul.107 Confessions are thus
necessary to self-examination and autonomous choice, aiding self-realization,
freedom, and the expansion of life opportunities. Correspondingly, on this view
the voluntariness and rational choice involved in confession are essential to
furthering, rather than limiting, human freedom.108
For both Foucault and Habermas, however, the “self” is not a prepolitical
fact but has a history shaped by society and the state.109 Furthermore, compelled
confessions in both of their theories serve as powerful ways to undermine the
individual’s autonomy and uniqueness that are purported to be central to the
modern liberal state.110
Miranda is thus an effort to respect individual autonomy and the equal
worth of persons. It is perhaps a half-hearted effort, because it is unclear
whether warnings and waiver alone—which happen in most interrogations—
can ever relieve the compulsion inherent in uncounseled, incommunicado police
questioning.111 Empirical data on Miranda’s effectiveness is not comforting.112
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly cut back on Miranda’s scope and stringency
while simultaneously re-affirming its core holdings.113 Skeptics see Miranda as
an ineffective compromise between the needs of the state and those of the indi-
106. See CROTTY, supra note 97, at 103-06.
107. See id. at 103-04.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 104-05.
110. See id. at 96-106; Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
117, 142 (defining autonomy as central to the liberal state).
111. See WHITE, supra note 86, at 116-24 (addressing Miranda’s failures).
112. What constitutes the relevant data and its meaning are highly contested. See, e.g., THE
MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 86, at 169-248 (collecting many of the competing studies and positions);
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37
CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (2001) (critiquing the empirical analyses of the primary academic opponent of
Miranda, Paul Cassell, and collecting citations to other well-known critics of Cassell); Paul Cassell,
The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confes-
sions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999) (setting forth Cassell’s most recent empirical analyses
and citing to his earlier work). Professor Welsh White has recently documented the many ways in
which interrogators have successfully adapted to Miranda, minimizing its effectiveness in safe-
guarding individual autonomy. See WHITE, supra note 86, at 76-101. Accordingly, he recommends a
number of reforms to aid in making at least some of the original aims of Miranda into reality. Id. at
190-215.
113. See WHITE, supra note 86, at 60-75, 117-18, 221. White summarizes his position thus:
When Miranda was decided, the Warren Court undoubtedly believed that its safeguards
would provide significant protection for suspects subjected to custodial interrogation,
with the result that interrogators would obtain significantly fewer incriminating state-
ments. During the thirty-five years that Miranda has been in effect, however, the post-
Miranda Court has weakened Miranda’s safeguards. And as Miranda’s safeguards have be-
come weaker, interrogators have become increasingly sophisticated in developing strate-
gies designed to overcome Miranda’s remaining obstacles. As a result, interrogators are
able to induce suspects to waive their Miranda rights in the great majority of cases . . . .
Id. at 221. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 639-703 (reviewing the case law narrowing Miranda’s
scope); see also United States v. Dickerson, 530 US 426 (2000) (nevertheless reaffirming Miranda’s core
holdings).
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vidual.114 Nevertheless, it is clear that Miranda is an effort, however flawed, to
provide some protection for human autonomy and equal worth beyond the
minimal protection offered by the Schneckloth voluntariness test’s prohibition
against coercion. Ferguson, by explicitly citing Miranda, thus seems to be a radi-
cal break with Schneckloth.
D. Contextualizing Consent
But appearances can be deceiving. No one seriously believes that the Court
has quietly overturned decades of post-Schneckloth voluntariness jurisprudence
nor radically altered the overall balance of power between criminal defendants
and the state.115 A more likely explanation is that the Court recognized that the
consent test must vary with the nature of the human relationships impinged
upon by the state.116 In Ferguson, two relationships were particularly important:
that between the physician and his patient and that between the parent and her
child.
1. The Physician-Patient Relationship
The relationship-specific nature of the analysis was underscored by the
briefs of amici. The Rutherford Institute, a pro-life organization, stressed the
centrality of the physician’s duties of trust and loyalty to his patient, which have
“been established in medicine from time immemorial. . . . The Hippocratic Oath
[itself requires the physician to declare], ‘What I may see or hear in the course of
treatment, which on no account must be spread abroad, I will keep to myself,
holding such things shameful to be spoken about.’”117 Confidentiality encour-
ages timely patient revelation of information needed for the physician to design
a sound treatment plan.118
But sound treatment can be effective only if physician and patient collabo-
rate.119 That requires patient trust.120 A patient who trusts his doctor is more
likely to comply with the doctor’s advice.121 Furthermore, breach of that trust
and confidentiality in the case of cocaine addiction—an addiction that is recog-
nized by the medical community as a disease—can have ill consequences for
114. For an extended expression of this skepticism, see WHITE, supra note 86.
115. Cf. WHITE, supra note 86, at 112-24 (arguing that the current conservative Court reaffirmed
Miranda partly because the Court had already so eviscerated the original Miranda protections as to
render them minimal roadblocks in the state’s war on criminals).
116. For a discussion of the importance of human relationships to feminist legal analyses, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 279-339.
117. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Amicus Curiae of the Rutherford Institute in Support of
Petitioners at 11-12, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) [hereinafter
Rutherford Institute Brief] (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
118. See id. at 12-13.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 12 (“The AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, II and IV among others, mandate phy-
sician-patient trust as the foundation for medical treatment.”); see also AMA, Current Opinions of the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (1980) (establishing the medical profession’s foundational
ethical principles in the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics).
121. See Rutherford Institute Brief at 12-13, Ferguson (No. 99-936); Christine Cassel, Confidential-
ity: An Illusion and a Sacred Trust, 7 AAMC REP. 1, 1-2 (July 1998).
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both the patient’s health and her life prospects. Criminal prosecution or even its
threat is a “mode of ‘treatment’” that “actually elevates the burden of suffering
on the maternal patient by imposing the considerable mental and emotional
distress of pending prosecution, and hence elevates the burden on the fetal pa-
tient as well.”122 Moreover, explained the Institute:
Because of the significance of a positive drug screen for the patient, the rights of
patients to autonomy and privacy have important implications for screening of
asymptomatic persons. If confidentiality is not ensured, test results may affect a
patient’s employment, insurance coverage, or personal relationships. Testing
during pregnancy is especially problematic, because clinicians may be required
by state laws to report evidence of potentially harmful drug or alcohol use in
pregnant patients.123
The American Medical Association (AMA) concedes that breaches of confi-
dentiality are sometimes necessary to protecting public health and safety.124 But
those breaches should be narrow in scope and content, disclosed to the fewest
possible persons to achieve the necessary ends.125 Therefore, in the Institute’s
opinion, confidentiality should be breached to release patient information to law
enforcement agencies only pursuant to a court order supported by clear and
convincing evidence that disclosure was necessary to serve a legitimate law en-
forcement need more important than protecting privacy and where alternative
means for serving that need are unavailable.126 The physician-patient relation-
ship, the Institute concluded, therefore distinguishes urinalysis of pregnant pa-
tients from everyday encounters with an airport or courtroom metal detector or
a border check:
It is more than the expectation of personal privacy that arises out of modesty; it
is the expectation that a health care facility and a treating physician and staff are
trustworthy confidantes. More than the act of taking urine for testing without
consent is at stake. What is at stake is the expectation that our doctors will not
work against us and on behalf of the state.127
Other amici, such as the AMA, readily embraced a similar position to that of the
Institute. At the core of the doctor-patient relationship, argued the AMA, “lies
trust and openness between the patient and the physician.”128 The AMA used
122. Rutherford Institute Brief at 20, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
123. Id. at 11; see also Cassel, supra note 121 (promoting patient confidence in the security of her
disclosures is critical to accurate history-taking because “[t]he history may include very sensitive
information about such potential chemical dependency or substance abuse, sexual practices, emo-
tional disturbances, and other things that would be threatening to the patient’s emotional stability or
even livelihood if they were disclosed.”).
124. See AMA, Code of Medical Ethics, E-10.01(4), Fundamental Elements of the Physician-
Patient Relationship (1994) (“The patient has the right to confidentiality. The physician should not
reveal confidential communications or information without the consent of the patient, unless pro-
vided for by law or by the need to protect the welfare of the individual or the public interest.”).
125. See Rutherford Institute Brief at 16-17, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 18.
128. See Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the AMA in
Support of Neither Party at 11, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) [here-
inafter AMA Brief].
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religious language, noting that “[w]ithout complete faith in the sanctity of the
discussions with their physicians, patients will be reluctant to disclose poten-
tially incriminating behaviors, even if such disclosures are necessary to receive
diagnosis or treatment.”129 The AMA distinguished drug addiction from man-
datory physician reporting of other sorts of patient criminal conduct and of im-
minent harm threatened by or to their patients because, unlike in those other ar-
eas, with addiction, the behavior is the disease.130 Early patient disclosure aids
both pre- and post-natal treatment and promotes safe delivery.131 The clear im-
plication was that, absent the clearest of patient statements to the contrary, pa-
tient consent to disclosure of confidential information should not be found.
2. Paternalism and the Parent-Child Relationship
Amici’s arguments concerning the parent-child relationship were often
closely tied to concepts of patient and parental autonomy, which were con-
trasted with the evils of paternalism.132 The Hospital’s position was essentially
that it knew better than did the patients how to care for the patients’ health and
that of their children. Amici squarely rejected these arguments.133
Paternalism has often been defined as “imposing. . .constraints on an indi-
vidual’s liberty for the purpose of promoting his or her own good.”134 Restated,
paternalism is “interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons
referring exclusively to the welfare. . .of the person being coerced.”135 Paternal-
ism therefore involves intervention in another’s life for his own good even if he
does not truly consent.136 Paternalism can be overt or subtle. Often it involves
taking advantage of another’s vulnerabilities, manipulating their emotions, or
playing on their ignorance to get them to do what their guardian deems to be
right.137
The major objection to paternalism is that it limits autonomy or self-
determination, respect for which is “a cornerstone of liberal legal theory and of
the American political system.”138 The capacity to make rational choices is an
129. See id. at 11.
130. See id. at 11 n.2.
131. See id. at 12-21.
132. See Rutherford Institute Brief at 19 & n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936). See generally AMA Brief,
Ferguson (No. 99-936). See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (analyzing additional briefs of
amici); see also FIONA RANDALL & R. S. DOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A COMPANION FOR
SPECIALISTS 39-47 (1999) (favoring the “partnership model” of the carer-patient relationship because
only it adequately respects the autonomy needs of both parties, treats both as equals, and best fur-
thers the primary aim of serving the patient’s “total good”).
133. See, e.g., Rutherford Institute Brief at 19-22 & n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (emphasizing both
patient and parental autonomy as being inconsistent with the Hospital’s cocaine-testing program).
134. William L.F. Felstiner & Ben Pettit, Paternalism, Power, and Respect in Lawyer-Client Relations,
in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 135, 136 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, eds. 2001).
135. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 108 (R. A. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
136. See JOHN H. KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PATERNALISM IN THE CARING LIFE 63
(1996).
137. See Felstiner & Pettit, supra note 134, at 137-38.
138. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
501, 512 (1990).
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integral part of the autonomy ideal, as I explained in my analysis of Miranda.139
The failure to accord another autonomy denies them respect as equal human
beings, which should be a part of all human relationships.140 Silas Wasserstrom
put it this way:
[F]rom the professional’s point of view the client is seen and responded to more
like an object than a human being, and more like a child than an adult. The pro-
fessional does not, in short, treat the client like a person; the professional does
not accord the client the respect that he or she deserves. And these, it is claimed,
are without question genuine moral defects in any meaningful human relation-
ship.141
Procedural justice research suggests that clients are most satisfied when
they believe that a professional has treated them fairly. If clients perceive pater-
nalism as limiting their participation in making key choices about the services
that they receive, they will view the relationship as less fair and will therefore be
less satisfied, regardless of the substantive outcome.142
That professionals have more knowledge and power than their clients is,
however, often simply a reality.143 Yet there is an alternative to paternalism even
in unequal power relations. The more powerful party can instead seek to em-
power the vulnerable, heal the wounded, dialogue with them honestly, give
them undiluted attention, and promote their self-respect.144 In short, the
stronger party can actively work to bring power and autonomy to the weaker
party.145 That can be a far more attractive model for the professional-client rela-
tionship and the state-citizen relationship, as several amici maintained.
The Rutherford Institute declared, “Respondent’s clinical approach, which
adopts an outlook of paternalism toward the maternal and fetal patient, has
been largely rejected by the medical community.”146 Where the doctor’s duties
to prevent harm and to act for the patient’s greater good conflict in the physi-
cian’s view with patient autonomy, “paternalism has been rejected in favor of
patient authority.”147 Part of the reason for this rejection is that “[p]articipating in
decisions increases patients’ sense of control, self-determination, and adherence
to care plans.”148 Similarly, the ACLU, NOW, and a host of other organizations
filed a brief condemning the Hospital’s paternalistic assertions that it had a spe-
cial interest in protecting the health of pregnant patients and its insisting that
139. See supra text accompanying notes 86-113.
140. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 19
(1975).
141. See id.
142. See Felstiner & Pettit, supra note 134, at 139; J. Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296-401 (1996).
143. See Felstiner & Pettit, supra note 134, at 142-43.
144. See SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, RESPECT: AN EXPLORATION 10-14 (1999).
145. See id.
146. See Rutherford Institute Brief at 19 n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
147. Id.
148. Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient
Well-Being?, 273(22) JAMA 1781 (1995).
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drug screens are necessary for the management of pregnant patients.149 “Like
other paternalistic rationales,” these organizations concluded:
. . .[T]his one cannot withstand scrutiny. The MUSC policy is punitive, not
therapeutic, resting as it does on both the threat and the reality of arrest and im-
prisonment of noncompliant patients. A therapeutic policy cannot depend on
coercion, for competent individuals in this society have the right to accept or re-
ject medical treatments.150
These same organizations stressed as well that pregnancy—and thus the
health of the fetus—did not diminish the woman’s privacy interest. The state
“does not stand in loco parentis to pregnant women.”151 Relying on the line of
abortion and contraceptive rights cases that recognize a pregnant woman’s
autonomy to control decisions about her own body despite her husband’s and
the state’s interest in potential human life, the ACLU concluded that, “Any pur-
ported justification for excepting pregnant women from the Fourth Amend-
ment’s general protection against unreasonable searches must ultimately rest on
an outmoded view of women as mere incubators of the fetus and mothers to
their children, subjecting women, on that basis, to otherwise unconstitutional
intrusions into their privacy.”152
The pro-life Rutherford Institute preferred to rest its argument on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s parental right to control one’s children’s medical care
and nurture, both before and after birth. “A mother’s relationship with her
child, whether born or unborn, is considered a fundamental right that cannot be
denied absent due process.”153 For the Institute, only individualized suspicion of
abusive behavior constitutes the “due process” that justifies interfering with
these fundamental parental rights, even where the health of the fetus is con-
cerned.154 Several amici also recognized that so respecting parental autonomy
made it more, not less, likely that treatment would improve the health of both
mother and child.155
Strictly speaking, these arguments of amici focused more on the strength of
the individual’s privacy interests than on the question of consent. But for the
Court and many parties and amici, privacy and consent were inseparable: ab-
sent valid consent, a suspicionless invasion of these maternity patients’ privacy
was constitutionally untenable.156
149. See Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union,
et al., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
150. Id. at 11 n.2.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Rutherford Institute at 22, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 19-20; AMA Brief at 11-12, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
156. See infra text accompanying notes 172-84 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s accurate summary of the
Ferguson Court’s views on privacy and consent).
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E. On Advantage-Taking and Voluntariness
Apart from whether these women gave knowing and intelligent consent,
the women and amici raised arguments consistent with the idea that the pur-
ported patient consent in the Ferguson case was not even voluntary.
Both the Petitioners in their Reply Brief and NARAL as amici noted that
many of the nine factors used to decide whom to test for cocaine “were thinly
veiled proxies for low socioeconomic status or race. . .”157 NARAL in particular
quoted the testimony of one witness, who said, “Women who are poor have
very little access to prenatal care, so that if you say, well, you didn’t get prenatal
care and so we’re going to test your urine for drugs, what you’re saying is
you’re poor, we’re going to test your urine for drugs.”158 This same witness testi-
fied that some of the criteria were associated with a wide range of problems
other than cocaine use and were unduly vague.159 Moreover, he noted that
“where vague standards are used to identify drug users in this context, African-
Americans are disproportionately targeted because of prejudices and precon-
ceptions, even though the rates of substance use during pregnancy are similar
across racial groups.”160
Similarly, the Hospital tested only for cocaine use rather than other illegal,
potentially harmful drugs. Yet African-American women abusing drugs are
significantly more likely to do so via cocaine than are drug abusers of other
races.161 Indeed, here the Policy was applied almost entirely to economically dis-
advantaged African-American women.162 Nurse Brown, who had expressed
demeaning views about African-Americans, boasted that, “she dictated which
patients should be tested.”163
Moreover, the “second chance” aspect of the Policy stacked the deck
against the poor. Thus Ms. Ferguson herself requested outpatient treatment so
that she would be free to care for her children, yet was “arrested for not going to
the inpatient unit on the very day she was supposed to start outpatient treat-
ment. . . . Because the majority of women seeking prenatal care at the hospital
were poor,. . .they had difficulties availing themselves of the ‘treatment’ of-
fered.”164
Additionally, the treatment offered was in fact not well designed to deal
with the special problems of pregnant drug addicts.165 That design failure was
significant concerning the intrusiveness and thus the reasonableness of the
searches because pregnant women are harmed by cocaine urine testing in spe-
157. NARAL Brief at 23, Ferguson (No. 99-936). See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 8 n.11, Ferguson
(No. 99-936) (noting, for example, that “poor women as a group have very little access to prenatal
care,” yet that is one of the nine criteria for testing).
158. See NARAL Brief at 23-24, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (quoting testimony of Dr. Ira Chasnoff).
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 24.
164. NARAL Brief at 15, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
165. See id.
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cial ways.166 But that failure adequately to confront the special circumstances
facing pregnant women was also relevant to establishing that the search was in-
voluntary, a reality that harmed African-American women as a group and not
merely individual patients. Thus, NARAL explained, “drug search policies such
as Respondents’ add fuel to the minority mistrust of the medical profession that
has existed historically because of incidents like the Tuskegee Study, in which
syphilis-afflicted African-American men were systematically denied treatment
in the name of science.”167
Moreover, as Petitioners explained, six of the women prosecuted were un-
insured patients when admitted, who were asked to sign consent forms while
they were in labor.168 Respondents “deliberately deceived and misled at least
one patient by telling her that her urine was being tested to determine if she was
dehydrated.”169 Because not one of the consent forms was clear about the true
ultimate nature and use of the urinalysis test results, argued Petitioners, all pur-
ported patient consent indeed resulted from deception.170 Therefore, Petitioners
explained,
Respondents have not carried their burden of establishing “whether consent can
be voluntary, in a constitutional sense, when given by an indigent, uninsured
woman in labor, who is dependent on medical care provided by the state’s pub-
lic hospital.” [citations omitted]. Even if the patients had known that signing
the consent to medical treatment would expose them to chemical surveillance
and criminal prosecution, the emergency medical context in which their consent
was obtained was inherently coercive. Thus, their signature on a standard hos-
pital consent form did not suspend the warrant and probable cause require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment.171
F. Justice Scalia’s Dissent: Fidelity to Precedent and to the Premises of
Paternalism
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, showed a clear-eyed understanding of the
radical break in consent-to-search precedent that the majority’s opinion repre-
sented. Scalia was candid about the majority opinion’s premises and implica-
tions in a way that the Court itself was not.172
There was no claim here that the urine was forcibly extracted. Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia, there were only three conceivable bases for the con-
tention that the patients’ consent to taking their urine was invalid: first, that the
patients were coerced by their necessitous circumstances; second, that the con-
sent was uninformed because the patients were not told that the urinalysis
166. See id. at 15-17.
167. Id. at 26; see also CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE:
A CHRONOLOGY 458-59 (1999) (“U.S. health officials had used Blacks as guinea pigs in a forty-year
syphilis experiment. . . in what came to be popularly known as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.”).
168. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17-18, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 15-16.
171. Id. at 15.
172. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91-104 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas).
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would include tests for cocaine; and third, that the consent was uninformed be-
cause the patients were not told that positive cocaine test results would be pro-
vided to the police.173
Justice Scalia correctly recognized that the latter two arguments were flatly
inconsistent with prior high Court precedent. Scalia explained that reliance on
Miranda’s knowing waiver standard was inapposite.174 To the contrary, argued
Scalia, Hoffa v. United States175 and the subsequent line of undercover agent cases
unequivocally established that under the Fourth Amendment the use of decep-
tion to obtain evidence is perfectly acceptable. That deception may include mis-
representation about the purposes for which that evidence will be used, includ-
ing obtaining it with the hidden purpose of turning the evidence over to the
police. Nor does it matter that the deception is undertaken by a partner in a re-
lationship of trust. “Abuse of trust,” Scalia explained, “is surely a sneaky and
ungentlemanly thing, and perhaps there should be (as there are) laws against
[some] such conduct by the government.”176 But, he continued, that “is immate-
rial for Fourth Amendment purposes. . . .”177
Scalia recognized, however, that the majority’s decision did not wholly
overturn the secret agent precedent. Rather, it “open[ed] a hole in our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the size and shape of which is wholly indetermi-
nate.”178 Scalia’s fear was precisely that the majority had made the nature of the
human relationships involved, the social context of the events, and the fine
points of human emotions relevant to deciding what should be the constitu-
tional test for a consensual search. It would be bad enough, Scalia argued, if the
confidential relationship guarded by the Court were at least one protected by
law. But South Carolina does not even recognize a physician-patient privilege.179
The Court, by its failure to provide further guidance, thus:
. . .[L]eaves law enforcement officials entirely in the dark as to when they can
use incriminating evidence from “trusted” sources. Presumably the lines will be
drawn in the case-by-case development of a whole new branch of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, taking yet another social judgment (which confi-
dential relationships ought not to be invaded by the police) out of democratic
control, and confiding it to the uncontrolled judgment of this Court—uncon-
trolled because there is no common-law precedent to guide it. I would adhere
to our established law, which says that information obtained through violation
of a relationship of trust is obtained consensually, and hence is not a search.180
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that “the patients were coerced
to produce their urine samples by their necessitous circumstances, to wit, their
need for medical treatment of their pregnancy.”181 Said Scalia,
173. Id. at 93.
174. Id. at 94.
175. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
176. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 94.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 95.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 1299.
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If that was coercion, it was not coercion applied by the government—and if such
nongovernmental coercion sufficed, the police would never be permitted to use
the ballistic evidence obtained from treatment of a patient with a bullet wound.
And the Fourth Amendment would invalidate those many state laws that re-
quire physicians to report gunshot wounds, evidence of spousal abuse, and (like
the South Carolina law relevant here. . .) evidence of child abuse.182
Justice Scalia thus rejected any notion that governmental advantage-taking
of necessitous suspect circumstances could ever constitute state action. He also
ignored the majority’s insistence that it was not overturning the sorts of laws
that he mentioned but merely requiring probable cause and a warrant, valid
consent, or some other recognized warrant exception to justify reporting laws’
enforcement. He similarly ignored the fact that reporting laws generally merely
alerted law enforcement to begin an investigation independently to develop
probable cause for an arrest.183 Overall, Scalia dismissed the context-and-
relationship sensitive, equality-enhancing, autonomy-respecting approach of the
majority. For Scalia, there was no need for a remand to determine the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding of consent. There was no
question that the pregnant women at MUSC were not forcibly compelled to part
with their urine. Having done so, they “passed and abandoned it,” losing any
continuing privacy interest in the liquid.184 Subsequent testing and distribution
of test results were thus not even searches. No further consent was needed.
G. Administrative Searches and Social Meaning
1. Case Law Background
The second major conclusion of the Ferguson Court, namely that the urine-
testing of the pregnant patients was an ordinary criminal-law-enforcement
search, requiring probable cause and a warrant, and not a more flexible admin-
istrative search, similarly requires some background on the difference between
these two types of searches.
“Administrative searches and seizures” are those conducted for a purpose
other than enforcing the criminal law.185 Where searches of a person are in-
volved, administrative searches are usually described as justified by “special
needs” beyond those of ordinary criminal law enforcement.186 For an adminis-
trative search or seizure, the Court eliminates or modifies the warrant require-
ment, the probable cause requirement, or both.187 Furthermore, warrantless,
182. Id.
183. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 6 n.9, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (“[Under the reporting statute],
the state is still put to the test of substantiating the accusation by conducting an investigation that
may require it to obtain a search warrant.”).
184. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 92-93. Scalia goes on further to clarify his objections to the majority
opinion. “In sum, I think it clear that the Court’s disposition requires the holding that violation of a
relationship of trust constitutes a search.” Id. at 96 n.4.
185. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 349.
186. Id. at 349-52.
187. See id. at 349.
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suspicionless searches are generally permitted only for administrative and not
ordinary criminal-law-enforcement-related searches and seizures.188
Of course, even criminal-law-enforcement-related searches sometimes
modify the probable cause and warrant requirements, but never to the point of
completely eliminating both such requirements. Thus, for example, in Terry v.
Ohio,189 the Court engaged in a similar sort of balancing test to that used in the
administrative search context. The Terry searches and seizures were, however,
unquestionably done to investigate suspected criminal activity. For brief, mini-
mally intrusive “stops” for criminal investigation and brief pat-down “frisks”
for weapons, therefore, the Court eliminated the warrant requirement.190 But the
Court did not eliminate the individualized suspicion requirement, albeit lower-
ing its bar to permit intrusions on mere reasonable suspicion rather than prob-
able cause.191 Yet the Court has repeatedly completely eliminated both the war-
rant and individualized suspicion mandates for drug testing in certain contexts,
precisely on the ground that the state was then merely engaging in an adminis-
trative search.192
There is a line of cases, primarily approving random, suspicionless road-
blocks, that purport to rely on Terry and its progeny rather than on the special
needs or administrative search cases.193 Yet the Court has recently made clear
that these cases as well turn on the existence of a purpose to serve some goal
other than enforcing the criminal law.194 That goal, once recognized, in turn jus-
tifies a balancing test ultimately endorsing abdication of the individualized sus-
picion requirement in favor of random searches and seizures. Rephrased, de-
spite its protestations to the contrary, the Court treats suspicionless roadblocks
as administrative searches.195
Several years ago, in Whren v. United States,196 the Court declared that an of-
ficer’s subjective intentions were irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment, except
in determining whether a search is an administrative one.197 Whren therefore sug-
gested that subjective intentions to serve goals other than criminal law enforce-
ment defined a search as an administrative intrusion.198 But, more recently, the
Court has rejected this position, stating that “programmatic purposes”—which
are apparently something other than state actors’ subjective intentions—are
188. See id. at 349-50.
189. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
190. See id. at 30.
191. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 333, 340-42.
192. See id. at 364-68.
193. See id. at 368-70.
194. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that random roadblock stops
to uncover evidence of illegal drug possession had criminal investigation as their primary “pro-
grammatic purpose,” thus being subject to the usual criminal case search and seizure rules, in con-
trast to the permissible warrantless, suspicionless drunk driving roadblocks).
195. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 368-70.
196. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
197. Id. at 810.
198. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 350, 363, 393-96.
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what matter.199 Although the Court has not defined “programmatic purposes”
explicitly, I will argue shortly that it has done so implicitly.
The problem for a test that turns on programmatic purposes, however de-
fined, is that many searches and seizures have dual purposes.200 Sometimes the
Court has squarely addressed this problem and sometimes it has not. In Michi-
gan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,201 for example, the Court upheld a suspicionless
sobriety checkpoint. The Court upheld these brief warrantless stops because of
the Court’s conclusion that “the checkpoint program was clearly aimed at re-
ducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers. . . .”202
rather than at collecting evidence of criminal conduct.
Yet the very same observations that would justify longer detention of a
driver to protect roadway safety—for example, an officer’s smelling alcohol on
the driver’s breath and administering an ultimately failed sobriety test—auto-
matically establish probable cause to believe that the criminal offense of driving
under the influence of alcohol has occurred.203 But the Court did not see this
lurking dual purposes question as a troubling one. The Court has recently
stated that where there are dual purposes, the “primary purpose” must be to
achieve a goal other than criminal law enforcement for the administrative search
and seizure or similar exceptions to apply.204 Yet it is unclear why the drunk
driving roadblock in Sitz should be viewed as having a primarily civil rather
than criminal investigative purpose. Nor is it clear why a difference in purposes
justifies more lax Fourth Amendment standards. On the other hand, just this
past term the Court, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,205 struck down a highway
checkpoint on the ground that its “primary purpose” was the “discovery and
interdiction of narcotics.”206 That case seemed relatively clear as to purpose be-
cause the checkpoints did not serve any immediate interest of roadway safety.
The roadblocks sought to uncover evidence of criminal drug possession, not
drug use while driving. That point also seems to affect how we weigh state
against individual interests. Still, while Edmond, which struck down the suspi-
cionless checkpoints as primarily motivated by the desire to investigate criminal
conduct, was correctly decided, it shed little light on why Sitz—in which the po-
lice definitionally sought evidence of the crime of drunk driving—should in-
stead be seen as having a civil purpose.
199. E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that programmatic purpose
of drug interdiction roadblock was criminal investigation); see infra text accompanying notes 213-36.
Although the apparent subjective purpose of the police and hospital workers in doing cocaine test-
ing of pregnant women was to improve their health and that of their future children, the Ferguson
Court saw the primary programmatic purpose as being criminal investigation. But see infra note 458
(analyzing a more recent case introducing some ambiguity regarding whether subjective purposes
can ever matter).
200. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (auto junkyard records inspection had dual
purposes of protecting the market in legitimate auto parts and aiding criminal investigation into
stolen auto parts); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 352-53, 363, 370.
201. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
202. Id. at 451.
203. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 370.
204. See sources cited supra note 199.
205. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
206. Id. at 34.
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The special needs cases preceding Ferguson that involved drug and alcohol
testing did not raise difficult dual purposes problems and thus shed no light on
the apparent inconsistency between Edmond and Sitz. In not one of the pre-
Ferguson drug-testing cases was evidence turned over to criminal law enforce-
ment agents.207
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n,208 the Court thus upheld the va-
lidity of Federal Railroad Administration regulations that mandated blood and
urine drug testing of employees involved in certain train accidents or similar
tests for employees violating certain safety rules. Results were used to improve
safety, but were not provided to criminal law enforcement.
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,209 the Court also upheld a
United States Customs Service program requiring mandatory urinalysis for ap-
plicants for three types of jobs or promotions: those involving drug interdiction,
those requiring the carrying of firearms, and those in which the employee would
handle classified documents. Test results could not be used in criminal prose-
cutions of the employee without the employee’s consent.
Similarly, In 1995, in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,210 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a suspicionless random drug-testing program required for
207. See generally TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 364-68 (summarizing case law).
208. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
209. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
210. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Literally as I put my final edits on this piece into the mail, the Court
decided Board of Educ. v. Earls. No. 01-332, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4882 (U.S. June 27, 2002). There, the Te-
cumseh, Oklahoma School District adopted a Student Activities Drug Testing Policy requiring all
middle and high school students to consent to drug testing in order to participate in any extracur-
ricular activity. Students must, under the policy, take a drug test before participating in the extracur-
ricular activity, submit to random drug testing while participating, and agree to be tested any time
upon reasonable suspicion. The policy was applied in practice to the school choir, marching band,
academic team, and national honor society. The policy thus had a much wider scope than that in
Vernonia. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Nevertheless, the Court saw the
factual distinctions to be without a difference. Relying on Vernonia, the Court upheld the Tecumseh
School District policy. In doing so, the Court emphasized that “the test results are not turned over to
any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results lead to the imposition of discipline or have
any academic consequences.” Earls, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4882, at *5. Indeed, noted the Court, “the only
consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the student’s privilege of participating in extracurricular
activities.” Id. Ferguson therefore still stands alone as the only special needs drug-testing case in
which evidence was turned over to criminal law enforcement authorities.
This article addresses the consent-to-search doctrine and the question of how to distinguish
between administrative searches and those devoted to ordinary criminal investigation. The Earls
Court addressed neither point directly. Rather, the Court’s focus was on how to engage in reason-
ableness balancing once the decision has been made that a search indeed has administrative or spe-
cial needs purposes. That is a matter largely beyond the scope of this article, other than some brief
ruminations in this article’s conclusion. Accordingly, I need not discuss the rich Earls opinion much
further here.
One additional point, however, is worth noting briefly. Justice Ginsburg, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, rejected the majority’s conclusion that the
school district’s program had a “voluntary” character because the students are not required to par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities. Ginsberg explained:
Participation in such activities is a key component of school life, essential in reality for
students applying to college, and for all participants, a significant contributor to the
breadth and quality of the educational experience. [citations omitted]. Students “volun-
teer” for extracurricular pursuits in the same way they might volunteer for honors classes:
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students participating in high school or grade school interscholastic athletics in
Vernonia, Oregon. The results of the test were disclosed only to a limited class
of school personnel who had a need to know. The results were again not turned
over to criminal law enforcement.
Finally, in Chandler v. Miller,211 the Court struck down a Georgia statute re-
quiring drug testing for designated state employees, so the question whether the
results could be shared with criminal law enforcement did not matter. Moreo-
ver, in none of these four cases were criminal law enforcement agents involved
in the creation or administration of the testing programs, so the significance of
such involvement was not addressed. The Ferguson case therefore confronted
the Court for the first time with an arguably dual purpose drug-testing program
and, in addition, one with significant criminal law enforcement involvement in
its creation.
I posit that the most significant factor in choosing which of several pur-
poses for creating a drug-testing program is the “primary” one, is the social
meaning associated with the program. If the most likely meaning plausibly
given to the program by the wider citizenry is one involving catching and con-
demning criminal offenders, then the search’s primary purpose is criminal law
enforcement. If, on the other hand, the meaning most likely to be adopted by
the citizenry is some less morally-stigmatizing civil goal, then the search’s pur-
pose is primarily administrative.212 Differences in likely social meaning do not
explain all the subtleties of the case law; distinctions in the strength of the pri-
vacy interests involved also seem to matter. But, after Ferguson, the analysis of
social meaning in identifying a search as serving criminal or, instead, civil law
enforcement purposes must be understood as taking center stage.
2. The Majority Opinion
The Ferguson Court held that the urine-testing program for maternity pa-
tients had as its primary purpose the investigation of criminal activity. In so
holding, the Court drew a distinction between “ultimate goals” and “immediate
objectives.”213 The ultimate goal, said the Court, “may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs. . . .”214 But
the “immediate objective of the searches was,” in the Court’s view, “to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.”215 In other, the
They subject themselves to additional requirements, but they do so in order to take full
advantage of the education offered them.
Earls, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4882, at *43 (Ginsberg, R., dissenting). The dissent is not here relying on the
consent-to-search doctrine, but it does suggest that there is a sort of “consent continuum,” with the
degree of consent, though not itself validating an administrative search, nevertheless remaining a
relevant factor in reasonableness balancing. This approach, we will see, is in fact consistent with
views expressed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Ferguson. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 246-51. For the Earls dissenters, the degree of “consent” was so small on the facts before
them as to weigh significantly against the drug-testing program’s reasonableness.
211. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
212. See infra Part IV (examining implications of feminist social meaning theory for dual-
purposes searches and seizures).
213. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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Policy was designed to ensure the use of criminal law enforcement or its threat
as the means for achieving the end of protecting the health and safety of cocaine-
addicted pregnant women and their fetuses. The Court continued:
In our opinion, this distinction is critical. Because law enforcement involvement
always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’
view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ul-
timate, rather than immediate, purpose. Such an approach is inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment. Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program,
which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women
into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials
at every stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the closely
guarded category of “special needs.”216
The last sentence of this quote is particularly illuminating. Read literally,
that final sentence for the first time adds to the primary purpose inquiry a new
requirement for classifying a search as administrative: the search must not ex-
tensively involve criminal law enforcement officials in its design and imple-
mentation. Elsewhere, however, the Court instead uses language suggesting
that the degree of law enforcement involvement is not a separate inquiry, but
rather a critical fact in gauging what is the state’s primary purpose.217 The Court
also suggests at yet another point that the degree of law enforcement involve-
ment may at least sometimes be what distinguishes subjective purposes of state
officials from the supposedly more objective “programmatic ones” that are le-
gally controlling. Thus, the Court explained, “As respondents have repeatedly
insisted, their motive was benign rather than punitive. Such a motive cannot
justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive in-
volvement of law enforcement in the development and application of the MUSC pol-
icy.”218 Indeed, the Court declared, the “stark and unique fact that characterizes
this case is that Policy M-7 was designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct
that would be turned over to the police and that could be admissible in subse-
quent criminal prosecutions.”219 The Court explained,
To say that any therapeutic purpose did not disappear is simply to miss the
point. What matters is that under the new policy developed by the solicitor’s of-
fice and MUSC, law enforcement involvement was the means by which that
216. Id.
217. Thus the Court, in explaining the need to engage in a “close review” of the Policy’s primary
purpose, said:
In looking to the programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence in order to
determine the relevant primary purpose. . .In this case, as Judge Blake put it in her dissent
below, “it. . .is clear from the record that an initial and continuing focus of the policy was
on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers. . .” [citation omitted]. Tellingly,
the document codifying the policy incorporates the police’s operational guidelines. It de-
votes its attention to the chain of custody, the range of possible criminal charges, and the
logistics of police notification and arrests. Nowhere, however, does the document discuss
different courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant, aside from treatment for
the mother’s addiction.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82.
218. Id. at 84-85.
219. Id. at 85-86.
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therapeutic purpose was to be met. Policy M-7 was, at its core, predicated on
the use of law enforcement. The extensive involvement of law enforcement and
the threat of prosecution were, as respondents admitted, essential to the pro-
gram’s success.”220
Of what did this extensive entanglement consist? Notably, concluded the
Court, the document codifying the Policy closely details the chain of custody re-
quirements, the range of possible criminal charges, and the logistics of police
notification and arrests.221 Yet nowhere does that same Policy document discuss
different courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant apart from
treating the mother’s addiction.222 Furthermore, police and prosecutors decided
who would receive the drug screening reports and what information they
would include.223 Law enforcement officials also helped in determining the pro-
cedures to be used in urinalysis.224 They had access to Nurse Brown’s medical
files on those testing positive, attended substance abuse team meetings, received
copies of team documents, regularly discussed patient progress with the team,
and took pains to coordinate the timing and circumstances of arrests with Hos-
pital staff.225 For all these reasons, concluded the Court, “the central and indis-
pensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement
to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment.”226
Finally, the Court believed that the “invasion of privacy in this case is far
more substantial”227 than in its four earlier special needs drug testing cases. Said
the Court:
The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular
benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an extracurricu-
lar activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized
dissemination of the results to third parties. The reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is
that the results of these tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel
without her consent. . . .In none of our prior cases was there any intrusion upon
that kind of expectation.228
The degree of the privacy interests invaded was not as critical to the Court’s de-
cision as was the degree of law enforcement involvement. Nevertheless, the
nature and size of the privacy interests involves mattered, especially in distin-
guishing other cases seemingly inconsistent with the Ferguson Court’s opinion.
For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin,229 the Court upheld a warrantless search
of a probationer’s home by his probation officer upon mere reasonable suspi-
220. Id. at 83 n.20.
221. See id. at 81-82.
222. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82.
223. Id. at 82.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 82.
226. Id. at 80.
227. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. For a detailed analysis of how to gauge the extent of a privacy in-
vasion, see Privacy and Human Emotions, supra note 102.
228. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
229. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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cion. A probation officer would seem to be an agent of criminal law enforce-
ment. The Ferguson Court distinguished Griffin partly on the ground that pro-
bationers have a lesser expectation of privacy than does the public at large.230
Similarly, in New York v. Burger,231 the Court upheld a legislative scheme permit-
ting police officers to conduct warrantless, purportedly administrative searches
of the records and property of vehicle dismantling businesses in a quest for sto-
len vehicle parts, the possession of which was, of course, also a crime. Again,
the Ferguson Court distinguished Burger partly on the ground that it “involved
an industry in which the expectation of privacy in commercial premises was
‘particularly attenuated’ given the extent to which the industry in question was
closely regulated.”232 Additionally, the Court distinguished the “handful of sei-
zure cases. . .which. . .applied a balancing test to determine Fourth Amendment
reasonableness”233—that is, the suspicionless border, drunk driving, and drug
interdiction roadblock cases. The Court distinguished the interdiction cases
partly by the unexplained earlier assertion that they simply did not involve
“special needs,” but also because “those cases involved roadblock seizures,
rather than ‘the intrusive search of the body or the home.’”234
Nowhere did the Court explain why its new focus on excessive entangle-
ment with law enforcement mattered, what involvement was too much, or why
privacy interests were relevant to choosing which category of purpose to place
the search into—administrative or criminal. Moreover, the Court did not ad-
dress the reason why privacy is no longer only relevant to determining how to
weigh interests once we decide that administrative reasonableness balancing
applies. Justice Scalia, in dissent, found the majority’s efforts to distinguish ear-
lier case law unpersuasive, as do I.235 First, however, it is important to examine
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in which he found the majority’s distinction
between “immediate” and “ultimate” goals unworkable but its focus on exces-
sive entanglement wise.236
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
a) The Opinion
Justice Kennedy begins his concurrence in the judgment by declaring that
the distinction between ultimate and immediate goals is “lack[ing] foundation in
our special needs cases.”237 To Justice Kennedy, all the Court’s special needs
cases turned on what the majority would now call the policy’s ultimate goals.
For example, he noted,
[I]n Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), had we em-
ployed the majority’s distinction, we would have identified as the relevant need
230. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15.
231. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
232. 532 U.S. at 83 n.21.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 91-104 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas).
236. Id. at 86-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87.
TASLITZ_FMT.DOC 06/10/03 9:03 AM
34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 9:1 2002
the collection of evidence of drug and alcohol use by railway employees. In-
stead, we identified the relevant need as “[t ]he Government’s interest in regu-
lating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure [railroad] safety.” Id. at 620.
In Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the majority’s
distinction should have compelled us to isolate the relevant need as the gather-
ing of evidence of drug abuse by would-be drug interdiction officers. Instead,
the special needs the Court identified were the necessities “to deter drug use
among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the [United
States Customs Service] and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those po-
sitions. Id. at 666. In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the
majority’s distinction would have required us to identify the policy as further-
ing what today’s majority would have termed the policy’s ultimate goal: “deter-
ring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren,” and particularly by student-
athletes, because “the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those
with whom he is playing sport is particularly high.”238
Justice Kennedy’s point was that “[b]y very definition, in almost every case
the immediate purpose of a search policy will be to obtain evidence.”239 That this
is so, he said, “reveals nothing about the need it serves.”240 Put another way,
procuring evidence has until today, in his view, “not been identified as the spe-
cial need which justifies the search.”241
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment because of the
substantial involvement of law enforcement in the policy from its inception.
None of the earlier special needs cases could, in his view, fairly be read to “sus-
tain the active use of law enforcement, including arrest and prosecutions, as an
integral part of a program which seeks to achieve legitimate civil objectives.”242
The Court waived the traditional probable cause and warrant requirements in
earlier special needs cases on the “explicit assumption that the evidence ob-
tained in the search is not intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.”243
Here, by contrast, the Hospital acted “as an institutional arm of law enforcement
for purposes of the policy.”244 Although the policy “may well have served le-
gitimate needs unrelated to law enforcement,” he declared, “it had as well a pe-
nal character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other
searches sustained under our special needs rationale.”245
Significantly, however, Justice Kennedy went on to discuss the role of con-
sent in special needs cases. Indeed, he said, “[a]n essential distinguishing fea-
ture of the special needs cases is that the person searched has consented, though
the usual voluntariness analysis is altered because adverse consequences (e.g.,
dismissal from employment or disqualification from playing on a high school
sports team) will follow from refusal.”246 Such consent does not automatically
238. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 88.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 88-89.
246. Id. at 90-91.
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resolve the matter in favor of the state, as would be the case with ordinary
criminal searches, because “the consent was not voluntary in the full sense of the
word.”247 Consent demanded as a condition of employment or participation in
an activity, while not true or complete consent, therefore still bore “upon the
reasonableness of the whole special needs program.”248 Justice Kennedy thus
bemoaned the “artificial context” of the consent issue not being squarely before
the Court.249 “Had we the prerogative to discuss the role played by consent, the
case might have been quite a different one,” he maintained, even if it were only
consent “with the special connotation used in the special needs cases. . . .”250
Justice Kennedy seems to be suggesting the possibility that even if the Court ul-
timately finds some sort of consent but obtained by a refusal otherwise to treat
the patients, that consent might render the searches reasonable. On the other
hand, he insisted that he had no preconceived notions and was not addressing
whether limits might be imposed on the use of the evidence if it turned out to
have been obtained with the patient’s consent.251
b) Kennedy’s Confusion
Justice Kennedy’s critique of the application of the “immediate/ultimate
purpose” distinction to the four earlier special needs drug-testing cases is not
entirely persuasive. He is correct that in every special needs case, the immediate
purpose is to obtain evidence. But that was not the majority’s point. The pur-
pose of the Hospital in Ferguson was to obtain evidence specifically for the pur-
pose of threatening to prosecute or actually prosecuting women who tested
positive for cocaine. In none of the other special needs drug cases was the evi-
dence obtained for the purpose of aiding the state in using its criminal justice
system to coerce compliance with behavior serving a health, safety, or other so-
cial goal purportedly independent from criminal law enforcement, as Kennedy
concedes. Indeed, in none of the earlier cases was criminal prosecution even a
possibility before the Court.252
Most ordinary criminal cases also serve goals other than criminal prosecu-
tion, such as protecting people’s safety from assailants, their financial stability
from thieves, or their health from charlatans.253 There seems to be little logical
247. Id. On this point, Justice Kennedy is correct. See infra text accompanying notes 279-457 (ap-
plying feminist consent theory to the Ferguson facts).




252. See supra text accompanying notes 207-11 (summarizing case law).
253. Cf. Burger, 482 U.S. at 712-13. The Court in Burger said:
[A] State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme
and through penal sanctions, Administrative statutes and penal laws may have the same
ultimate purpose of remedying the social problem, but they have different subsidiary pur-
poses and prescribe different methods of addressing the problem. . . .
In United States v. Biswell, we recognized this fact that both administrative and penal
schemes can serve the same purposes by observing that the ultimate purposes of the [ad-
ministrative] Gun Control Act were “to prevent violent crime and to assist the states in
regulating the firearms traffic within their borders.” It is beyond dispute that certain state
penal laws had these same purposes.
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difference in purpose between prosecuting a defendant for possessing cocaine,
but with the understanding that the charges will be dismissed if the offender
completes a drug treatment therapy program, and requiring an addicted mother
to obtain such treatment or face later criminal prosecution. In both cases, the
threat of criminal prosecution is the intended means for saving the addict from
her addiction.254 The earlier special needs drug-testing cases, which did not in-
volve the prospect of criminal prosecution at all, do not therefore seem to me to
be the hard ones, though I will shortly offer some reasons below for this asser-
tion other than my own sense that most people’s likely intuitions would agree
with me about this point.
The hard cases are instead the roadblock and other dual purposes cases.
Although the Court has insisted that the roadblock cases do not involve special
needs, the Court admits that both types of cases turn on the presence or absence
of a primary purpose other than criminal law enforcement.255 Absent unusual
circumstances like impending terrorist acts, the Court also agrees that ordinary
criminal searches presumptively require probable cause and a warrant or one of
the recognized exceptions to those requirements.256 No such presumption gov-
erns cases where the purpose of the search is to serve a civil goal.257 Purported
differences in the degree of invasion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment in-
terests in roadblock and special needs drug-testing cases should thus not be the
critical factor distinguishing administrative from ordinary criminal searches.
Primary purpose, suggests the Court’s pre-Ferguson case law, is a far more im-
portant consideration. But neither logic nor psychology can determine which
purpose is “primary” and which “secondary.” Value judgments are ultimately
involved.
The roadblock cases illustrate this last point. In those cases, the very evi-
dence sought—that of drunk driving—establishes a crime. The clear purpose of
the state in such cases seems simultaneously and equally to protect roadway
safety and to prosecute criminally those who endanger that safety, the Court’s
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.258
Unlike the majority, Justice Kennedy arguably sees the degree of law en-
forcement involvement in creating and implementing a search policy as an inde-
pendent concern from determining primary purpose.259 Yet this does not explain
Id. (citations omitted). I do not cite the Burger case to approve of either its specific holding (that there
was indeed an administrative search there involved), or its distinction between “ultimate” and “sub-
sidiary” purposes. Rather, the above quote merely emphasizes that criminal prosecutions often si-
multaneously serve arguably “civil” purposes as well.
254. See infra text accompanying notes 568-77 (discussing “drug courts,” criminal courts com-
bining punishment with therapy).
255. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
256. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
257. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 349-51.
258. See id. at 368-70 (summarizing roadblock cases).
259. Justice Kennedy is admittedly ambiguous on this point, see Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86-88, but
the better interpretation of his position is that purpose and law enforcement involvement are inde-
pendent inquiries. For example, he emphasizes that none of the Court’s precedents sanctioned the
routine inclusion of law enforcement as an integral part of a program that “seeks [i.e., is intended] to
achieve legitimate, civil objectives.” Id. at 88. Nevertheless, he declares, despite this intention, ex-
tensive law enforcement involvement gives the search “as well a penal character. . . .” Id. at 89.
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the roadblock cases. In every roadblock case, criminal law enforcement agents
played the major role in designing and administering the policies.260 With one
extreme exception, the Court has nevertheless upheld suspicionless, warrantless
roadblocks.261 None of these seizures can be deemed free of extensive law en-
forcement involvement, yet they were upheld as valid administrative searches.262
But in Ferguson, there were either two equal purposes—one administrative, one
criminal—or, in the ordinary sense of the term, the major motivating force was a
beneficent civil goal: to help drug-addicted women get off cocaine. These pur-
poses, combined with extensive law enforcement involvement, still resulted in
striking down the searches as ordinary criminal-law-enforcement-related intru-
sions. My position, explained in Part IV of this article, is that this apparent in-
consistency can be explained in two ways: first, as in the area of consent, the
Court saw the nature of the human relationships involved as important; second,
the degree of social stigma between the cases varied. Even the threat of a pur-
portedly justified criminal prosecution of a mother, especially a poor, African-
American mother, for child abuse carries enormous social stigma that prosecu-
tions for drunk driving where no one is hurt still do not. Moreover, non-
consensual criminal-investigation-related searches of pregnant women by their
doctors invade sacred parent-child and doctor-patient relationships that are not
invaded with seized suspected drunk drivers.263 The feminist focus on human
relationships, emotions, power inequalities, and social meaning therefore once
again offers the best explanation of Ferguson’s meaning.264
It was precisely these sorts of concerns which Justice Scalia rejected in his
dissent.
H. Justice Scalia’s Dissent Revisited
Although, as discussed earlier, Justice Scalia believed that the urine tests of
the pregnant women were consensual and that provision of the test results to
the police did not constitute a search, he nevertheless argued in the alternative
that the testing was a “special needs” search.265 The district court’s finding of
fact that the goal of the testing policy “was not to arrest patients but to facilitate
their treatment and protect both the mother and unborn child”266 was binding
upon the high Court unless clearly erroneous.267 In Justice Scalia’s view, that
finding was amply supportable.
Justice Scalia rejected the majority’s argument that the “addition of a law-
enforcement-related purpose to a legitimate medical purpose destroys applica-
260. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 368-70 (summarizing roadblock cases).
261. See id. (summarizing case law). The one extreme exception is Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (explain-
ing that drug interdiction roadblocks clearly served the primary purpose of criminal law enforce-
ment rather than civil purposes, such as protecting driver and passenger safety, because the searches
sought evidence of illegal drug use and not evidence of drug intoxication at the time of driving).
262. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 368-70.
263. See infra text accompanying notes 514-604.
264. See infra Part V.A.
265. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98-99.
266. Id. at 98 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at A-38).
267. Id.
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bility of the ‘special needs’ doctrine.”268 “[T]hat is quite impossible,” Justice
Scalia continued, “since the special-needs doctrine was developed, and is ordi-
narily employed, precisely to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of
course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective.”269
Justice Scalia illustrated this conclusion by analogy to Griffin v. Wisconsin.270
Griffin, as mentioned earlier, involved a warrantless search of a probationer’s
home by a probation officer. That officer was prompted to search by a tip he
had received from a detective, reporting that the probationer illegally possessed
a firearm. The probation officer conducted his search accompanied by the police
and indeed found a weapon, leading to the probationer’s trial for its unlawful
possession. The Court affirmed a denial of the probationer’s motion to suppress
because the special need of assuring his compliance with the terms of his release
justified the warrantless search. The Court noted that the probation officer is
not:
[T]he police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen.
He is an employee of the State Department of Health and Social Services who,
while assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to
have in mind the welfare of the probationer. . . .In such a setting, we think it rea-
sonable to dispense with the warrant requirement.271
Justice Scalia thought that Griffin squarely controlled Ferguson:
Like the probation officer, the doctors here do not “ordinarily conduct
searches against the ordinary citizen,” and they are “supposed to have in mind
the welfare of the mother and child.” That they have in mind in addition the
provision of evidence to the police should make no difference. The Court sug-
gests that if police involvement in this case was in some way incidental and af-
ter-the-fact, that would make a difference in the outcome. . .But in Griffin, even
more than here, police were involved in the search from the very beginning; in-
deed, the initial tip about the gun came from a detective. Under the factors re-
lied upon by the [Ferguson] Court, the use of evidence approved in Griffin would
have been permitted only if the parole officer had been untrained in chain-of-
custody procedures, had not known of the possibility a gun was present, and
had been unaccompanied by police when he simply happened upon the
weapon. Why any or all of these is constitutionally significant is baffling.272
Justice Scalia further rejected the effort to distinguish Griffin on the ground
that probationers have lesser privacy expectations than does the general public.
Even if that is true, that observation, said Scalia, is irrelevant to his central point:
that the presence of a law enforcement purpose does not exclude application of
the special needs doctrine. Scalia thus also rejected Justice Kennedy’s argument
in concurrence that the special needs cases “do not sustain the active use of law
enforcement. . .as an integral part of a program which seeks to achieve legiti-
mate, civil objectives.”273 Said Justice Scalia:
268. Id. at 99.
269. Id.
270. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
271. Id. at 876-77.
272. 532 U.S. at 101.
273. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Griffin shows that is not true. Indeed, Griffin shows that there is not even any
truth in the more limited proposition that our cases do not support application
of the special-needs exception where the “legitimate, civil objectives” are sought
only through the use of law enforcement means. (Surely the parole officer in
Griffin was using the threat of reincarceration to assure compliance with pa-
role.)274
Justice Scalia might be saying that whenever there are dual purposes—one
administrative, the other criminal-investigation-related—the former always
controls. If so, he would be correct to view Griffin and Ferguson as inconsistent.
Both should have been denominated “special needs” searches. But such an ap-
proach would be flatly inconsistent with the Court’s express emphasis on
choosing a “primary” purpose as the governing one.275 If Justice Scalia is im-
plicitly focusing on social meaning, however, then his reading of the meanings
likely to be perceived by society’s ordinary citizens would also render the Griffin
and Ferguson cases inconsistent. He sees both Griffin and Ferguson as involving
do-gooders (probation officers who rehabilitate, doctors who heal) and who are
strong enough to use “tough love” to help their charges.276 Both should there-
fore be viewed as administrative searches.
But the Court majority had a very different implicit view of the social
meaning associated respectively with the Griffin and Ferguson searches. For the
majority, probation officers are indeed “do-gooders.” But the Ferguson doctors
worked hand-in-hand with the police to use threats, and the actuality, of crimi-
nal prosecution of pregnant women for abusing their unborn children, an action
imposing precisely the sort of dramatic stigma associated with the criminal jus-
tice system, despite the likely similarity in the subjective intentions of both pro-
bation officers and medical personnel to aid needy others.277 If this characteriza-
tion of social meaning is accepted, the two cases require the very different
results embraced by the majority; the two opinions are, therefore, fully consis-
tent.
My own view is that ordinary citizens and even elites would understand
searches by probation officers as criminal-investigation-related, though I have
274. Id. at 102 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 213-36.
276. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103-04, where Scalia declared,
When the doctors and nurses agreed to the program providing test results to the police,
they did so because (in addition to the fact that child abuse was required by law to be re-
ported) they wanted to use the sanction of arrest as a strong incentive for their addicted
patients to undertake drug-addiction treatment. And the police themselves used it for that
benign purpose, as is shown by the fact that only 30 of 253 women testing positive for co-
caine were ever arrested, and only 2 of those prosecuted. . . .It would not be unreasonable
to conclude that today’s judgment, authorizing the assessment of damages against the
county solicitor and individual doctors and nurses who participated in the program,
proves once again that no good deed goes unpunished.
See also id. at 101 (characterizing probation officers as those supposed to have probationers’ welfare
in mind and the Ferguson doctors as those supposed to have the welfare of mother and child in
mind).
277. See infra Part V.
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no empirical data to support my intuition.278 If I am right, then Griffin was
wrongly decided. But if I am wrong, then Griffin and Ferguson are, contrary to
Justice Scalia’ view, quite consistent.
I will return to the question of social meaning in Part V. For now, having
examined the relevant doctrine concerning consensual and administrative
searches, I further explore Ferguson’s significance by examining applicable femi-
nist theory, beginning with feminist understandings of “consent.”
IV. FEMINISM AND THE CONSENT TO SEARCH
Feminist theory on the meaning of “consent” in sexual assault and sexual
harassment cases often reflects an understanding of consent that is strikingly
similar to that embodied in the Ferguson majority’s opinion on the consent-to-
search doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.279 Under the current law defin-
ing rape, for example, the absence of force or its threat is generally equated with
the presence of consent.280 Consent and voluntariness thus mean the same thing,
with voluntariness defined as the absence of physical coercion or its equivalent.
Many feminists reject this “masculine” notion of voluntariness. Instead, coer-
cion is seen to inhere in a broader set of threats of economic or reputational, and
278. Noted criminal law scholar R.A. Duff, for example, rejects the idea that probation officers
provide merely therapeutic, rather than punitive, services. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 99-105 (2001). Duff explains:
The first and basic element [of probation] is supervision. The offender is required to report
regularly to his probation officer. This enables her to keep a formal check on his behavior,
and provides a structure within which he can seek and she can offer advice and help in
avoiding future criminal conduct. It is a punishment—a burden imposed on him by the
court for his offense. Implicit in it is the censure that his crime deserves. That censure, as
thus communicated, makes clear the implications of his crime: for this punishment tells
him that his commission of the crime cast doubt on his commitment to the community’s
public values (the values embodied in the criminal law), threatening to undermine the
mutual trust on which the community depends; he must therefore subject himself to a
kind of supervision that other citizens need not accept. But it is a punishment that looks to
the future. Through this supervision he will, we hope, come to face up to the need to
amend his future conduct and be helped to show how to achieve such amendment.
Id. at 101.
279. Some feminist theorists entirely reject the idea that the absence of consent should be central
to the law of sexual assault or sexual harassment. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 245 (1989) (“Rape should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which
physical force is one form. Lack of consent is redundant and should not be a separate element of the
crime.”); STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF
LAW 82-83 (1998) (suggesting that MacKinnon would easily find compulsion given her view of sharp
power inequalities favoring men in virtually all heterosexual relationships and seeing her idea of
“compulsion” as very different from the idea of “consent.”). I need not explore here the wisdom of
these theories. My concern is to define “consent,” so I necessarily rely on feminist theorists who find
the consent concept viable and go about the task of giving it meaning.
280. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 114 (“In the existing law of rape, it remains per-
fectly legal for a man to use coercive pressure to compel a woman’s consent to sex. Flagrant threats
are treated as part of the permissible repertoire of sexual bargaining, provided they steer clear of
arousing fear of physical harm.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories: Culture Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S ST. 387, 422-24, 448-53 (1996) [hereinafter Patriarchal Stories]
(explaining the cultural and psychological processes that makes the current law-in-action denomi-
nate sex as “non-consensual” only if obtained by the use of a significant measure of force).
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not only physical, harm.281 Indeed, even some offers, although not rising to the
level of “threats,” can be seen as “coercive,” exploiting certain women’s vulner-
abilities and weaker bargaining position, vulnerabilities often partly created by
the men whose conduct is challenged.282 Every situation involves limited choices
and pressures to favor one option over another.283 How much and what sorts of
pressures and option limitations are unacceptable, rendering the choice invol-
untary, is a value-laden exercise.284 For many feminists, the value of female sex-
ual autonomy is sufficiently high that it must be protected against particularly
powerful sorts of economic and social manipulation that can overbear a
woman’s will.285 Thus, if the boss of a mother of two who is struggling to pay
her rent offers to give the woman an undeserved promotion in exchange for
sexual favors, that exploits the woman’s financial vulnerability, rendering her
choice not truly voluntary.286 Careful attention to gendered power imbalances,
and to circumstantial evidence of the case-specific maldistribution of parties’
power, as well as the availability of a keen sensitivity to the role of emotion in
human interaction, characterizes the feminist approaches to “voluntary” sexual
contact.287
More importantly, however, is that, for feminists, voluntariness is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for consent.288 Consent is partly a performative,
permission-giving act that alters the moral relationship between two parties
such that one obtains a privilege to do what he otherwise would have no right to
do.289 But that act must also be accompanied by an appropriate quality of will—
a fully informed, deliberative choice.290 Because consent involves deciding what
281. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 82-83 (summarizing some of the relevant theories);
KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 53-56 (1996) (summarizing radical
feminist theories that view “rape as degradation” in a context of widespread power inequalities).
282. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 137-67 (defining coercive sexual offers); BURGESS-
JACKSON, supra note 281, at 95-102 (discussing the significance of “manipulated vulnerability”—vic-
tim vulnerability deliberately created by the wrongdoer, and “non-manipulated vulnerability”—cre-
ated by circumstances, including culture—in conservative, liberal, and radical theories of rape).
283. See Patriarchal Stories, supra note 280, at 422.
284. See id.
285. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 139-64 (recounting various ways in which economic and
social power can undermine female sexual autonomy).
286. See id. at 141-45, 161 (offering a series of analogous examples).
287. See id. at 139-64 (demonstrating these qualities). See generally Emotions in Date Rape, supra
note 102 (emphasizing the importance of human emotions and power imbalances in understanding
the law of rape).
288. See, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 43-45 (1998) (explaining that valid consent re-
quires the capacity to do so, adequate information concerning all material facts, and voluntariness).
See generally Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102 (arguing that reasonable, affirmative communica-
tive efforts to determine a woman’s wishes should be necessary in proving any man’s consent de-
fense to a charge of rape).
289. See Brenda M. Baker, Understanding Consent in Sexual Assault, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME:
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 49, 51-52 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999) (adopting such a
formulation of “consent”); cf. ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 3-6 (explaining that consent requires a
positive, intentional act in addition to cognitive, dispositional, and volitional states of mind).
290. See Patricia Kazan, Sexual Assault and the Problem of Consent, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, 27-41 (Stanley French et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that the soundest
model of consent is both performative and attitudinal, the latter requiring adequately informed
choice); see also ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 43-44 (arguing that informed choice, especially as it re-
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combination of act and will should alter moral obligations and legal rights, the
choice of the standard for finding consent and the rules for proving it must vary
with context.291 Some feminists argue for especially high standards of sexual
consent because of the serious psychological and social consequences for the
parties; the need to offset the women’s relative vulnerability and physical, psy-
chological, social, or financial disadvantage relative to many men; and the im-
portance of reinforcing a newly-emerging conception of the woman’s self as an
autonomous adult whose self-determined choices about what happened to her
body merit respect.292 Moreover, these feminists see sexual interaction as being
not only about the individuals involved but also about men and women as a
group.293 Higher standards of consent give women more sexual bargaining
power, in turn giving them a greater ability successfully to struggle for eco-
nomic, intellectual, and political independence.294 The fate of the group in the
battles of sexual politics is at stake.295
For similar reasons, other feminists press for a high evidentiary burden for
proving consent in addition to a muscular definition of sexual consent itself. As
one theorist explains, “the greater the harms that would result from acting on
the false assumption that consent has been given, the better grounded should be
the belief that it has been.”296 This observation is especially apt where, as with
sexuality, the understanding of a social conventions’ meaning is open to differ-
ing interpretations (such miscommunication often occurring between men and
women) and the possibility of directly confirming or refuting a particular inter-
pretation easily available, perhaps by asking whether a nod means “yes” or just
“maybe.”297 High standards of proof require clear, affirmative indications of a
“yes” rather than its presumption from conventional norms.298 Wearing a low-
cut dress, downing a few drinks, and not verbally protesting against an aggres-
sive male’s escalating sexual overtures is therefore insufficient to establish the
woman’s consent.299
Even those feminists who are less willing to heighten the substantive and
procedural concepts governing sexual consent are likely ready to do so for inter-
lates to what it is that a person consents to being exposed, should be central to proving legal con-
sent); Baker, supra note 289, at 56.
291. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 289, at 60-64 (arguing for a variable, context-specific notion of
consent).
292. See id. at 60-61.
293. See, e.g., Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102.
294. See, e.g., LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSEN, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 3-4 (1998)
(arguing that the law has always played a role in apportioning sexual bargaining power between
men and women).
295. Cf. RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 33, at 134-48 (discussing group impact resulting from in-
dividual rape trials).
296. ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 15.
297. See id. at 14-15; SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 58-62 (explaining that men and women may
on average make sharply different assumptions about when a woman’s conduct signals her con-
sent).
298. See ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 15-16, 28 (summarizing the “good reasons” for adopting a
contextual affirmative consent approach); SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 99-113, 267-73 (sexual
autonomy requires an affirmative consent standard).
299. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 269-70 (using similar example).
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actions in certain settings or particular relationships where the male-female
power imbalance is significant and severe, as it may be for a woman employee
facing a male-dominated management.300
These feminists’ general analyses of consent provide useful guidelines for
better understanding the consent-to-search doctrine explored in Ferguson. Criti-
cally, many feminist thinkers draw analogies to the idea of informed consent in
the doctor-patient relationship of obvious relevance in Ferguson.301 Informed
consent to medical procedures is a requirement rooted partly in the right to bod-
ily autonomy; informed consent to erotic contact is an aspiration rooted partly in
the suggested and related right to sexual autonomy.302
A. Informed Consent
Sex matters to our core sense of identity.303 Sex is often about far more than
just physical pleasure. Sex opens us up to physical and emotional vulnerability.
That self-exposure is one critical way to explore a particular set of human rela-
tionships critical to a meaningful life.304 Sex is a way to express love, to procre-
ate, to start a family.305 The individual’s quest for a mate or life partner; the so-
cial contest over gay rights; the obsession with romantic love in songs, movies,
literature, and plays all reflect the centrality of sexual interaction in humans’
lives.306
300. Feminists who oppose heightened standards in rape cases “worry that treating passivity or
ambivalence as nonconsent will ‘patronize’ women, who should be assumed capable of asserting
their own wishes.” SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 269. But laws against sexual harassment can be
justified by the female victim’s need for personal retribution, hardly a hallmark of passivity, and
workplace imbalances can be seen as turning on case-specific economic disparities, rather than on
stereotyped notions of female passivity. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s
Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 305, 324-30, 342-54 (2001) (discussing
retribution and sexual harassment). Although sexual harassment has implications for women as a
group, see id. at 342-54, the concept can also be understood as defending against individual power
disparities to which either sex can be subjected. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 172-73 (making a
similar point, while noting that it is nevertheless statistically rare for men to be workplace harass-
ment victims). Professor Schulhofer has described the dynamics of the economic disparity:
Even when a subordinate feels able to rebuff her boss’s attentions, his advance can cast a
cloud over their working relationship. The subordinate may be left feeling physically self-
conscious and professionally vulnerable, sensing that she was placed in a sexual role and
that her professional boundaries were not respected. She may worry that she will no
longer receive desirable assignments, that her work won’t be evaluated fairly, that pro-
motions she might have gained will now go to others. Yet her only alternative may be to
submit.
Id. at 173.
301. See infra text accompanying notes 332-38.
302. Id.
303. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, RELIGION
AS ANALOGUES 172-75 (1999) (explaining how gender and sexual orientation are central to key as-
pects of personal identity).
304. See ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 19-22.
305. See id. at 21.
306. See id. at 21 (discussing sex and personal relationships); RICHARDS, supra note 303, at 172, 75
(discussing gay rights); Patriarchal Stories, supra note 280, at 429-65 (discussing media, myths, and
sexuality’s centrality).
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Sex is also about power.307 If death is, in practice, the penalty for female but
not male adultery, as is still true in some cultures, wives will be reluctant to
leave their homes because of the dangers of suspicious contact with other men.308
If the heterosexual majority abhors homosexual acts, openly gay citizens risk
ostracism and job discrimination, while closeted gays may avoid political activ-
ity for fear of exposure.309 When women have little say over when and how they
will engage in sexual activity, they may cling to otherwise unsatisfying male
lovers rather than risk being alone on the streets, and their lack of sexual choice
itself marks them as a degraded caste of citizens, unworthy of equal access to
economic and political power.310
The right to sexual autonomy—to decide whether and when we become
sexually intimate with another—is therefore seen by feminists as among the
most important of personal rights and liberties.311 Autonomy is the right to self-
rule. Random, careless, misinformed, or coerced choices are not acts of true self-
307. See Patriarchal Stories, supra note 280, at 394-429 (reviewing social and psychological proc-
esses by which sexual interactions negotiate power relationships).
308. See Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A Com-
parative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281 (2002) (discussing two asylum claims by Pakistani women whose husbands
accused them of adultery, therefore physically abusing them and forcing them to leave their homes,
making them vulnerable to possible criminal prosecution, which, under Pakistan’s then-governing
interpretation of Sharia law, could subject the women to flogging or being stoned to death); Azizah
Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women’s Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and Opportunities, 15 J.L. &
RELIG. 37, 62 n.144 (2001) (noting that varying interpretations of the Prophet Mohammed’s words
arguably equate adultery, in some scholars’ view, with “leaving the marital home without permis-
sion”).
I am not an Islamic scholar and take no position on what the Prophet meant or what Sharia
means. Indeed a complex system of proof can make actual conviction for adultery difficult even
where death is a possible penalty. See Kathryn Christine Arnold, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings
Getting Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1343, 1364 n.108
(2001) (Islamic law calls for four male witnesses or repeated confessions to prove adultery). Moreo-
ver, in theory similar penalties may, in some nations giving Sharia law a conservative interpretation,
be equally imposed upon men and women. See Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need Worlds Collide: The Hudad
Crimes of Islamic Law and International Human Rights, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 43, 66 (2000). However, the
law on the books and the law in practice can be very different. See John R. Schmertz and Mike
Meier, House of Lords Finds Two Pakistani Women Entitled to Asylum in England Because Official Paki-
stani Discrimination Against Women Establishes Gender As “Particular Social Group” Under U.N. Conven-
tion and Protocol on Refugee Status, 5 INT’L L. UPDATE 78, 1007-08 (1999) (although Pakistani law pur-
ported to prohibit discrimination on grounds of sex, there is strong discrimination against married
women, who are subordinate to their husbands, husbands who frequently charge their wives with
adultery, which may result in whipping or stoning; where the most severe punishments are in-
volved, the evidence of women is not even admissible; half the women prisoners in Pakistan have
been arrested on adultery-like charges under which they can be held for years without any evidence
of their crime).
309. See Privacy and Human Emotions, supra note 102 (tracing connection between expanded gay
privacy rights and growing gay political power); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 13-138 (1999) (tracing the history of the “apartheid of the closet”).
310. See RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 33, at 134-48 (explaining how rape and rape law-in-
practice limit women’s access to economic and political power); see also Patriarchal Stories, supra note
280, at 397-400 (summarizing social science information on how women’s autonomy is restricted by
their fear of rape).
311. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 99-101.
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governance but rather of other-governance, or reflective of an impaired capacity
for self-initiated law.312 Autonomy therefore minimally requires mental compe-
tence and an awareness of options and of information sufficient to enable the
individual intelligently to choose among the range of available alternatives.313
Many philosophers would go further, requiring the availability of a significant
array of reasonable alternatives and extensive information about the pertinent
facts, along with freedom from deception and preferences and capacities undis-
torted by overwhelming cultural influences.314 Adequate education and a cul-
ture supportive of introspection are also essential to the deliberation that self-
rule requires.315
True consent therefore requires knowledge of precisely to what it is you are
consenting and what that entails.316 You need not know everything, but you
must know everything that would make a real difference to whether and to
what you would consent, including awareness of what may happen to you and
to others as a consequence.317
Vulnerability to, and dependence upon, another can make the idea of in-
formed choice even more important.318 An eleven year old child who accepts her
father’s representations that sex between them is natural and will bring them
closer suffers from a lack of accurate and complete information, an insufficient
capacity for deliberation, and a betrayal of her father’s trust.319
The problem of date rape can sometimes be understood as a failure to en-
sure the presence of a woman’s informed consent. The man might sincerely be-
lieve, based on the woman’s actions, that she has consented when indeed she
has not. That confusion may stem from very different understandings of the
meaning of certain actions, a gendered communication gap.320 Preconceptions of
the males as the sexual aggressors, women as the passive recipients, linger
still.321 A woman may believe that she has adequately conveyed her non-
consent, but the man perceives that she is playing coy and persists. She may
interpret that persistence as indicating that he does not care about her lack of
consent, thereby becoming frightened and submitting to his will.322 At least one
survey study supports this scenario. In a 1992 survey, 22% of American women
reported at least one incident in which they felt that they were forced to have
sex. But only 3% of American men felt that they had ever forced sex on any
312. See RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 33, at 139-40 (defining individual and collective self-rule
and exploring their diminishment by current procedural and substantive rape laws).
313. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 105.
314. See id. at 105-06.
315. See id.
316. See ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 46.
317. Id.
318. See Baker, supra note 289, at 56-57.
319. Id.
320. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 58-61.
321. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 24-31 (summarizing social science on this point).
322. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 62; Robin Weiner, Shifting the Communication Burden: A
Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 143, 147-49 (1983).
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woman.323 Either those three percent are extraordinarily geographically mobile
and sexually active, or there is a good deal of “unintended” rape going on.
A clear warning to a woman could avoid this sort of misunderstanding.
Such a warning might require the man in the particular instance to say, “Do you
understand that I am assuming the following set of conventions and that if you
behave in the following way (for example, “seeming to protest but then silently
submitting when I persist”), I will take that as a sign of your consent?” Of
course, this strikes us as absurd, too formal for a romantic relationship and
surely devoid of spontaneity. But a similar result can be achieved, and has been
proposed, in another fashion: communicative sex or the requirement of an af-
firmative “yes.”324 Such a standard simply requires a man not to proceed with a
sexual act in the face of mere silence or submission. The man must either spon-
taneously receive an affirmative “yes,” either by words or by unequivocal ac-
tions, such as the woman’s moving the man’s hand to her genitalia, or must ask
the woman for such an expression as to that particular act.325 An affirmative
“yes” to one sort of sexual act does not adequately respect sexual autonomy if it
is taken as consent to all other sexual acts. Consent to act “A” is not consent to
act “B” unless the consenter understood that consequence to follow.326
Other options are possible. We might rely on “quasi-consent”—the idea
that the woman should have known that certain of her actions would be relied
upon by the man as indicating consent.327 Many women do in fact, studies show,
engage in precisely the coy, “feigned resistance” that many men imagine.328 But
given the diversity of women’s understandings of sexual behavior, the impor-
tance of the right to sexual autonomy, and the grave dangers of physical, social,
and psychic harm to the women, it seems wiser to place the risk of error on the
man, at least up until the point that the man has made proper efforts to obtain,
and has received, a clear, affirmative “yes.”329
A third solution—privileging the man’s actual perceptions—like the second
solution, which privileges his reasonable perceptions—suffers from a similar
flaw: it safeguards the man’s right to sexual autonomy but not the woman’s.330 I
have spoken so far, for simplicity’s sake, of the man’s seeking an affirmative
“yes.” But the same test should apply to the rarer instance in which the woman
wrongly believed that the man was consenting to the woman’s sexual aggres-
323. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA 221 (1994).
324. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 4-8, 52-64 (defining and defending communica-
tive sexuality); SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 254-73 (defending an “affirmative yes” standard that
does not necessarily require a verbal yes but does require some equivalent action).
325. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 254-73 (discussing affirmative yes standard); ARCHARD,
supra note 288, at 6-7 (explaining that consent to a particular sexual act is not consent to all others).
326. See ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 6-10. Archard favors communicative sexuality and an af-
firmative yes standard primarily for couples who are strangers or are uncertain about the status of
their relationship. See id. at 27-28, 146-47.
327. See id. at 13-14.
328. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 63-65 (summarizing social science); Emotions in Date
Rape, supra note 102, at 24-27 (similar).
329. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 52-54. Accord ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 9-10,
14-16.
330. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 30-31.
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sions. Each must seek clear communication from the other if the sexual auton-
omy of both is to be honored.331
This feminist reliance on informed consent draws heavily from the law’s
development of similar concepts concerning a patient’s consent to medical pro-
cedures.332 Medical procedures, especially invasive ones, implicate the right to
bodily autonomy.333 Like violation of the right to sexual autonomy, violation of
bodily autonomy can cause grievous physical, emotional, social, and economic
pain.334 A serious but successful surgery can mean months of painkillers, physi-
cal therapy, high doctor’s bills, social isolation, strained marital and parental
relationships, and lost time from work. A botched operation can be far worse,
confining the patient to a lifetime in a wheelchair and perhaps years of self-pity,
struggling to regain the respect of self and others.335 Moreover, just as a sexual
relationship may place a woman in a vulnerable situation so that she trusts her
lover not to do what she does not want, so does a patient trust a doctor only to
proceed with the procedures the patient desires and in a fashion that the patient
fairly understands as protecting his own interests.336 Finally, just as women’s
understandings of sexual conventions and sexual desires vary, so may patients’
understanding of what they will undergo and its value and consequences
vary.337 Rather than too easily risk error, the doctor should encourage a fully in-
formed patient choice.338
Increasingly, therefore, an adult patient’s right to decide what should be
done to his or her body, not the doctor’s choices or assumptions, determine
what constitutes informed consent.339 In Canterbury v. Spence,340 for example,
Judge Spottswood Robinson, IIII explicitly rejected “good medical practice,” that
is, “what a reasonable practitioner would have supplied,” as the test for what
information the doctor must reveal.341 Judge Robinson impliedly recognized that
the patient’s right to bodily autonomy is not honored if the doctor’s reasonable per-
ceptions control. Instead, Justice Robinson required the doctor to provide all in-
331. See id. at 24-27, 74-76 (explaining that both men and women must be judged responsible for
their sexual emotions and actions, though it is most often men who will be in the role of aggressor).
Whether the absence of an affirmative “yes” requires criminal or merely civil penalties is not a mat-
ter that I need to address here because it is the meaning of “consent” rather than the proper remedies
for its violation that is one of this article’s chief concerns. Compare SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at
283-84 (proposing criminal statute), with Baker, supra note 289, at 63-65 (arguing that an affirmative
“yes” is a desirable sexual ideal but expects too much of men to justify criminal punishment).
332. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 289, at 51-54, 58 (analogizing to medical consent).
333. See id. at 58-61.
334. See id.; SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 229-48.
335. Having recently suffered through an ultimately successful gall bladder operation and re-
covery from an unrelated knee injury, I have had personal experience with the physical, financial,
and emotional costs of even a well-done surgery. The costs of a poorly done surgery are far higher.
336. See Baker, supra note 289, at 58-61.
337. See id. (explaining how individual choice by patients as to treatment and women as to sexual
activity are analogous).
338. See id. at 53-54 (arguing that absent efforts to fully inform the patient, the risk of error con-
cerning consent should fall on the physician); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 271 (arguing
that the burden of avoiding error as to sexual consent should fall on the initiator, usually the man).
339. See Baker, supra note 289, at 58.
340. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
341. Id. at 786.
TASLITZ_FMT.DOC 06/10/03 9:03 AM
48 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 9:1 2002
formation pertinent to the patient’s decision about treatment. His rationale:
“The patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to re-
veal.”342 His opinion represents the general shift from physician authority in de-
cision making to a “more collaborative model in which patient autonomy is em-
phasized.”343 That autonomy includes control (with rare exceptions) over what
will be done with the information derived from various bodily intrusions and
tests.344 Privacy concerns are indeed a major consequence of medical testing,
having implications for employment prospects, insurability, and social stand-
ing.345 A complex web of ethical rules and statutory and case law works to pro-
tect patients’ privacy rights.346 Informed consent to medical procedures there-
fore requires knowledge of what tests and procedures will be done, for what
purposes, and with what consequences for privacy and long-term emotional,
physical, social, and financial help.347 It is this broad and generous conception of
informed medical consent guided by the right to bodily autonomy that inspired
feminists to adopt a similar approach to protecting sexual autonomy.348
The state’s violation of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of the
Ferguson patients can similarly have enormous consequences for the women in-
volved. Exposure of their drug addiction, especially to the police, can deprive
these women of their freedom, weaken or distort their relationship with their
children, stigmatize them, and make their future employment prospects all that
much dimmer.349 Significantly, the state does so by piggybacking on the very
doctor-patient relationship whose special nature requires a robust informed
consent jurisprudence. Breach of doctor-patient trust is likely to have particu-
larly ill effects on patients’ future trust in physicians, willingness to seek medical
help, and willingness to follow doctors’ directives.350 Moreover, female patients
relying on gynecologists and obstetricians, who must let doctors explore inti-
mate body parts and who rely on the doctors to protect the fetuses’ young lives,
are particularly dependent on their physicians, likely to trust them, and vulner-
able to poor decisionmaking or to manipulation.351 Protection of their bodily,
342. Id.
343. Baker, supra note 289, at 61.
344. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
346. See sources cited supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
347. See sources cited supra note 117-24 and accompanying text; cf. Privacy and Human Emotions,
supra note 102, at 129-34, 150-56 (discussing harms from privacy invasion, especially by unwanted
disclosure of information).
348. See Baker, supra note 289, at 53-63 (relying on the medical analogy); Stephen Schulhofer,
Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 74-75 (1992) (similar).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 463-604 (parties’ arguments); see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 542-59 (discussing social meaning of, and methods for, punishing cocaine-addicted
mothers).
350. See generally AMA Brief, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (making similar points in the specific context
of drug-addicted pregnant patients); Rutherford Institute Brief at 19 n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (ar-
guing that it is widely accepted that the free flow of information between doctor and patient to en-
able informed patient decisions increases patients’ sense of control and willingness to adhere to care
plans).
351. Cf. SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 229-48 (discussing how female patients are likely to be
especially vulnerable when seeing gynecologists, fertility specialists, and similar sorts of physicians).
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sexual, and parental autonomy requires, in a feminist perspective (which also
honors birth and motherhood), at least the protections provided by requiring
fully informed consent.352
B. Paternalism
The Hospital in the Ferguson case argued for a weaker notion of consent
than that adopted by the Court, the Hospital at least implicitly relying on pater-
nalism.353 “Paternalism” is, in common sense terms, simply the idea of one per-
son acting as a parent toward another.354 The paternalist believes that he or she
knows what is best for a dependent other and therefore should be able to make
decisions for that other.355 “Paternalism” is often viewed pejoratively when it
characterizes the relationship between two adults because it infantilizes one of
them.356 Yet adults sometimes voluntarily submit to significantly paternalistic
relationships, such as rank-and-file soldier to officer, student to teacher, or adult
child to frail, aging parent.357 Similarly, paternalistic arguments justify much
352. On the social significance of birth and motherhood, see infra text accompanying notes 589-
604.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 132-56.
354. 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 336 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining “paternalism” as “the principle
of acting in a way like that of a father to his children”).
355. Cf. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 273-74 (1996) (defining paternalism as “a fiduciary
model. . .under which the primary responsibility for securing B’s welfare lies with A rather than B”).
Wertheimer continues: “This is particularly so in professional contexts, where the quality of the pro-
fessional’s service is one that the consumer cannot easily or successfully monitor or in cases where it
is predictable that strong emotions, such as fear or grief, will distort one’s judgment.” Id. at 274.
Similarly, Keith Burgess-Jackson explains, liberals do “not oppose interference [with individual
choices] if the consent given is less than voluntary, for in that case, by definition, one is not acting
autonomously.” KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 169 (1996). How-
ever, one type of voluntariness-reducing factor is “defective belief (which impairs cognition. . . .)”
Id. at 169-70. This view that the state must interfere if choices are ill-informed or confused is known
as “soft paternalism,” which, in Jackson’s view, “is consistent with, and perhaps required by, liber-
alism.” Id. at 169.
356. Cf. GILLIAN BROWN, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: THE LOCKEAN LEGACY IN EARLY
AMERICAN CULTURE 16 (2001) (“Thus, along with the familiar and venerable phrase ‘consent of the
governed,’ the most prominent idea in the founding of the United States is independence from the
past, famously embodied in the figure of the rightfully rebellious child of autocratic parents.”).
Southern slavery, for example, was partly defended on the paternalistic ground that whites knew
what was best for their black “children,” white rule thus “uplifting” the slaves. Andrew E. Taslitz,
Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1325-32 (2000).
357. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 355, at 273-74 (“Consider paternalism. If people attach impor-
tance to their choices because those choices are instrumental to their welfare, then contractors will
reasonably want some protection from their propensity to make bad or irrational choices—if it is
possible to identify such cases in a reasonable way and if that protection does not cast doubt on their
general competence. For that reason, there are some contexts in which the contractors may opt for a
fiduciary model of their transactions with others. . . .”). Professor Wertheimer notes that this sort of
consensual paternalism characterizes professional contexts, and I have offered in text analogous ex-
amples in which I believe that the logic of consensual paternalism controls. See id. at 274.
Wertheimer further explains that consent legitimates transactions, id. at 271, including paternalistic
ones. See id. at 273-74.
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government regulation, such as protecting unwary consumers from dangerous
products or uninformed choices.358
In medicine, the paternalistic idea is that patients are simply incapable of
making fully informed, rational judgments about certain aspects of their care.359
The paternalist physician, for example, might seek a patient’s consent to all
“necessary” medical testing, leaving the decision about what constitutes “neces-
sity” to the doctor’s skilled judgment.360 Something close to this sort of argu-
ment was made by the Hospital in Ferguson.361 The argument is also one long
well- received in the medical community.362 But the trend in that same commu-
nity has been toward ever-increasing patient autonomy.363
Properly understood, however, the dichotomy between paternalism and
autonomy is misleading. The political thought of John Locke is often said to
have been among the animating intellectual currents involved in the American
Revolution.364 Locke’s emphasis on the “consent” of the governed seemed a
blow against the monarchical version of paternalism, which saw the sovereign
as parent to his subjects.365 But Locke did embrace a very different sort of “pa-
ternalism” that was central to his political worldview.
For Locke, the “law of opinion” determines what is virtue and what is
vice.366 Changing opinion is a crucial activity in a consensual society because
opinion organizes behavior.367 Real consent is always informed, both working
with and representing opinion.368 The means for keeping the public well-
informed so that reasoned struggle and informed choice can continue in the
realm of public opinion mattered greatly to Locke.369 Self-determination re-
quired knowledge and its twin, consent, and the people tacitly consented to a
358. See Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST DETESTABLE
CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 71, 83 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999) (“[M]ost work-
ers reasonably accept paternalistic interventions that protect them against harmful decisions that
they would likely be compelled to make when they are not sufficiently free or informed to make
autonomous ones.”).
359. See FIONA RANDALL & R.S. FOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A COMPANION FOR ALL
SPECIALISTS 40 (2d ed. 1999) (“The traditional doctor-patient relationship was one of benevolent pa-
ternalism. In other words, doctors thought they should act in a loving and fatherly way towards
their patients, who were often ill-informed and uneducated.”).
360. Cf. id. at 129-32. Doctors sometimes withhold information that a patient has not explicitly
requested when the doctor deems such incomplete revelation to be for the patient’s own good. Id.
361. See Rutherford Institute Brief at 19 n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (so characterizing the Hospi-
tal’s position); ACLU Brief at 11 n.2, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (similar).
362. See RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 359, at 40.
363. See id. at 40-47; Rutherford Institute Brief at 19 n.29, Ferguson (No. 99-936) (“Respondents’
clinical approach, which adopts an outlook of paternalism toward the maternal and fetal patient, has
been largely ignored by the medical community.”).
364. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 3-4; GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY 59 (2002) (explaining that the heritage of liberal thought drawn on by the colonists included
the writings of philosopher John Locke).
365. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 16-19.
366. See id. at 5.
367. See id.
368. See id. For an excellent summary of Locke’s political thought, see D. A. LLOYD THOMAS,
LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT (1995).
369. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 5.
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government by not rebelling.370 By the time that Lockean thought was used to
define the Constitution, American political thinkers adapted the word “consent”
to convey not just its ideal conception but also the difficulties of achieving the
continuing self-determination that consent implied:371
The very inclusion in the Federalist Papers of the specifying adjective “voluntary”
in the phrase “voluntary consent of a whole people” suggests the uncertain re-
lation of consent to individual freedom. The fact that consent—the pre-eminent
act of individual authorization—requires the supplementation of volition im-
plies that consent by itself is not necessarily a self-determined act. In addition to
appearing with the auxiliary of will, consent usually appears in affiliation with
knowledge and experience: as in the tandem concepts of informed consent and
the age of consent. Consent would seem to become representative of agency
only in conjunction with will and knowledge that the self does not invariably
possess.372
For Locke, consent validated not only political obligation but other sorts of
obligation too. Feminist legal scholars remind us that Locke derived his political
theory from, and linked it to, his conceptions of childhood and of mutual child-
parent obligations.373 For Locke, each person has, upon his birth, a right to con-
sent to or reject another’s rule. A child is therefore born with agency.374 Parental
rule stems from the child’s “weak and helpless” condition and initial lack of
“Knowledge or Understanding.”375 But this is a temporary “sort of rule” that
disappears when the child acquires the knowledge and capacity to use reason to
exercise his natural right to consent.376 The child is born with property in him-
self, to be held in trust by the parent until the child can manage it on his own.377
Because this property is held in trust, the parent’s rule is limited by his obliga-
tion to nurture and educate the child toward self-rule:
The Bonds of this [child’s] Subjection are like the Swaddling Cloths they are
wrapt up in, and supported by, in the Weakness of their Infancy. Age and rea-
son as they grow up, loosen them till at length they drop quite off, and leave a
man at his own free Disposal.378
Locke continues:
The Power, then, that Parents have over their Children, arises from that Duty
which is Incumbent on them, to take care of their Off-spring, during the imper-
fect state of Childhood, to inform the Mind, and govern the Actions of their yet
370. See id. at 6-8 (discussing Locke’s views on autonomy and informed consent); THOMAS, supra
note 368, at 34-42, 57-87 (discussing Locke’s views on tacit consent and rebellion).
371. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 17.
372. Id. at 18.
373. Id. at 15-45. Professor Brown’s emphasis on the implications of Lockean thought for women
and for children qualifies Brown, in my view, as a clear feminist historian. See id. at 109-23 (on the
“feminization” of Lockean consent).
374. See id. at 20-21.
375. John Locke, The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. VI, §56, at 323 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1960).
376. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 22.
377. See id.
378. LOCKE, supra note 375, ch. VI, §55, at 322.
TASLITZ_FMT.DOC 06/10/03 9:03 AM
52 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 9:1 2002
ignorant nonage till reason shall take its Place, and ease them of that Trouble, is
what the Children want, and the Parents bound to. . . .379
Revolutionary era Americans were often either directly or indirectly aware
of Locke’s vision of the child as having independent agency.380 Lockean con-
cepts, though altered somewhat, underlay much early American thinking about
how to raise children and about the ultimately political nature of childhood and
education.381 The flip side of parental rule, when translated to the political obli-
gations of adults toward their sovereign, was that the sovereign was an “abusive
parent” if he did not bend his rule toward the goal of the child’s independ-
ence.382 Moreover, that power lapses when knowledge comes.383 King George,
having ignored these lessons, was no longer entitled to rule his American “chil-
dren.”384
Lockean consent, several scholars have noted, has implications for medical
concepts of consent.385 The patient is to be seen as sovereign over himself, pos-
sessed of active powers.386 Even the anesthetized individual “consents” to what
is necessary to restore his mental faculties of choice and authorization.387
Under such a view, the patients in Ferguson may indeed initially have
lacked the knowledge and capacity to make informed judgments about testing.
But that simply imposed on the physicians the obligation to give the patients the
information, emotional support, and guidance necessary to enabling the patients
to make informed choices. Because these were adult patients, but financially
and emotionally dependent on the Hospital, it would take relatively little effort
for the Hospital to meet its duty to enable patient capacities for self-
determination rather than to make choices for the patient. Once so enabled, the
Hospital’s rule would have lapsed.388 By not making serious enough efforts to
aid the pregnant women’s independent, rational decisions, the Hospital misun-
derstood the true nature of “paternalism”: the obligation to raise a dependent
other to self-rule.389
C. The Role of Necessitous Circumstances
1. Threats, Offers, and Coercive Offers
One way to read the facts in Ferguson is that there were two distinct stages
of “consent”: first, the uninformed consent to all necessary medical testing, re-
379. Id. § 58, at 324 (emphasis in original).
380. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 20-29.
381. See id. at 15-45.
382. See id. at 16-17.
383. See id. at 20-21.
384. See id. at 16.
385. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 28; Elaine Scarry, Consent and the Body, 21 NEW LITERARY
HISTORY 860, 868 (1990).
386. See sources cited supra note 385.
387. See sources cited supra note 385.
388. See supra text accompanying note 373-84 (discussing Lockean view that parental rule lapses
when child is fully informed).
389. See BROWN, supra note 356, at 20-21.
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sulting in a patient’s surprise dirty urine screen; second, the very informed pa-
tient agreement to enter into a drug treatment program and submit to additional
drug screens in exchange for not being prosecuted for the first drug test’s
“dirty” results.390 The immediately preceding two sections of this article argued
that the first stage was constitutionally invalid. Uninformed consent is no con-
sent at all. But what about the second stage of the process? Invalidating an in-
formed but unpleasant choice might seem to turn on the distinction between
“threats” and “offers.”
A “threat” is commonly defined as leaving its recipient worse off. A threat
narrows the range and desirability of the options available to the victim.391
“Your money or your life” leaves a robbery victim no real choice whether to
comply with his assailant’s demands, thus invalidating the victim’s “consent” to
part with his money.392
An offer, by contrast, is frequently described as leaving its recipient better
off. The offer expands the number and desirability of the options available to
the offeree.393 If a male college student in one class says to a female college stu-
dent in another class, “Go out with me, and I’ll take you to see the most sought-
after play on Broadway—The Producers!,” that arguably gives the female student
a desirable option (seeing the play) that she previously lacked.
Sometimes, however, the parties may have very different perceptions about
whether the new options created are desirable or not. This is particularly true
with sexual relationships, which are governed by highly contested norms and in
which male and female on-average perceptions may differ widely.394 If a man in
a new heterosexual relationship tells the woman that he will end the relation-
ship unless she agrees to greater sexual intimacy, he may see that as an offer to
continue dating her in the future in exchange for her meeting his sexual needs.395
But she may expect the level of sexual involvement normally to escalate slowly,
at a pace giving her comfort. Therefore, she may experience his insistence on
quickening the pace as a threat to end their relationship unless he complies with
her demand.396 Although this is not the sort of threat ordinarily deemed worthy
of control by the law, the example illustrates how characterizing something as a
390. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing Ferguson facts).
391. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 126. Some authors reject this definition of a threat as
option-narrowing, for example, because it can be hard to tell the impact on options and because
asymmetrical power relations may create undue pressure for the subordinate party to accept a par-
ticular-but-undesirable option even if the numbers of choices available are in some ways increased.
See, e.g., Larry May & Edward Soule, Sexual Harassment, Rape, and Criminal Sanctions, in A MOST
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL EASSAYS ON RAPE 188-90 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999)
(making similar points in the context of sexual harassment). These critics have a point, but little
purpose would be served in my pursuing it because, for my purposes here, I can as readily state my
position in the more traditional terms denoted by offer and threat as by using the critics’ under-
standings.
392. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 121 (using the “money or your life” example).
393. See id. at 126.
394. See id. at 121-29.
395. See id. at 121.
396. See id.
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threat or an offer may require choosing among conflictive perspectives on nor-
mative grounds.397
Rape law currently primarily regulates only threats and, even then, only
threats of, or the actual infliction of, physical injury.398 For example, John Biggs
of Pennsylvania convinced his 17 year old daughter to have sexual intercourse
with him and to keep the act secret by threatening otherwise to distribute nude
photographs of the daughter.399 Yet Biggs could not be convicted of blackmail
because he obtained sex, not money; and could not be convicted of rape because
he threatened public humiliation, not physical harm.400 Feminists have long ar-
gued that threats of reputational and especially economic harm can be almost
equally as coercive as physical force.401 Moreover, the power of a threat can be
substantially increased in certain settings and certain dependent relationships.402
That power can be directly used—as where a doctor threatens to withhold his
needed services from a patient unless she consents to having sex with him.403
But, especially in these sorts of dependent and unequal relationships, coercion
can be exercised indirectly. Thus, what looks like a legitimate offer can in fact be
a coercive offer, one fairly perceived as implying a threat.404
Sexual harassment laws illustrate the point. Suppose that a male manager
does not threaten to block a female employee’s deserved promotion in exchange
for sex. Instead, he offers her an undeserved promotion in exchange for sex.
That sounds like an offer, plain and simple, because the employee is granted a
397. See ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 53 (arguing that the correct test for threats is whether they
leave the recipient “no reasonable alternative” to compliance, an ultimately normative question that
may at best be resolved by appeal to shared understandings). Leo Katz offers a helpful hypothetical
to make a similar point in the Fourth Amendment context:
Ask yourself whether the following case involves an illegal search and seizure: the police
stop a traveler at an airport because he resembles the Drug Enforcement Agency’s courier
profile. Stops on the basis of such profiles [let us assume] have been ruled unconstitu-
tional. Notwithstanding this ruling, the police tell the traveler that unless he consents to
be searched they will detain him until they have obtained a search warrant. The traveler
consents. The robbery analogy makes clear why this consent will be found coerced and
hence invalid. The traveler was being asked to buy back (through his consent to the
search) what was already his: the right not to be detained.
LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW
138-39 (1996); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 123 (arguing that regardless of whether a
woman perceives an action as a threat, the decisive question in deciding whether the law should
agree with her is “whether the inducement would take from the woman anything she is legally enti-
tled to have” and that in the dating situation, the man’s offer to continue dating the woman only if
she agrees to have sex with him does not violate any such entitlement).
398. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 52.
399. See Commonwealth v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
400. See id.; SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 7 (analyzing Biggs case).
401. See, e.g., Civil Society, supra note 300, at 350-54, 379-84 (discussing sexual harassment laws
and economic and emotional harms). See generally LEORA TANENBAUM, SLUT! GROWING UP FEMALE
WITH A BAD REPUTATION (1999) (describing a “sluttish” reputation as coercively imposing “femi-
nine” sexual values).
402. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 139-48 (cataloging examples).
403. See id. at 234.
404. See id. at 146 (offering “iron fist in a velvet glove,” that is, a masked threat; implied threats
for more zealous enforcement of rules; and indirect threats in the apparent form of an offer as exam-
ples).
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positive option, promotion, to which she would otherwise not have access. Yet,
because of the stark power imbalance and the substantial discretion and room
for judgment accorded managers, the female employee might reasonably fear
that a “no” will later result in subtle and hard-to-prove retaliation, the “iron fist
in the velvet glove.” She may worry that she will start receiving poor evalua-
tions or be denied raises or challenging work. The offer operates in practice as a
threat.405
The involvement of the state, especially of criminal law enforcement, cre-
ates a similar danger of coercive offers. A threat of more zealous, if otherwise
legitimate, law enforcement can be powerfully coercive. The police often have
tremendous discretion to enforce varying laws to varying degrees. Even where
they theoretically lack such discretion, being expected to enforce a particular law
“to the letter,” in practice they often retain discretion. Citizens thus understand
that they may face criminal law enforcement only or primarily if they in some
way incur an officer’s ire.406 A threat (express or implied) to retaliate by meticu-
lous law enforcement if an “offer” is refused thus denies the target “the right to
impartial determination of the issue on the merits (i.e., whether to enforce the
law. . .).”407
Thus, if a police officer demands money for not making an arrest where the
failure to arrest is a clear dereliction of duty, that seems at first blush to make
the “offeree” better off, receiving a benefit (non-prosecution) to which he was
not otherwise entitled. But the recipient of the offer could reasonably under-
stand that an officer has countless opportunities to look for other infractions and
may fear this officer’s doing so if his offer is rejected.408
Liberal feminist thinkers see such power imbalances as most seriously
abused, thus invalidating consent, in situations of “manipulated vulnerabil-
ity.”409 Manipulated vulnerability occurs when the offeror creates the situation
that limits the offeree’s options.410 Consequently, if a man skilled in wilderness
survival invites a novice female camper into the depths of a snow-covered forest
on a “practice” hike, then threatens to leave her alone to die unless she has sex
with him, she is in one sense made better off by his offer: she has a chance to live
that she would otherwise lack once in the woods without his help.411 But he in-
tentionally created the very danger from which she now seeks to escape for the
very purpose of limiting the number and desirability of her choices so that his
offer would look more attractive. Liberal thinkers see such offers as inherently
coercive.412
405. See id. at 135 (similar example and analysis); May & Soule, supra note 391, at 189 (arguing
that an offer to give a financially-needy female at-will employee job security in exchange for sex,
which leaves a woman who cannot afford even brief unemployment with no serious alternatives but
submission, is more a threat than an offer).
406. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 139-40.
407. Id. at 140.
408. See id. at 141-42 (articulating this example).
409. See BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 281, at 98-99.
410. See id.
411. See id. at 95 (analogous example).
412. See id.
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Each of these aspects of coercive offers—a power disparity, express or im-
plied threats of overzealous criminal law enforcement, and manipulated vulner-
ability—are present in Ferguson. The pregnant women in Ferguson were poor,
relatively unsophisticated in the law, and heavily dependent on their trusted
physicians to see them through the vulnerability of childbearing and birth.413 A
number of them were asked to consent while in labor.414 Few prosecutions of
these pregnant women for child abuse based on drug usage were likely until the
Hospital took the initiative to work arm-in-arm with the police to craft a pro-
gram of testing and prosecution.415 By starting this program and encouraging
the women unknowingly to participate in testing for illegal drug use, the Hos-
pital created the very situation of limited choice and maximum vulnerability to
which the women later objected: the choice to submit to criminal prosecution
now or to enter forced drug therapy and face the risk of prosecution later.
Moreover, the club used to pressure the women into therapy for drug abuse was
an expressed willingness of the police to refrain from what the law permitted—
prosecution for child abuse—in exchange for entering a therapy program. The
counterpart understanding expressed by the state, via the Hospital, was its in-
tention to prosecute the women to the fullest extent of the law unless they sub-
mitted to the state’s demands. In short, the state threatened to prosecute weaker
parties, the patients, based on incriminating information that the state obtained
by manipulating the patients’ confidential relationship with their trusted doc-
tors.416 That is not consent.
2. Exploitation and Quasi-Coercion
The validity of consent may also be undermined if it is obtained by ex-
ploiting the victim. Exploitation invalidates consent wholly apart from whether
the victim’s choice is an informed one or whether the offer can reasonably be
understood as involving veiled threats.417 Exploitation arises from a stronger
413. See supra text accompanying note 39.
414. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing Ferguson facts). Although I do not
address the point here because it does not draw specifically on feminist theory, the Ferguson facts
also suggest an “unconstitutional conditions” analogy. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 499-503.
The idea would be that it is unacceptable to burden the exercise of a constitutional right to privacy
with the condition that such exercise is impliedly permitted only at the cost of forfeiting the only af-
fordable and available medical treatment for the pregnant mothers and their unborn children. See id.
(articulating an information costs analysis as the best way to understand United States Supreme
Court case law on when, if ever, the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits questioning under
the threat of non-criminal sanctions).
416. See Baker, supra note 289, at 55 (defining exploitation); WERTHEIMER, supra note 355, at 208
(describing an exploitative transaction as one whose terms or substance are unfair).
417. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 355, at 208; Baker, supra note 289, at 55 (defining exploitation);
see also ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 61-63 (explaining that the core understanding of exploitation is
where one side takes unfair advantage of another, the risk of which is especially great in professional
relationships involving dependence, trust, and emotional intimacy). Archard gives the example of a
patient who must,
[O]pen herself up, lay herself bare, share significant confidences with her doctor. . . . So the
professional relationship is itself one in which the client is dependent upon her profes-
sional, it is one in which the client herself may be vulnerable, and it is conducted in a
manner which requires trust and openness.
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party’s benefiting from a weaker party’s vulnerabilities that are caused by back-
ground conditions rather than by the stronger party himself.418 Those back-
ground conditions arise from unfair institutional arrangements.419 A nation in
which all means of production are owned by the state exploits a starving worker
by offering him a bare subsistence wage. His choice is illusory. If he wishes to
avoid starvation, he must accept the offer that ensures him life, albeit a hard one,
barely a life at all.420
A simple disparity in bargaining power does not in itself constitute exploi-
tation.421 If a wealthy law firm offers a highly paid position but involving long
hours to a single, pregnant, underpaid legal aid attorney, that offer may be hard
to refuse. Nevertheless, the offeree has reasonable alternatives to accepting the
law firm’s conditions. The lawyer might value time with her future child more
than money, thus staying in her current job, though that may mean counting
pennies. Alternatively, in a reasonably robust employment market, she may
search for a middle ground, patiently awaiting a better, if not well-paying, job
with reasonable hours. The law firm may be unwilling to alter its offer because
many other talented young lawyers are willing to accept it as is. But the offer is
not exploitative.422
“Exploitation is standardly distinguished from coercion, because it does
not constrain desires or choices but depends upon them like strings to be
played.”423 Offering a hungry homeless man minimum wage to work at a gru-
Id. at 61.
418. See Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST DETESTABLE
CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 77, 81 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999).
419. See id.
420. This hypothetical follows from the logic of Gauthier’s position. See id. at 81-85.
421. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 355, at 223, 264-65, 269-72 (arguing that neither unfairness nor
flawed consent flow from mere unequal gain or inequality of bargaining power, nor do hard circum-
stances alone invalidate consent, though consent may be vitated if, for example, such circumstances
give rise to over or underestimating benefits and risks). Professor Wertheimer argues that the fair-
ness of a transaction should be judged based upon the hypothetical market price that an unpres-
sured and fully informed buyer would pay, a price set by neither party taking special advantage of
another party’s special vulnerabilities. See id. at 230-34. Whether or not Professor Wertheimer’s test
is the correct one, it does highlight the case-specific and partly normative nature of the inquiry to
determine when a transaction is unfair and thus exploitative.
422. This hypothetical follows from Professor Wertheimer’s explanation of why inequality of
bargaining power does not alone invalidate consent. See id. at 223-26. Wertheimer explains that in-
dividual exploitation can cause collective harm. See id at 245. Thus if one member of a group could,
for example, somewhat alleviate this hard circumstance by accepting a nevertheless exploitative of-
fer, that may lead to exploitation of others in the group and, over time, to the worsening of condi-
tions for all. Yet if all group members resist exploitation, all may eventually obtain non-exploitative
offers with better over-all results for the entire group. See id. at 245-46. Accordingly:
[U]nder such circumstances, allowing oneself to be exploited may be individually rational
but collectively self-defeating. If this is so, in refusing to accept A’s [exploitative] proposal,
B [as an exploited group member] is simply doing her part—at some personal sacrifice—in
upholding this set of beliefs. She is refusing to free-ride on the willingness of others to re-
fuse to allow themselves to be exploited. From this perspective, one does not refuse to be
exploited to get a better deal for oneself. One refuses to be exploited because one owes it
to others. In seeing why fairness matters, then, we may also see something about its moral
weight and force.
Id.
423. Baker, supra note 289, at 55.
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eling, health-endangering job expands his options and offers him the things he
may most want—work and money. Yet that offer is indeed exploitative.424
The hallmark of exploitation is that it radically limits reasonable alterna-
tives because of the constraints imposed by “unfair” (a term to be defined
shortly) social institutions.425 Philosopher Norman Daniels calls offers made to
those victimized by such conditions “quasi-coercive”:
The intuition underlying calling unfair or unjust restrictions of options “quasi-
coercive” is that they involve diminished freedom of action of the same sort,
which is glaring in the central cases of coercion. A central difference may be in
the mechanism through which freedom of action is diminished. We do not have
the direct and invasive intrusion into the choice space of the individual, which is
present in central cases of coercion, for example when the mugger exceeds his
rights by pointing a gun at my head. Instead, we have an indirect, yet perva-
sive, erosion of that space as a result of unjust or unfair social practices and in-
stitutions.426
A related idea involves extending an offer to someone whose traits of char-
acter make them less likely to become informed or less able to see the other op-
tions that do exist. Those character traits may not necessarily be caused by un-
just social conditions, yet advantage-takers may still be seen as “preying on the
weak.”427 Adults obtaining young teens’ “consent” to appear in pornography is
exploitative because the teens have not yet developed the full capacity for rea-
soned judgment that we expect in adults. If, of course, a character trait is sig-
nificantly created by unjust social conditions, advantage taking of that trait seems
closer to the core idea of exploitation.428
Radical feminists reject the liberals’ distinction between manipulated and
non-manipulated vulnerability. Radicals find preying on a vulnerability mor-
ally objectionable regardless of who caused it.429 Suppose that Richard’s brother
Dick creates a vulnerability, perhaps by abandoning a novice female camper in
the woods—an example that I discussed earlier. If Richard followed Dick, saw
424. See id.
425. See Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy, in A MOST DETESTABLE
CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 71, 79-81 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999).
426. Norman Daniels, Does OSHA Protect Too Much?, in MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 51
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1987).
427. Professor Archard points out that Richard offering Mary an obscenely large amount of
money to sleep with him is probably viewed as an offer while Richard’s promising dire conse-
quences if Mary does not sleep with him is probably viewed as a threat. See ARCHARD, supra note
288, at 55-57. Yet in both cases human action renders one choice more desirable than the other. One
way to explain our different reactions is that they reflect different perceptions of the victim’s charac-
ter. See id. at 57. Archard explains that “[t]error excuses where greed does not. This is not to deny
that both may be irresistible motives to action; it is to find the first but not the second an estimable
trait of character. Id.
428. Archard thus points out once again that mere bargaining power disparity does not alone
establish exploitation. See id. at 58-60. But, for example, extreme poverty might hamper her charac-
ter in such a way that she lacks the will to refuse—a harm to character that may be seen as so ex-
treme as to establish her incomplete capacity to consent under the circumstances. See id. at 58-60.
Alternatively, she may be seen as suffering from the sort of “special vulnerability” being manipu-
lated by Richard that is at the core of the definition of exploitation.
429. See BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 281, at 99-100.
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the abandoned woman’s fear, then offered to rescue her only if she had sex with
Richard, how does that suddenly render the woman’s agreement consensual?,
query the radicals.430
If the reply is to say that what really matters is whether the woman’s vul-
nerability arises from deliberate human agency or instead from accident or na-
ture, that, say the radicals, is no reply at all. Illustratively, “all poverty can, on a
plausible account, be attributed to human action, at least in the sense of being a
foreseeable consequence of certain human actions.”431
Indeed, argue the radicals, all men are collectively responsible for women’s
physical and economic vulnerability. This is so because all men, no matter how
well intentioned, benefit from, and in small ways reinforce and encourage, fe-
male vulnerability.432 Rape fear thus may make women afraid to venture out at
night without a man and willing to tolerate a peaceful but insensitive man for
fear of loss of his protection or of more dangerous alternative suitors.433 Men
who accept these benefits (rather than still working to be more caring and sensi-
tive) thus become complicitous in supporting an oppressive status quo.434
Liberals raise various objections to the radical stance. Notably, the radicals’
logic seems to suggest that all heterosexual interaction is by definition non-
consensual.435 Relatedly, the only solution is to await the general overthrow of
unjust gendered social institutions.436
But there is a middle-ground alternative between the liberal and radical
extremes. Our legal system already recognizes that it may be feasible and wise
for the law to intervene, even under conditions of generalized oppression, only
in alleviating the worst abuses under unjust social conditions.437 Moreover, be-
cause those abuses arise from advantage taking by those who have not signifi-
cantly contributed to creating the background injustices, it may make little sense
to subject those beneficiaries to criminal punishment.438 Rather, the solution may
be to prevent some parties’ unjust enrichment at another’s expense while allevi-
ating the worst social injustices.439
The labor market illustrates the point. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) prohibits employers from even making certain offers
to employees, such as “hazard pay” for agreeing to exposure to certain sorts of
technologically eliminable risks, for example, to certain levels of toxins.440 Work-
430. See id. at 95-96 (suggesting this example).
431. ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 55-56.
432. See BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 281, at 100.
433. See Patriarchal Stories, supra note 280, at 395-400.
434. See id. at 399-400 (discussing the benefits “good men” receive from rape fear); Emotions in
Date Rape, supra note 102, at 52-58 (discussing the dangers of the sexually insensitive male personal-
ity).
435. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 83.
436. See id at 53, 107 (“Truly voluntary consent, as [radicals] Muehlenhard and Schrag conceive
it, exists for none of us in this lifetime.”).
437. See Gauthier, supra note 418, at 79-82 (using labor law as an example).
438. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 279, at 107 (“And we can condemn the social constraints as un-
justified without being logically compelled to condemn her male partner’s behavior as improper.”).
439. See Gauthier, supra note 418, at 82-85.
440. See id. at 81-83.
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ers might welcome such offers as a better alternative than unemployment. But
what they are welcoming is a new but undesirable option in an otherwise even
harder world. Any worker that refuses such an offer will be replaced by one
who accepts it, eventually leading all into degraded circumstances.441 On the
other hand, the employer needs workers to keep his company operating. By
OSHA’s barring hazard pay offers, companies can hire workers at all only by
providing safer working conditions.442 One of the worst abuses of unregulated
capitalism is avoided without the need for revolution against the entire system,
even if a more just system can be conceived.
The no-hazard pay rule illustrates a broader principle for avoiding ex-
ploitative offers. One kind of non-exploitative offer made under unjust social
conditions is crafted by seeking a hypothetical market price that an unpressured
and fully informed buyer would make.443 Rephrased, the market price must be
one in which neither party takes special advantage of the other’s special vulner-
abilities or decision-making incapacities.444 The state’s mandating such an offer
involves paternalism at its best. The state prohibits certain kinds of offers on a
vulnerable party’s behalf in order to increase the number of desirable alternatives
and amount of information available to him. That restriction on his freedom of
choice thus ultimately enhances his autonomy.445
Sexual interaction can be conceived of as (in part) a market exchange. Le-
gal rules that prohibit certain extreme sexually exploitative offers and mandate
full exchange of information about sexual intentions seek to shift the terms of
sexual bargaining in favor of the otherwise more vulnerable party.446 That is still
a sort of liberal solution because it does not mandate certain outcomes. As with
OSHA, sexual conduct liability rules limit some choice to enhance overall
autonomy, while leaving wide room for continued bargaining.447 Martha
Chamallas thus defines a sexual offer as legitimate only if “the target would
have initiated the encounter had she been given the choice.”448 Lois Pineau of-
fers a test for whether a particular offer meets this standard: Did the parties
make reasonable communicative efforts to determine one another’s desires and
intentions?449 Just as an employer is not excused by his ignorance of how work-
place conditions affect employee health, so must a male sexual aggressor be
deemed reckless and culpable for his failure to make reasonable efforts to de-
441. See id. at 82-85.
442. See id. at 81-84. See generally LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE
POLITICS OF SEX (1998) (viewing sexual interactions as bargains in which state has always taken a
regulatory interest in the relative power of the parties).
443. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 355, at 230.
444. See id.
445. See Gauthier, supra note 418, at 82-83.
446. See generally HIRSHMANN & LARSON, supra note 442.
447. See id. at 3-6, 268-70; Gauthier, supra note 418, at 82-85.
448. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 836 (1988).
449. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 4-8, 45-55 (summarizing and re-interpreting Lois
Pineau’s views).
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termine the impact of his conduct on a woman.450 Culpable ignorance of sexual
intentions is exploitative.
All the above analysis of course begs the questions, “When are social con-
ditions unjust, and when are offers under such conditions unfair?” I need not
explore the difficult and contested intellectual terrain harboring general answers
to these questions. Virtually all theorists who have addressed the matter agree
that relationships of vulnerability, dependence, and trust can create the kind of
impaired decision making capacity most subject to exploitation.451 Professional
relationships, doctor-patient interaction in particular, raise this danger.452 A pa-
tient must “open herself up, lay herself bare, and share significant confidences
with her doctor.”453 An ill patient is emotionally vulnerable, and this may be es-
pecially so for a pregnant mom-to-be because of the risks of the intimacy of the
parent-child relationship. Poverty stemming from social injustice may also be
exploitative, but this should most clearly be so where that poverty deprives a
pregnant patient of any medical treatment options but one.454 When even the
risk of exploitation is so high, as it is under these circumstances, state interven-
tion is called for.455 When the state conspires with the doctors to bring the threat
of the full force of the state’s criminal justice system to bear to ensure patient
compliance with state-mandated behaviors and the evisceration of patient pri-
vacy, the exploitation is all that more severe.456
Finally, I am not ignoring the value of the child’s life and health. Those
concerns are relevant in weighing the competing interests of the state and the
individual suspect in conducting the reasonableness balancing that the constitu-
tion requires. But the fetus’ health is irrelevant to whether the mother has val-
idly consented to the loss of her otherwise constitutionally protected privacy
interest.457
450. See id. at 45-55 (Pineau’s views as establishing a negligence standard requiring reasonable
communicative efforts by the man to determine the woman’s intent); GAUTHIER, supra note 418, at
82.
451. See, e.g., ARCHARD, supra note 288, at 21, 55-62.
452. Id. at 61-62.
453. See id.
454. For a discussion of the effect of poverty on consent, see supra notes 157-70 and accompany-
ing text.
455. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legis-
lation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 762-65 (1999) [hereinafter Racist Personality] (stating that con-
duct creating a sizeable risk of racial oppression is morally condemnable and, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, should be the basis for legal liability); Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 45-55
(discussing why certain conduct creating a significant risk of gendered oppression should be subject
to criminal liability).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing Ferguson facts).
457. These observations flow from still-more-basic ones: that, once the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies, the reasonableness of a non-consensual search requires balancing governmental against indi-
vidual interests. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 349 (summarizing reasonableness balancing).
The nature of the balancing may more easily favor the state for administrative searches, but whether
there is an administrative search in the first place turns on the state’s purposes, as section V will ex-
plain, not the relative size of the defendant’s and the state’s interest. See id. at 350.
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND SOCIAL MEANING
The Ferguson Court’s majority opinion continued to embrace the idea that
the state’s purpose is what distinguishes an administrative search from an ordi-
nary criminal investigatory one. Yet the Court rejected the notion that the sub-
jective purposes of state actors control.458 Instead, what matters is the state’s
“programmatic purpose,” which the Court concluded was, in the case before it,
criminal investigation.459 This conclusion is at first surprising because it contra-
dicts the likely subjective intentions at work. The Hospital and the police very
likely see themselves as protecting the health and safety of the pregnant women
and their soon-to-be-children rather than as wreaking retribution. The credible
threat of punishment may thus have been seen by these state actors simply as a
motivator to ensure that parent and future child received medical help. Yet the
Court found the “programmatic purpose” to be pursuit of a criminal investiga-
tion.460 What explains this apparent contradiction? The Court never clearly de-
fined “programmatic purpose.” But the Court did consider the extent of police
involvement in creating and implementing the hospital’s search program to be
critically relevant in determining whether such a purpose existed.461
My argument in the penultimate part of this article is that the apparent
contradiction can be resolved, and the “programmatic purpose” phrase sensibly
defined, by embracing the radical feminist insight that the meaning of human
actions both partly constitutes and contributes to the functioning of social sys-
tems. The Ferguson majority was right to categorize the hospital’s searches as
ordinary criminal ones because that is the social meaning most fairly ascribed to
the state’s actions. The heavy involvement of the police sent the message that
the program’s purpose was punitive and retributive. The program created the
sort of stigma associated with the criminal justice system, a stigma amplified by
the twin aspects of the conduct involved: the alleged use of drugs and the viola-
tion of governing conceptions of “good” motherhood.462
458. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing Ferguson majority opinion). There is
some confusing language in a recent high Court case, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
There, the Court upheld what it ultimately concluded was an ordinary criminal-investigation-related
search but upon mere reasonable suspicion. In doing so, the Court declared in dictum, “With the
limited exception of some special needs and administrative search cases, [citation omitted] ‘we have
been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of indi-
vidual officers.’ [citation omitted]” Id. at 593. The actual individual motivations test seems inconsis-
tent with the Court’s recent emphasis elsewhere on “programmatic purposes.” See supra text ac-
companying notes 213-36. The “individual motivations” language could thus be the result simply of
careless writing. On the other hand, the Knights opinion does not say “with the exception of all” spe-
cial needs and administrative search cases but rather with the exception merely of “some” of them.
That might suggest that the Court sometimes applied a “programmatic purpose” and sometimes an
“actual individual officer’s motivation” test. If this is so, however, the Court has never stated so di-
rectly nor laid out guidelines for choosing when each test applies. Furthermore, regardless of what
the Court says it is doing, in practice its case holdings and rationales are also inconsistent with an
actual motivations test. See supra text accompanying notes 185-212. In any event, the social meaning
of actions is what separates criminal from administrative searches and is, I submit, the most norma-
tively desirable approach to administrative searches.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 213-36.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 213-36.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 213-36.
462. For details, see infra text accompanying notes 588-604.
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A. Feminism and Social Meaning
It is a hallmark of much radical feminist theory that the creation of shared
social meanings both partly constitutes and creates social oppression.463 Mean-
ings are, of course, conveyed through language and other symbols. It is not the
subjective and perhaps idiosyncratic meanings given human action by individu-
als that matter but rather the widely shared meanings that create a common
culture.464 These meanings often operate at a subconscious level.465Furthermore,
law and legal actors are part of the social system of meaning, playing important
roles in reflecting and reaffirming, or instead modifying, shared understand-
ings.466
Feminist philosopher Drucilla Cornell, for example, argues that we are
born into the world mired in social meanings based on group membership.467
When the doctor announces, “It’s a girl,” she activates a host of assumptions
about what that means. Those assumptions will forever affect the way that oth-
ers behave toward, and conceive of, the child and how she in turn behaves to-
ward others and conceives of herself.468 Those conceptions are both cognitive
and affective, for emotions guide our choices of to what to pay attention in the
world and what value to assign it.469 In the case of women and other oppressed
groups, “degradation,” the devaluing of women as equal human beings, is a
frequent part of current systems of social meaning.470 Cornell therefore embraces
psychoanalysis as a useful critical tool because it helps in understanding how
“symbolic systems come to hold sway and how they are governed inevitably by
social fantasies.”471
Group affiliation is both inevitable and desirable, however, argues Cor-
nell.472 Liberation lies in freeing individuals to revise their group affiliations—to
463. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE 49, 54, 80, 83 (1998) (arguing that elite control of public discourses, the distilling of persons
into their marketplace images, and the symbolic wounds of hate speech all help to constitute an op-
pressive social structure); DRUCILLA CORNELL, JUST CAUSE: FREEDOM, IDENTITY, AND RIGHTS 3-7, 21-
24, 137-39 (2000) (arguing that we are defined by the social and symbolic worlds around us, so femi-
nist politics requires imaginative acts envisioning a new world as essential to social resistance);
Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Stereotypes, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001) (synthesizing feminist scholarship collectively demonstrating that much
gendered oppression stems from meanings embracing the devalued worth of women); Feminist Ap-
proach, supra note 30 (suggesting that thought itself may be understood as an interpretative act).
464. See sources cited supra note 463.
465. See Chamallas, supra note 463, at 772-82.
466. See generally RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 33 (offering an extended defense of this point in
the context of rape trials).
467. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 5.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 7. For a detailed analysis of the implications of human emotions fundamentally
turning on cognitive evaluations of value, including what is worth our attention, see MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT (2002).
470. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 22; Chamallas, supra note 463, at 772-82.
471. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 24.
472. See id. at 137.
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choose them, rather than having them imposed—and to affect their meaning.473
Humans grow into unique individuals only in the context of webs of relation-
ships.474 Individuation into unique personhood requires true autonomy in
which each of us differentiates ourselves from stereotyped meanings.475 Pro-
tecting the “imaginary domain” that allows us to conceive of and thus choose
other selves is essential to human freedom.476 Law is liberating, in Cornell’s
view, when it protects that domain while discouraging the degrading meanings
and physical violence that violate respect for others’ worth.477 “The law,” says
Cornell, “should take a woman’s experience into account by giving her the free-
dom to define what her experience means.”478
Feminist law professor Martha Chamallas similarly argues that the major
flaw in much mainstream anti-discrimination law is its focus on intentional dis-
crimination.479 There are, Chamallas emphasizes, two equally insidious forms of
generally subconscious bias that deeply harm women and other subordinated
groups.480 These unconscious processes are forms of cognitive bias.481 Chamallas
focuses in particular on two such biases: “devaluation”482 and “biased proto-
types.”483 Devaluation involves the systematic devaluing of the worth of a
member of a disfavored class.484 One example is the increased likelihood of a
jury’s imposing a death sentence where the victim in a criminal case is white as
compared to where the victim is black.485 Professor Randall Kennedy labels this
phenomena, “racially selective empathy:” “the unconscious failure to extend to
[blacks] the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and
care, given as a matter of course to [whites].”486 “Biased prototypes” are the
“stock images, mental portraits, schemas, or cultural scripts. . .that operate to
limit the law’s protection of marginal social groups.”487 Prototypes are cognitive
shortcuts that enable persons to make sense of new situations by categorizing
them as in the same class as more familiar, prototypical ones.488 Jurors’ precon-
473. See id. at 139. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY (1998) (sug-
gesting that the freedom to choose group affiliations rather than have them imposed is a growing
characteristic of modern civilizations worldwide).
474. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 139.
475. See id. at 23; Racist Personality, supra note 455, at 746-58 (discussing the importance of indi-
vidualized justice).
476. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 139.
477. See id. at 21, 139.
478. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
479. See Chamallas, supra note 463, at 747-55.
480. See id.
481. Id.
482. See id. at 755.
483. See id. at 778.
484. See Chamallas, supra note 463, at 756.
485. See id. at 760-61.
486. Randall Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988) (quoting Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-”Foreword,” In
Defense of the Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976) (alterations and citations
omitted in original).
487. Chamallas, supra note 463, at 776.
488. See id. at 778.
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ception of “real rapists” as strangers leaping from the bushes, for example,
makes them skeptical of claims of “date rape.”489
Oppositional legal theory thus embraces the idea that changing the oppres-
sive social meanings, whether conscious or not, associated with certain behav-
iors or groups is an important task of the law.490 Insulting meanings must be si-
lenced, liberating ones enhanced. The latter can be accomplished by introducing
the very different meaning-perspectives and images of large portions of the
subordinated groups into public discourse.491 This sort of analysis underlies
radical efforts to suppress hate speech and pornography while increasing racial
minority and female representation in the media, local and national politics, and
the everyday centers of power in corporations, educational institutions, and en-
trepreneurial endeavors.492
Feminist legal scholar Anita Superson indeed argues that altering deroga-
tory social meanings should be the whole point of legal prohibitions against
sexual harassment on the job.493 Sexual harassment harms not only an individual
woman but also women as a group by instantiating their subordinate status.494 It
is the message of women’s group inferiority sent by harassing conduct that “in-
terferes with the rights of subordinated-group members to participate equally in
society, maintaining their basic sense of security and worth as human beings.”495
The meaning of the message is determined not by the victim’s idiosyncratic re-
sponses but by the objective fairly attributed social meanings that constitute
women’s oppression.496 Superson explains:
[W]hat is decisive in determining whether behavior constitutes [sexual harass-
ment] is not whether the victim is bothered, but whether the behavior is an in-
stance of a practice that expresses and perpetuates the attitude that the victim
and members of her sex are inferior because of their sex.497
This summary of the views of three leading radical feminist thinkers illus-
trates the ways in which a critical strain in feminist jurisprudence delineates ex-
isting social distinctions based on social meaning and advocates harnessing the
law’s power to alter those meanings. Importantly, radical feminists do not seek
to transcend social meanings, an impossible task.498 Many social meanings are
489. Id.
490. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 463, at 47-49 (arguing that group-based points of view must be
used to disrupt public “truths” about the groups).
491. See id. at 47-49, 52-55, 65-66, 80, 83, 86, 102.
492. See id. at 80-86, 102. See generally Civil Society, supra note 300 (arguing that retribution and
equal social valuation best justify laws against hate speech and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment).
493. See MARGARET A. CROUCH, THINKING ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE
PERPLEXED 147 (2001).
494. See id.
495. Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Hate Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2348, 2348 (1989).
496. See CROUCH, supra note 493, at 149.
497. Anita M. Superson, A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment, 24 J. SOC. PHIL. 46, 58 (1993).
498. See generally ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001) (arguing that antidiscrimination law really operates to try to
change the social meanings that we ascribe to stereotypes and generalizations rather than ignoring
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indeed liberating, and the “imaginary domain” must be wide enough to enable
persons to choose with which set of meanings they affiliate while participating
in meaning-evolution.499 Rather, radical feminists make the identification of pre-
existing social meanings the first task of legal policymakers. Lawmaking and
application must then be guided in part by current social meanings. Where
those meanings are degrading, the law must seek to change them, sometimes
acknowledging the law’s partial responsibility for creating them. But whatever
choices the lawmakers make cannot be made in ignorance of the role of social
meanings and norms.500
B. Communicative Retributivism
Although radical feminists have been among the earliest and most cogent
critics of meaning-blind social theories, other scholars have embraced meaning-
full philosophies that are fully consistent with the insights of radical feminist
thinking. For current purposes, the most important of these scholars are “com-
municative retributivists.”501 The idea behind their philosophies is straightfor-
ward. Every human action is expressive. Expressive actions that send a mes-
sage of the recipient’s inferiority to the actor do, or should, evoke retributive
anger in the victim and in properly empathetic observers.502 For example, a suc-
cessful gunpoint robbery sends the message that his victim is not of equal worth
to the robber. Therefore, the robber can do as he pleases, regardless of the harm
that he imposes on his victim.503 This message of diminishment, however, also
violates widely shared values of equal human worth that require refraining
from physically harming another or forcibly taking his property.504 Observers
embracing those values experience indignation at the blatant violation of social
norms, norms that will lose their unifying power if they are not vindicated.505
Criminal punishment brings the criminal down a peg, “putting him in his
place.” Such punishment sends society’s message that the offender is of no
greater value than his victim.506 A mere oral declaration of such value will not
do the trick. Only punishment, usually in the form of imprisonment or its
threat, has the emotional power to send a message that will be taken seriously,
thereby reaffirming social norms.507 Retributive punishment is therefore desir-
or eliminating them entirely). See also ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL
EQUALITY (1996) (similar).
499. See CORNELL, supra note 463, at 4-5. See also id. at 7 (“Theories of justice that ignore the heart
can never deliver on the roses”). “The law should take women’s experience into account by giving
her the freedom to decide what her experience means.” Id. at 21.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 463-96 (summarizing radical feminist views on these is-
sues).
501. See Civil Society, supra note 23, at 323-30 (defining “communicative retributivism”).
502. See id.
503. See Racist Personality, supra note 475, at 746-58 (explaining degrading messages in violence).
504. See id. at 750; Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 58-64 (significance of the retributive
emotions in protesting against diminishing messages); Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 23, at 348-49
(retribution, diminishment, and social bonds).
505. See Civil Society, supra note 23, at 348-49.
506. See id. at 320.
507. See id.; ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 108-11 (2001) (discussing punishment and so-
cial norms).
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able when it vindicates norms that are praiseworthy as a matter of political mo-
rality, but retribution is undesirable when the opposite is true.508 Punishing the
robber makes sense because it affirms both parties’ equal worth. But punishing
an African American male in the 1950s Jim Crow South for sitting next to a
white woman on a bus would reaffirm the reprehensible social norms embrac-
ing black inferiority, precisely the opposite of the idea of equal human worth
and respect on which communicative retributivism is founded.509 In its embrace
of meaning identification, the salience of emotions, the centrality of respect, and
the dangers of cognitive bias, communicative retributivism is fully consistent
with radical feminist social meaning theories, though many such retributivists
are self-identified liberals.510
Merely labeling a crime as such is therefore not what truly makes it a crime.
Here, I am not relying on the old malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction.511
Social attitudes determine in the first instance what are “true” crimes, meriting
significant retributive punishment and being deeply stigmatizing.512 Even
among true crimes, social attitudes concerning each crime’s seriousness vary
with the conduct at issue.513 A comparison between social attitudes toward
drunk driving versus drug abuse illustrates the point.
1. Drunk Driving, Social Stigma, and Retribution
It is likely that a majority of Americans engage in at least the occasional
recreational use of alcohol.514 Many Americans also drive.515 Thus neither
drinking nor driving are in themselves socially condemned conduct. Moreover,
it is likely that many Americans have, and likely continue to, drive after drink-
ing, though they may not then consider themselves drunk.516 Drunk driving
508. See Civil Society, supra note 23, at 330-35.
509. See id. at 331.
510. Compare supra text accompanying notes 463-96 (radical feminist views), with Jean Hampton,
Correcting the Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1659, 1698-
1702 (making the point that communicative retributivism and liberalism are consistent), and R.A.
DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 41-48 (2001) (fusing liberal and communi-
tarian sources to craft an idea of “political liberal community” and his own variant of communica-
tive retributivism).
511. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (4th ed. 2001).
512. Id.
513. See infra text accompanying notes 514-59
514. See JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 3 (1989).
515. No citation seems necessary for this proposition. I have known a handful of adults who did
not drive by the time that they were college age. Of this handful, all but two—one of them my
mother, the other a colleague at Howard, eventually learned to drive. Both the never-bloomers and
late-bloomers spent most of their lives as residents of New York City, where subway and bus serv-
ices are omnipresent. I suspect that my experience is typical.
516. Cf. Kathy Denton and Dennis Krebs, From the Scene to the Crime: The Effects of Alcohol and So-
cial Context on Moral Judgment, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 242, 247-48 (1990).
When sober, people believe it is wrong to drive impaired. They acknowledge that others
succumb to the temptation but believe they would not. But all this changeswhen they are
out drinking. In social drinking contexts, under the influence of alcohol, people moderate
both their moral convictions against driving while impaired and their judgments about
engaging in this behavior. . . In typical social drinking contexts, moral judgment appears
to be a poor match for habit, convenience, and external behavior cues that favor driving
(the sight of one’s car; other people getting into their cars).
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prohibitions were thus long understood as creating mere “sumptuary” of-
fenses—laws regulating essential personnel expenditures on paternalistic social
or moral grounds, such as “blue laws” prohibiting working on Sundays.517 Sig-
nificant penalties for violating sumptuary laws were long inconsistent with
popular attitudes, leading juries, according to the major study on jury attitudes
of the 1960s, to often acquit drunk drivers who have injured no one.518 Part of
the reason for such attitudes was the perception that “since almost everybody is
doing it [driving drunk], it seems a violation of the principle of evenhanded jus-
tice to single out this particular defendant for prosecution.”519 Another reason
for jury verdicts was jurors’ empathy for accused drunk drivers: “to some extent
the jurors see themselves as on trial but for the grace of God, to some extent the
jury resents the sumptuary interventions, and to some extent the jury objects to
the penalty.”520
In the 1980s, a nationwide campaign against drunk driving began, led by
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).521 That movement led to widespread
enhancement of criminal penalties for, and enforcement efforts against, drunk
driving, combined with educational campaigns about its dangers.522 Yet en-
forcement efforts seem to wax and wane, likely continuing the perception that
there is a low chance of being caught, thus again raising the problem of even-
handed justice.523 Publicly expressed attitudes may have changed many people,
who now, when sober, label drunk driving wrongful behavior.524 These same
people’s attitudes frequently change, however, when they have engaged in so-
cial drinking.525 Furthermore, despite what sober people may say publicly, a re-
cent study found that between 1958 and 1993 jurors’ leniency—that is, their
willingness to acquit—remained substantially unchanged.526 Interestingly, al-
though jurors continue to acquit more frequently than do judges, judicial will-
ingness to acquit has increased since 1958.527
The public does support the criminalization of drunk driving, but this is
likely due to their belief that such punishments aid deterrence and that civil
remedies alone will not do the job.528 Thus one researcher concluded that the
public’s cry for retribution is likely to be considerable when “killer drunks”
cause accidents, partly because the cost of injury is imposed on “innocent” peo-
Id.
517. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 286 & n.2 (1966).
518. See id. at 294-97.
519. Id. at 287.
520. Id. at 296.
521. See GERALD D. ROBIN, WAGING THE BATTLE AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING: ISSUES,
COUNTERMEASURE AND EFFECTIVENESS 8 (1991).
522. See id. at 9-19.
523. See id. at 114-17; Rebecca Snyder Bromley, Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases, Has It
Changed? 1958 Versus 1993, 20 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 27, 32-33 (1996).
524. See Denton and Krebs, supra note 516, at 247.
525. See id. at 247-48.
526. See Bromley, supra note 523, at 52-53.
527. See id. at 52-53.
528. Cf. Brandon K. Applegate et al., Public Support for Drunk-Driving Countermeasures: Social Pol-
icy for Saving Lives, 41 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 171 (2001) (discussing public’s endorsement of legal
deterrence and rehabilitation, while also supporting socially-based interventions).
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ple, who do not drive drunk.529 Similarly, large percentages of the public favor
drunk driving roadblocks to protect public safety.530 Yet substantial percentages
of the public oppose any criminal penalties.531 Large fines were opposed by over
60% of the public.532 Indeed, for every criminal punishment, a “meaningful per-
centage of [survey] respondents opposed its use. Further, as the costs of the
sanction rose, support decreased: large fines and confiscation or impoundment
of the offender’s car—measures that are rather costly to the offender—received
considerably less support than less severe sanctions.”533 The public’s heart likely
hardens a bit when drunk driving results in unsafe driving but hardens sub-
stantially when accident, injuries, or death results.534 But where there are no ill
results, “[t]here seems to be a limit. . .on how far the public wishes to go in the
pursuit of deterrence.”535 On the other hand, there is substantial public support
for psychological treatment for drunk drivers and even stronger support for
spending tax dollars on educational programs and media campaigns.536
The data is admittedly sparse, yet suggests that the public feels little need
for retribution against drunk drivers who cause no injuries. Drunk driving gen-
erally involves the negligent, rather than the knowing or purposeful, creation of
a risk of harm.537 Such soft attitudes toward the crime of drunk driving are con-
sistent with empirical studies and philosophical arguments that negligent con-
duct does and should elicit the most modest of retributive responses.538 Indeed,
significant retributive responses to negligent behavior usually turn on a percep-
tion of an accused’s extreme and callous indifference to human suffering as a
central and relatively consistent aspect of his character.539 Strong retributive
529. See JACOBS, supra note 514, at 4.
530. See id.
531. See id. at 7.
532. Id. at 7.
533. Id. at 9.
534. See id.
535. JACOBS, supra note 514, at 9.
536. See id. at 10.
537. For example, in Pennsylvania, a person commits the offense of driving under the influence
of alcohol if he either: (1) is in physical control of the movement of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving or (2) is in such con-
trol while the amount of alcohol by weight in his blood, if he is an adult, is 0.10% or greater. See 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (2002). Driving while incapable of doing so safely—the first basis for
liability—is obviously a prohibition against careless, that is, “negligent,” driving. Driving when
your blood alcohol level is 0.10% or greater, with no further inquiry, sounds like strict liability: you
are liable even if there is no evidence that your alcohol level impaired your ability to drive safely. A
better reading, however, is that the 0.10% rule is but another form of the negligence requirement be-
cause anyone drinking enough to have so high a blood alcohol level is creating a significant risk of
driving negligently that is not counterbalanced by the social benefits of driving in that condition—a
cost-benefit analysis that is the very definition of negligence. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note
102, at 45-48 (explaining when formally strict liability offenses are substantively negligence offenses).
538. I am not arguing that negligent conduct never elicits strong retributive responses. See Emo-
tions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 45-55 (negligent indifference to a woman’s consent in a rape case
fits secular notions of evil). However, negligence ordinarily elicits a far weaker retributive need than
does, in ascending order of culpability, recklessness, knowledge, or purpose. See Andrew E. Taslitz,
Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 14-16,
20-24 (1993).
539. See Emotions in Date Rape, supra note 102, at 45-55.
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feelings also require a sense that the accused is “Other” than the “good” people
and is garbage or excrement to be cleansed from the body politic.540 Neither
sentiment is likely toward drunk drivers who do no harm. One well-known re-
searcher, attempting to explain the relative lack of scholars’ interest in studying
the problem of drunk driving, put it this way:
A. . .hypothesis to explain lack of criminological interest is that drunk drivers do
not conform to social psychological images of “crime.” There are no ancient
stereotypes of drunk drivers to rival those of murderers, thieves, and terrorists;
in fact, drunk drivers are often depicted as feckless and humorous rather than as
abhorrent and diabolical. A. . .related hypothesis is that drunk drivers do not
conform to sociological images of “criminals.” For the most part, criminology
has taken popular opinion and legislative emphasis on lower-class wrongdoing
as a given. But drunk driving is not a crime associated with the poor and dis-
possessed. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs), drunk driv-
ers have the highest percentage of white offenders (90 percent) of any arrest
group.541
Criminal punishment for drunk driving is thus probably more about deter-
rence than retribution, more about safety than routing evil. As such, drunk
drivers who injure no one likely face little of the sort of extreme social stigma
ordinarily associated with criminal punishment. This conclusion contrasts
sharply with the very different set of public attitudes embraced toward illegal
drug use.
2. Drug Abuse, Stigma and Retribution
The “War on Drugs” sets its sights not only on the sellers of illegal drugs
but also on those who use them.542 The current war is part of a longer histori-
cally cyclical American pattern of tolerance, then intolerance, for drug use.543
The current cycle of intolerance started in the 1970s and has escalated since.544
Leading drug use historian David Musto describes the quality of periods of in-
tolerance thus:
Soon the trend reverses; drug use starts to decline faster and faster. Public
opinion turns against drugs and their acceptability begins to evaporate. Gradu-
ally, drug use becomes associated, truthfully or not, with the lower ranks of so-
ciety, and often with racial and ethnic groups that are feared or despised by the
middle class. Drugs begin to be seen as deviant and dangerous and become a
potent symbol of evil.545
540. See Civil Society, supra note 23, at 355-66.
541. See JACOBS, supra note 514, at xxi.
542. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS
56-59 (1999).
543. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 91-93
(1995).
544. See id. at 92-94.
545. TONRY, supra note 543, at 92-94 (discussing DAVID MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS
OF NARCOTICS CONTROL (exp. ed. 1987)).
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Drug offense sentences have accounted for a substantial portion of the
trebling of the United States’ prison population since 1980.546 New laws and en-
forcement practices foreseeably led to a disproportionate assault on poor mi-
nority communities, for example, because such drug users are the easiest to
catch in the act given that drug sales in poor neighborhoods most often take
place on the street.547 This process in turn reinforced images of crime and crimi-
nals as evil, in part because they are seen as not of “the people” but rather dif-
ferent, outsiders.548
Vilification of drug users is so extreme that scholars have analogized our
treatment of users to the treatment of Jews during Nazi Germany. “[I]llicit drug
users are portrayed as the source of most crime in America.”549 As one Arizona
detective explained, “Drugs, food stamps and guns are synonymous. If you find
one, you’ll find the others.”550 Just as the Nazis labeled Jews disease carriers, so
do we label drug users, “[c]rack-using prostitutes” seen as spreading sexually
transmitted diseases, including the deadly threat of AIDS.551 But mere contact
with users is deadly, even apart from the literal carrying of disease. Former
drug Czar William Bennett explained, “First use invariably involves the free and
enthusiastic offer of a drug by a friend. This friend—or ‘carrier,’ in epidemiol-
ogical terms—is seldom a hard-core addict. . .A non-addict’s drug use, in other
words, is highly contagious.”552 Drug users, like the Jews in Nazi Germany, are
portrayed as sexually loose, often homosexual, and enamored of sexual perver-
sions.553 Drug users are often labeled “crazy,” engaging in “bizarre and fright-
ening behavior,” from staring at the sun until blinded to running naked while
throwing dog feces.554 Drug users are unfit to survive much less flourish, so we
should waste no resources coddling them.555 They are not parents, siblings, or
children; not friends, co-workers, or religious supplicants. They are, instead,
subhuman,556 in the words of former President Reagan, creatures whom “[a]ll
Americans of good will are determined to stamp out. . .[as] parasites.”557 Drug
users, like the Jews portrayed in Nazi propaganda, are “portrayed as an ever-
growing group dangerous to the nation; self-preservation requires a war on
546. See TONRY, supra note 543, at 81-82.
547. See id. at 96-115.
548. Cf. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Criminal
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 858-65 (2000) (drug offenders as “scapegoats” to be banished from
the community).
549. RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, DRUG WARRIORS AND THEIR PREY: FROM POLICE POWER TO
POLICE STATE 16 (1996).
550. KANSAS CITY TIMES, June 17, 1989, A1, A18.
551. MILLER, supra note 549, at 17.
552. Office of National Drug Control Strategy 10-11 (1989); see also DRUG POLICY 1989-1990: A
REFORMER’S CATALOGUE 95 (Arnold S. Tebab & Kevin B. Zeese eds., 1989) (critiquing Bennett’s posi-
tion).
553. See MILLER, supra note 549, at 18-19.
554. Id. at 19.
555. See id. at 21.
556. See id. at 23.
557. RONALD REAGAN, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD
REAGAN (1991).
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them.”558 That war in turn requires ostracizing them, confiscating their property
(forfeiture), and isolating or annihilating them by massively expanding their
lengthy incarceration in prisons and jails.559 In sharp contrast to the public per-
ception of drunk drivers who cause no injuries to others, drug users are viewed
as inherently evil, tainted vermin to be expelled from the body politic.
3. Implications for the Law on Administrative Searches
This difference in the social meaning ascribed to drunk drivers (ordinary
folks with lapsed judgment) and drug abusers (true, dangerous criminals of the
worst sort) may help to explain apparent inconsistencies in the United States
Supreme Court case law distinguishing between administrative and criminal-
investigation-related searches and seizures. Remember that this distinction is
not based on differences in the accused’s subjective mental states but rather on
something else.560
The Court has treated drunk-driving roadblocks as serving a primarily
administrative purpose. This is so even though the very evidence sought to
serve that administrative purpose (protecting public safety) is simultaneously
and necessarily evidence for use in an all-but-inevitable subsequent criminal
DUI prosecution.561 The Court has alleged that the imminence of the danger to
public safety is what establishes the primary purposes’ being administrative.562
But that makes little sense. The immediacy of a danger may have a logical
bearing on the reasonableness of a search, but it does not in any way alter its
purpose. Moreover, many crimes raise grave and imminent dangers to physical
safety (assault, rape, robbery, among many others),563 so that point alone cannot
distinguish administrative from criminal law enforcement purposes. If a
search’s purpose does not turn on a police officer’s subjective intentions, it can
instead best be understood as turning on the wider audience’s—that is, soci-
ety’s—likely perceived intentions, intentions embodied in the commonly under-
stood social function—the social meaning—of the search.564 DUI prosecutions
are not perceived as serving significant retributive functions, so the administra-
tive purpose of protecting against risks to physical safety can be given preemi-
nence.565 On the other hand, the Court recently held in the Edmond case566 that
558. MILLER, supra note 549, at 24.
559. See id. at ix-xi. For a powerful analysis of how the War on Drugs destroys individuals and
families see SASHA ABRAMSKY, HARD TIME BLUES (2002).
560. See supra text accompanying notes 185-212.
561. See supra text accompanying notes 193-205.
562. See supra text accompanying notes 200-202.
563. See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 211-22 (defining assault, rape, robbery, and other crimes in-
volving generally imminent dangers of bodily or serious bodily injuries).
564. Cf. Civil Society, supra note 23, at 330-35 (discussing the importance of exploring likely audi-
ence interpretations of criminal actions as the audience’s probable emotional response while con-
doning such interpretations and responses only when they are consistent with political morality).
565. See supra text accompanying notes 514-41.
566. 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (“Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is society con-
fronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in
Sitz was designed to eliminate,” Id. at 43; however, “the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack . . . .” Id. at
44.) (emphasis added); see also, supra text accompany notes 199-207 (discussing Edmond). But see
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drug interdiction roadblocks serve the primary purpose of serving criminal
prosecution, the Court again partly relying on the flawed no-imminent-danger
distinction. A more persuasive distinction is the greater social opprobrium at-
tached to drug users captured in the War on Drugs.567
The importance of this distinction in social meanings is highlighted by a
comparison to drug courts. These courts offer drug offenders, and sometimes
other sorts of offenders who happen to have a drug problem, the option of par-
ticipating in an intensive court-monitored treatment program rather than the
normal and complete criminal adjudication process.568 Sometimes this option is
offered before a plea (successful treatment resulting in case-dismissal), some-
times post-plea, and sometimes post-trial-conviction but pre-sentence.569 Drug
courts fuse two perspectives on drug use: the moral (drug use is evil) and the
therapeutic (drug use is a disease).570 Drug courts differ from ordinary criminal
courts in being less adversarial, more judicially activist, more reliant on shame
and approval, and deeply interventionist in defendants’ everyday lives.571 These
courts’ stress on therapy makes an accused’s emotivist expression—revealing
the most intimate details of his family background, sexual relations, and emo-
tional life—central to his rehabilitation.572 Correspondingly, it gives courts li-
cense to regulate all the areas of a drug user’s life, sometimes including random
day or nighttime home searches without individualized suspicion.573 The judges
often applaud such searches not only because they deter drug use but also be-
cause they enable the court to undertake other interventions, such as couples
counseling, anger management, parenting classes, and undercutting associations
with the “wrong people.”574 These interventions may extend for long periods of
monitoring—beyond likely prison sentences—where necessary to get a user
“straight.”575 Such all-encompassing “treatment” is neither experienced by the
users as, nor seen by the courts as, truly “voluntary” because a refusal to par-
ticipate means imprisonment.576 The onerous conditions of drug court pro-
grams—far more demanding than ordinary probation—are likewise experi-
enced by accused and court alike as retributive.577
C.S. Lewis, writing in 1953, described extensive “rehabilitative” efforts by
the criminal justice system as anything but true therapy: “The things done to the
criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting imminent physical danger as distin-
guishing drunk driving from drug interdiction roadblocks).
567. See generally MILLER, supra note 549 (analyzing the demonization of drug users in the War
on Drugs).
568. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 5
(2001).
569. See id. at 41.
570. See id. at 15-17.
571. See id. at 63-84.
572. See id. at 170-72, 181-88.
573. See NOLAN, supra note 568, at 202-03.
574. Id. at 203.
575. See id. at 196-98.
576. See id. at 199-201.
577. See id. at 51-57, 170-71; see also Hampton, supra note 510, at 1685, 1687-98 (1992) (discussing
the strong retributive component of forced sex therapy for those convicted of sexual assault).
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the old days when we called them punishments.”578 The American Friends
Service Committee similarly has said: “When we punish the person and simul-
taneously try to treat him, we hurt the individual more profoundly and more
permanently than if we merely imprison him for a specific length of time.”579
C.S. Lewis again cautioned:
[T]hey are not punishing, not inflicting only healing. But do not let us be de-
ceived by a name. To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to
lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern
psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of
“normality” hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed alle-
giance; to know that this process will never end until either my captors have
succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent success—who
cares whether this is called Punishment or not?580
Modern drug courts similarly try to restructure the individual in the image
chosen by the state.581 The bottom line is this: all parties understand that when
the criminal courts enter the picture, retribution and the social stigma associated
with even potential criminal conviction remain central to even the most “thera-
peutic” of programs.582 The police play an especially important symbolic role in
this process. Police serve many functions—order maintenance, citizen assis-
tance, and investigating and prosecuting crime.583 Both because of safety con-
578. C.S. LEWIS, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 224 (June 1953).
579. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 147-48 (1971).
580. LEWIS, supra note 578, at 227.
581. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Court Movement: Revolu-
tionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 439, 522-23 (1999) (generally defending the movement yet acknowledging that drug court “re-
quirements may prove more onerous than the traditional court sanctions for the same offense” and
“generally obligate a defendant to make more frequent court appearances and force the defendant to
undertake forms of treatment which place more burdens on the defendant than normal probation”);
see also, NOLAN, supra note 568, at 194-204 (summarizing ways in which drug courts seek to restruc-
ture the individual).
582. See NOLAN, supra note 568, at 205-06. Nolan posits that,
[A]rguably, the drug legalization debate is best framed according to a just desert under-
standing of the purpose for punishment. From this vantage point, those in favor of legali-
zation view the harsh sentences as disproportional to the offense ofdrug use. Those op-
posed to the legalization of drugs argue that involvement with drugs deserves some form
of criminal sanction. Those in the middle view certain drug offenses (e.g., selling narcotics
to minors) as deserving strict sentences and others (e.g., recreational use of marijuana) as
perhaps warranting no penalty at all. Regardless of one’s position, the questions are still
the same. Are the laws just? Are the sentences proportional to the offense? The contours
of the drug legalization debate, as such, rely on a just desert notion of justice. But the drug
court circumvents the legalization debate altogether. It does not make drug use a wholly
medical matter, because it does not remove the social control of drugs from the legal
world. Rather the therapeutic and legal views are intertwined. The drug courts employ
the knowledge and expertise of the therapeutic worldview, but in the very center of the
criminal adjudication process.
Id.
583. See, e.g., DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 15-35 (1994) (discussing the investigation
and prosecution of crime); SUSAN L. MILLER, GENDER AND COMMUNITY POLICING 99-117 (1999) (ex-
amining citizen assistance); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 23-55 (2001) (discussing the maintaining of order). See generally JAMES
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cerns and the “not-a-true-crime” nature of DUI, police DUI roadblocks can eas-
ily be seen as serving order maintenance and safety protection functions. But
drug interdiction roadblocks are more likely seen as policing serving its function
of aiding in the investigation and potential prosecution of crime, in effect, the
first stop on a road that may lead to the criminal courthouse door.584 If that is
right, then police involvement in a scheme to gather evidence of drug use in a
manner that maximizes the chances of using that evidence in a later criminal
trial; that involves the police in close monitoring of “treatment” programs; and
that threatens criminal prosecution as the penalty for disobedience—all of which
were true in Ferguson585—should carry similar social stigma. There is little to
distinguish the pre-trial coercion of treatment in criminal drug courts from the
pre-trial coerced treatment in Ferguson.
But the stigma affixed to the women’s conduct in Ferguson was amplified
still further because the crimes alleged were not simply drug use but child
abuse.586 That distinction—involving the stigma of violent crimes against one’s
child—implicated a serious breach of our deepest concepts of motherhood.587
That in turn made the retributive purposes of the actual and threatened pun-
ishment associated with the investigatory searches in Ferguson all the more
powerful.
4. Motherhood’s Meaning
To be a mother in our culture is to take upon oneself the obligations of
“preservative love, nurturance, and training” of one’s children as a substantial
life responsibility.588 Preservation of the child’s physical health and security is
historically the preeminent of these demands.589 “A mother who callously en-
dangers her child’s well-being is simply not doing maternal work.”590 Indeed,
when such endangerment is intentional or extreme, the mother becomes a
“monster,” a hideous creature whose very survival endangers all that holds so-
ciety together.591 Children, hearth, and home collapse when a mother fails to fit
her assigned role.
Susan Smith was the classic mother-turned-monster, a “small-town Medea
who could not be allowed to live.”592 In July 1995, Smith, then aged 23, was con-
victed by a South Carolina jury of murdering her two children, three-year-old
LARDNER & THOMAS REPPETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE (2000) (tracing changing functions
and social roles of the police over time in one of America’s premier cities).
584. See supra text accompanying notes 193-205.
585. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing Ferguson case facts).
586. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (summarizing crimes alleged in the Ferguson case).
587. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
588. See SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 17-18 (1995).
589. See id.
590. Id.
591. See EDWARD J. INGEBRETSEN, AT STAKE: MONSTERS AND THE RHETORIC OF FEAR IN PUBLIC
CULTURE 1-17, 99-123 (2001) (defining “monstrosity” and explaining its connection to motherhood).
Ingebretsen continues: “In the emotional shorthand of family values, monstrosity lurks, particularly,
in those who repudiate gender or fail it—the homosexual or the bad mother.” Id. at 121; see also
Kennedy, supra note 548, at 835-45, 858-68 (2000) (arguing that retributive punishment promotes so-
cial solidarity under modern circumstances by marking criminals as “monsters”).
592. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 591, at 99.
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Michael and fourteen-month-old Alex.593 Nine months earlier, Smith had told
police officers that an African-American male forced her out of her car at gun-
point, kidnapping her two children and stealing her car.594 Nine days later she
confessed to strapping the boys into the car and rolling it into a nearby lake.595
The media described her act as “unspeakable,” arguably because it of-
fended our view of children as symbols of the very reason for the existence of
culture and family and of the home as a “haven for domestic virtue.”596 One
scholar summarized the public’s reaction:
Numerous reports vented upon the question, “Why does a mother kill her
child?” “A shocked South Carolina town asks: “Why?” intoned the USA Today.
A woman interviewed on NPR says, “I just can’t imagine any mother doing
that.” In some disheartening way, as the narrative cycle concluded in the July,
1995 trial, it seemed clear that the story line was ideologically directed to make
such statements possible. . .One headline asked, or rather declared, “Mothers
Wonder: How?” Another report notes that Smith (and Pauline Zile [another
mom who killed her children]) will suffer “great pain”—not primarily for the
deaths of their children but, in addition, for charges even more daunting than
these. The two women are guilty of “betraying motherhood,” indeed, but also
of betraying the “rest of the country,” and, finally, for “all the frightened little
children who will be lost or kidnapped from now on.”597
Pregnant addicts, like the women in Ferguson, are not seen as much better
than baby killers like Susan Smith.598 Political scientist Iris Marion Young ex-
plains:
The level of passion directed against pregnant addicts often seems higher than
that felt for most ordinary criminals. It is not just anyone who has harmed her
baby as, for example, by shooting it up with cocaine. It is the child’s mother. The
mother is supposed to be the one who sacrifices herself, who will do anything
for her child, who will preserve and nurture it. That’s what mothering means.
The rage directed at pregnant addicts unconsciously recalls the feeling that we
all had as children of rage toward our mothers who were not always there for
us, did not always respond to our needs and desires, and sometimes pursued
their own purposes and desires. The mother who harms her child is not merely
a criminal; she is a monster.599
The stigmatizing rage felt toward pregnant mothers is enhanced when
those mothers are black.600 Black women are disproportionately more likely than
593. Id. at 101.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 102.
597. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 591, at 104.
598. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 77-80 (1997) (explaining that, and why it is so).
599. Id. at 77-78.
600. See id. at 78. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV L. REV. 1419 (1991) (focusing especially on the pol-
icy implications of race intersecting with drug-addicted motherhood). For a more general analysis
of the stigmatization of black women more broadly, and black motherhood specifically, see MICHAEL
PORTER, THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY BLACK WOMEN (2001).
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white women to be in a lower economic class, bringing them more frequently
into contact with state institutions so that they will more probably be punished
than will be whites.601 Black motherhood has from the dawn of the republic been
devalued in the white mind.602 “In the tradition of American racial attitudes, all
black women are by definition not ‘good’ mothers, and it would be best if they
did not bear children at all.”603 Black mothers, like the women in Ferguson, al-
ready bear a stigmatic mark by nature of their skin color.604 Black pregnant drug
addicts, again like those in Ferguson, confirm by their conduct the white as-
sumption that black mothers are inherently unworthy: natural criminals.
The combination, therefore, of race, class, breached motherly obligations,
extensive police involvement directed toward prosecution, and the women’s
being charged with the “true” crime of drug abuse carried a powerful social
message that the drug testing and treatment program in Ferguson had the pri-
mary “programmatic” purpose of marking the pregnant patients as criminal
suspects rather than as subjects of the state’s administrative goals of patient
safety and health.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ferguson case is best understood in the light of feminist theory con-
cerning consent and social meaning. Feminist consent theory reveals the im-
portance of a variable notion of consent sensitive to the relative power imbal-
ances between the parties. Moreover, the idea of consent is a robust one,
requiring more than simple “voluntariness.” Consent must also be meaning-
fully knowing and intelligent.605 But even voluntariness, feminists teach, re-
quires far more protection than the absence of actual or threatened physical or
mental torture. Coercive offers taking advantage of relationships of dependence
and trust are involuntary.606 In Ferguson, physicians took advantage of their
poverty stricken patients’ trust and need to obtain their uninformed agreement
to certain medical tests. These physicians then used those tests to give the pa-
tients offers they could not refuse: mandatory, involuntary therapy or prison.607
That is not a “consensual” choice.
This feminist analysis raises broader questions, however, of the wisdom of
current consent doctrine. Granted, ordinary police encounters with suspects on
streets or buses do not involve the sort of relationship of physician-patient trust
present in Ferguson. Nevertheless, there is hardly an absence of power imbal-
ances (favoring the state) or implicit coercion in such everyday police-citizen
601. See YOUNG, supra note 598, at 78.
602. See id.
603. See id.
604. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 125-64 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997)
(tracing various ways in which our culture stigmatizes black motherhood).
605. See supra Part IV (summarizing feminist consent theory).
606. See supra text accompanying notes 281-87 (discussing feminist notions of voluntariness and
the importance of threats and coercive offers).
607. See supra text accompanying notes 36-61 (summarizing the Ferguson facts and analyzing
their significance).
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interactions.608 Nor can the existence of some measure of knowing awareness of
the right to say “no” or intelligent appreciation of the consequences of agreeing
to a search be entirely ignored in any rational definition of “consent.”609 Perhaps
“consent” does not identify a one-size-fits-all concept, but neither does it justify
equating itself with mere voluntariness, and a weak form of voluntariness at
that.
Feminist social meaning theory offers for the first time a coherent way to
distinguish between administrative and criminal-investigation-related
searches.610 The Court has said that “programmatic administrative purposes,”
not subjective desires, identify a search as “administrative.”611 Yet the irrele-
vance of subjective purposes skirts this question: what is the alternative? The
most plausible perception of the audience at which a suspicionless or low suspi-
cion search is aimed is an alternative, “objective” way to identify a search’s
“programmatic” purpose. “Plausible perceptions” can include the idea of social
meaning.612 Drunk driving is technically a crime, but where no person or prop-
erty is harmed, it neither elicits significant public demands for retribution nor
significantly stigmatizes a guilty party’s name.613 But drug abusers are perceived
as evil social infections to be purged from the body politic.614 Mothers who
abuse their children are considered particularly reprehensible, and this con-
demnation is magnified for poor black women.615 Searches of pregnant black
drug addicts for evidence of drug abuse presumed harmful to their soon-to-be-
born children thus carry the kind of status diminishing stigma associated with
ensnarement in the criminal justice system. Such searches are thus best seen as
being done for the purposes of criminal rather than administrative prosecution.
Although the Court has labeled several types of searches for evidence of drug
abuse “administrative,” none of these searches carried the additional stigma of
breached maternal obligation, child abuse, and racial and class criminality
stereotyping.616 These are distinctions in social meaning that help to reconcile
the apparent inconsistencies in the doctrine.
Nevertheless, a social meaning focus can also call the wisdom of existing
doctrine into question. Pressing need, such as avoiding train accidents by
608. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 27-34 (2001) (describing the power imbalances in ordi-
nary “consensual” searches).
609. See supra text accompanying notes 288-99 (discussing importance of information and under-
standing to consent).
610. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing significance of social meaning theory for administrative
searches summarized).
611. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-84.
612. See supra text accompanying notes 463-500.
613. See supra Part V.B.1 (discussing minimal social stigma from drunk driving absent injury or
accidents).
614. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing how drug abusers today face extreme social ostracism and
stigmatization).
615. See supra text accompanying notes 600-04 (discussing public images of pregnant black
women).
616. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 349-70 (summarizing administrative search cases up to
1997); ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, 2001 SUPPLEMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 26-40 (2001) (summarizing administrative search cases between and including 1997 and
2001).
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stoned engineers, can justify compromising the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements, even for ordinary criminal searches, as the Court recognized in cre-
ating the “stop-and-frisk” on mere reasonable suspicion doctrine in Terry v.
Ohio.617 But the presumption favoring some sort of individualized suspicion re-
quirement is apparently harder to overcome, and certainly should be harder, in
criminal searches than in administrative ones.618 Searches for drug abuse by
suspects who are not pregnant still may carry a significant criminalizing social
stigma.619 To declare such searches “administrative” too easily minimizes their
regulation.620 If they are instead located within the Terry criminal case reason-
ableness-balancing methodology, that should at least favor significant evidence of
a drug problem that actually imminently endangers safety before individualized
suspicion can be entirely abandoned.621 Thus a case like Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass’n,622 in which there was a proven record of intoxication by safety-
sensitive personnel, thus endangering passengers and crew, might still sensibly
merit a random, suspicionless drug testing program.623 But a case like National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,624 in which there was no equivalent evi-
dence concerning U.S. Customs Service employees, would no longer make
sense.625 In any event, a social meaning inquiry more keenly highlights the costs
and benefits of searches in a way that should improve the rationality of the rea-
sonableness balancing that the Fourth Amendment requires.626 It reminds us, as
does the best of feminist theory, that human emotion, social status, and political
and economic power must be taken into account if the law is to achieve both the
appearance and reality of justice.627
617. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
618. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) (“We are particularly reluc-
tant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental
authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.”). The Court’s recent decision in Board
of Educ. v. Earls further supports this conclusion. 2002 U.S. Lexis 4882. There, in the context of up-
holding a school district’s drug-testing program for all students participating in extracurricular ac-
tivities, including random drug-testing, the Court emphasized that there is no irreducible Fourth
Amendment individualized suspicion requirement in the context of special needs searches involving
health and safety. See id. For more details on Earls, see supra note 210.
619. See supra text accompanying notes 542-59.
620. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 349-70 (discussing the significance of categorizing a
search as “administrative”).
621. See id. at 318-70 (comparing Terry line of cases with those under the administrative search
doctrine).
622. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
623. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 364-65 (analyzing Skinner).
624. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
625. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 365-66 (analyzing Von Raab). Post-Ferguson, the Court
majority apparently continues to disagree with me on this point. See Board of Educ. v. Earls, 2002
U.S. Lexis 4882 at *26 (stressing, in relying in part on Von Raab, that evidence demonstrating a drug
abuse problem is not always necessary to the validity of a testing regime, though finding—as the
dissenting Justices did not—ample evidence of such a problem to “shore up the need for. . . [a] drug
testing program”).
626. See id. at 150-57 (discussing cost-benefit analysis required by Fourth Amendment “reason-
ableness” balancing).
627. See generally What Feminism, supra note 22 (summarizing basic tenets of feminist legal theory
while illustrating their application to evidence rules at criminal trials).
